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Working paper

Information design in coalition formation games

Abstract:

I examine a setting, where an information sender conducts research into a payoff-relevant state variable, and releases information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents’ actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The sender, who has commitment power, by designing an information mechanism (a set of signals and a probability distribution over them), maximises his payoff, which depends on the action taken by the agents, and the state variable. I show that the coali...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.2139/ssrn.2987779

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
St Edmund Hall
Role:
Author
Publisher:
SSRN Publisher's website
Pages:
Article: 28.2017
Series:
FEEM Working Paper
Host title:
FEEM Working Papers
Publication date:
2017-06-16
Acceptance date:
2017-05-28
DOI:
Source identifiers:
931021
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:931021
UUID:
uuid:f9f6da22-48b1-4de5-a0b2-6ff9a93248e7
Local pid:
pubs:931021
Deposit date:
2019-07-25

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