Symbolic and Ideological Representation in National Parliaments

A Cross-National Comparison of the Representation of Women, Ethnic Groups, and Issue Positions in National Parliaments

Didier Ruedin,
Wolfson College

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<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Advanced industrial countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSES</td>
<td>Comparative Study of Electoral Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mj</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Multi-member district</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>Mixed-member majoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Mixed-member proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Representation score</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Single-member district</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Value Survey</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the great advances in the last century was the radical expansion of citizenship: the view that all humans are essentially equal. This argument of justice is well reflected in the mantra of *one person one vote*, with inclusiveness being a fundamental criterion for democracy (Dahl, 1985). However, despite these advances, ideals of equality are far from accomplished. In some places, women and ethnic minority groups remain systematically marginalized and under-represented in national parliament. This is problematic because the level of representation of women and minority groups in national parliaments is indicative of their status in society.

Representation in national parliaments is also sought for different reasons. It is sometimes argued that women or ethnic minorities have distinctive interests, and on this ground, their inclusion in parliaments is vital to accommodate these interests. Examples include birth control for women, or issues of land resources that may affect certain ethnic minority groups. The argument put forward is that such issues are not representable by anyone not directly affected. Although this contention is in many cases controversial, representation is thought to ensure that these particularized interests can be defended in parliament.

Parliamentary representation is also sought because of legitimacy and accountability. Where certain views or groups are excluded from processes of decision-making, the power held by such institutions is sometimes questioned as illegitimate. Accordingly, an institution consisting only of men, or one
where only left-wing ideas are present, for instance, is seen as deviating from the ideal of inclusiveness to the extent that its legitimacy is questioned. Going back to Rousseau, this view is rooted in the ideals of direct democracy, and representation in parliaments is regarded as entrusting someone else with one’s rightful privileges and rights to take part in decision-making processes. What all the outlined views share is the importance given to the representativeness of parliaments. In order to achieve the goal of higher levels of representation in parliament, it is necessary to understand which factors are associated with under-representation.

The starting point of this project is the vastly different levels of representation in national parliaments. Representation is approached in terms of the representation of women, ethnic groups, as well as policy issues. I refer to the representation of women and ethnic groups as symbolic representation, and use the term ideological representation for the representation of policy positions and issue preferences in different domains. In order to establish the contributing factors for higher levels of representation, it is first necessary to outline different conceptions of representation. On this basis, it is possible to establish the levels of representation in different current legislatures. The first research question that follows is: How can we explain differences in the levels of representation? In other words, applied to the specific forms of representation examined in this project: What factors are associated with levels of gender representation, ethnic group representation, and ideological representation in different domains?

In this project, institutional, cultural, and other factors are considered as contributors to the different levels of representation observed. Very broadly, institutional factors refer to aspects of the electoral system, whereas cultural variables capture the prevalent attitudes towards women and ethnic minority groups in different societies. Unfortunately in the existing literature cultural factors are often ignored or only included as an after-thought, this despite the recognition that attitudes in the population towards women and minority
groups may be substantial in shaping the level of representation in national parliaments. Part of this thesis is dedicated to exploring the influence and possible interdependence between cultural and institutional factors for representation. The intuition is that the effects of institutional factors may be limited if not accompanied by analogous cultural attitudes. The anticipated role of institutional, cultural, and other variables is further developed in a theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. By considering both institutional and cultural factors, the project is also able to examine whether current approaches to improve levels or representations—principally by means of quotas—are an effective means to this end.

When talking about representation, it is necessary to recognize that political representation is multifaceted and multidimensional. In the following pages, the representation of women and ethnic minority groups is equally examined as that of policy positions. Indeed, the relationships between the different forms of representation are of key interest, and this project examines whether there are factors that are associated with higher levels of representation in all cases, or whether there is a trade-off between different forms of representation. With an eye on electoral engineering, it is particularly interesting to determine whether improving one kind of representation necessarily comes at the cost of another, or whether different forms of representation can be reconciled, or can even be mutually supportive. The guiding research question is: How are levels of representation in different forms linked? In other words, applied to the specific forms of representation examined in this project: What are the relationships between levels of gender representation, ethnic group representation, and ideological representation in different domains?

The different forms of representation are examined in more detail in chapter 2. The project focuses on symbolic representation—concerned with demographically defined groups, particularly women and ethnic groups—and ideological representation—linked to policy preferences. Symbolic representation is asso-
associated with group rights, an aspect of citizenship more commonly recognized and emphasized in recent years. In free societies where all citizens are considered equal, everyone has the same right to representation. Consequently, the under-representation of certain groups is an issue concerning the legitimacy of the parliament in question.

