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Thesis

The politics of judicial review in inter-war Europe

Abstract:

Why do some politicians choose to tie their own hands by empowering courts to review the constitutionality of legislation? This is a persistent question in judicial politics. According to a popular rational choice theory, politicians accept judicial constraints on their power because they seek “insurance” against costs they might incur during future periods in opposition. Hence, the key variable favouring support for judicial review is electoral alternation.

This theory fails to e...

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Division:
SSD
Department:
Politics & Int Relations
Oxford college:
Wolfson College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Politics & Int Relations
Sub department:
Politics & Int Relations
Oxford college:
Nuffield College
Role:
Supervisor
ORCID:
0000-0002-9617-478X
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Politics & Int Relations
Sub department:
Politics & Int Relations
Oxford college:
Nuffield College
Role:
Supervisor
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford

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