Journal article icon

Journal article

Learning by doing, precommitment and infant industry promotion

Abstract:

We examine the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a two-period Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing. The inability of firms and governments to precommit to future actions encourages strategic behaviour which justifies an optimal first-period export tax relative to the profit-shifting benchmark of an export subsidy. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with government precommitment but decreas...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Publisher copy:
10.1111/1467-937X.00094

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University College Dublin
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Research group:
Industrial Economics
Oxford college:
Merton College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Blackwell Publishing Publisher's website
Journal:
Review of Economic Studies Journal website
Volume:
66
Issue:
2
Pages:
447-474
Publication date:
1999-04-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-937X
ISSN:
0034-6527
URN:
uuid:cbc675b5-4bbc-4c19-92e5-f9d9940788ce
Local pid:
ora:2138
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP