Journal article
Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
- Abstract:
-
This paper extends Levin's (2003) relational contract model by having not only the agent's cost of effort (agent's type), but also the value of that effort to the principal (principal's type) subject to i.i.d. shocks. When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types for multiple principal types, it is also pooled across those principal types. When optimal effort separates some agent types for multiple principal types, efforts of those agent types may be separated across principal types....
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.004
- Publication website:
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000913
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Authors
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Volume:
- 92
- Pages:
- 122–137
- Acceptance date:
- 2015-06-11
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0899-8256
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- UUID:
-
uuid:c1751a5f-7a75-4b66-821b-ad5c8194fa22
- Deposit date:
- 2015-06-26
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