Journal article
Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
- Abstract:
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This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable payoffs. This result is related to the ratchet effect in that: (1) a type imitating a less productive type receives an information rent and (2) with full separation, one imitating a more productive type rece...
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- Publication status:
- Accepted
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Wiley Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Econometrica
- Acceptance date:
- 2015-07-28
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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1468-0262
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- Keywords:
- UUID:
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uuid:d5c8a15f-1d28-4d57-9f16-531e2e15d5ea
- Deposit date:
- 2015-11-18
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- Copyright date:
- 2015
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