Thesis icon

Thesis

Conceivability and metaphysical possibility

Abstract:

David Chalmers maintains that certain kinds of conceivability are reliable guides to metaphysical possibility. In this essay, I argue that Chalmers is wrong about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. I begin by explaining the notion of metaphysical possibility and by distinguishing it from those of other kinds of so-called possibility (including epistemic, logical, conceptual, physical, and natural possibility). I then explain Chalmers’s view on the relatio...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Magdalen College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Supervisor
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2008
Type of award:
BPhil
Level of award:
Bachelors
Awarding institution:
Oxford University, UK
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:fdc3935c-1529-4140-9ee1-0c43edb513aa
Local pid:
ora:10128
Deposit date:
2015-02-19

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP