Journal article
Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games
- Abstract:
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Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium, but in some situations convergence fails. Existing research studies the problem of equilibrium convergence in classes of games with special properties. Here we take a different approach, conventional in ecology and in other natural sciences: we generate payoff matrices at random to c...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Version of record, pdf, 927.6KB)
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- uuid:e151f3ee-1c33-431b-a52d-6630368557e6
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Authors
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- American Association for the Advancement of Science Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Science Advances Journal website
- Volume:
- 5
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- eaat1328
- Publication date:
- 2019-02-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-12-07
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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2375-2548
- Source identifiers:
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951471
Item Description
- Pubs id:
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pubs:951471
- UUID:
-
uuid:e151f3ee-1c33-431b-a52d-6630368557e6
- Local pid:
- pubs:951471
- Deposit date:
- 2018-12-11
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Pangallo et al
- Copyright date:
- 2019
- Notes:
- © 2019 The Authors, some rights reserved; exclusive licensee American Association for the Advancement of Science. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License 4.0 (CC BY-NC). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, so long as the resultant use is not for commercial advantage and provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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