At the same time, it is often argued that ideological representation is what voters care about (Darcy et al., 1994). The focus in this case is on the role of parliament in policymaking: either actively in creating policies, or passively as watchdogs of the government. The intuition is that voters care about their interests, and are concerned with how well the representatives in parliament defend their policy preferences. In this sense, however, in some cases ideological representation may not be enough: The presence of like-minded members of parliament does not guarantee their active involvement in processes of policymaking.

For this reason, performative representation is of interest: It would be interesting to know what members of parliament actually do. However, performative aspects of representation are beyond the scope of this project for a number of reasons. The biggest challenge is the lack of adequate data in many countries—the voting patterns of members of parliament are commonly used. However, voting patterns in parliament might not be the best indication of performative representation, since a parliamentarian may have an impact on a particular bill through discussions and arguments put forward in select committees even in places where party discipline encourages him or her to vote differently. What is more, the impact of policies is also shaped by factors outside the parliament, such as large businesses, the media, or government committees. The result is that a proper examination of performative representation is highly complex to capture empirically.

Moreover, focusing on performative representation would imply that parliaments are purely a tool for policymaking. Different conceptions would be dis-
regarded, such as the importance of the representation of women and ethnic minorities in parliament as a sign of justice and the equality of citizens. Following this argument, the presence in parliaments is sometimes regarded as intrinsically valuable, whilst other contributions focus on the symbolic value of inclusion, and women and ethnic minorities as role models for future generations.

The systematic analysis of parliamentary representation in this project does not assume a purely utilitarian view reducing the role of parliament to policymaking. Political representation is rooted in concerns of justice, going back to Rousseau: the equality of citizens is highlighted, with the view that parliament should mirror the citizens as well as possible—creating a microcosm. Consequently, this project includes different conceptualizations of representation: Both symbolic and ideological forms of representation are considered. Following this focus on justice, the project presumes meaningful and competitive elections, with the result that presence in parliament is linked to power. In some places this fundamental assumption of justice is violated, such as in repressive regimes (de Rezende Martins, 2004; Matland, 2006; Baldez, 2006; Khan, 2007). In such countries, the dynamics related to political representation may differ significantly (Yoon, 2004). I circumvent these issues by excluding unfree countries in the empirical analyses. The analyses in this project are based on the 131 countries classified as free or partly free by Freedom House (2006).¹

There are a number of themes in this project. One is the role of different forms of political representation. The role of institutional and cultural factors in explaining different levels of representation is another recurring topic, as is their possible interaction. Even though in the literature institutional factors are the

¹ There is an inherent difficulty in classifying regimes into free and unfree, because many regimes are in fact hybrid cases (Diamond, 2002); a fact reflected by the concept of partly free in the Freedom House classifications.
most commonly used explanation, in this project cultural variables are included in a systematic manner. Only by so doing can the relative importance of cultural factors be appraised, and with that can the effectiveness of introduced measures be examined, such as that of quotas.

The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the different conceptualizations of representation. This builds up to a theoretical framework of parliamentary representation, from which a series of hypotheses are derived. This framework is not intended to provide a unifying theory, but is a tool to bring together the different, separate facets of political representation. It helps to identify the factors associated with different levels of representation, but might also be useful to recognize potential linkages between different forms of representation. With that, both research questions are addressed. The hypotheses that are derived from the framework build the basis for the empirical chapters: Gender representation is examined in chapter 4, ethnic group representation in chapter 5, chapter 6 is concerned with ideological representation, whilst chapter 7 is dedicated to the relationships between different forms of representation. The empirical chapters also deal with subject-specific literature and previous results. Possible contributing factors that could not be included in the empirical analyses are discussed in the concluding part, making sure that a more complete picture of representation is presented. With that, limits to electoral engineering are discussed in the light of institutional and cultural influences on levels of representation.
Chapter 2

Theory and Hypotheses

Although the concept of political representation is commonly used in the literature (Birch, 1971; Eulau & Wahlke, 1978; Blondel et al., 1997; Brennan & Hamlin, 1999; Miller et al., 1999), its exact meaning is rarely examined in detail. By looking at the concept in detail, it quickly becomes clear that there is no single understanding (Pitkin, 1967; Brennan & Hamlin, 1999). Being the central concept in this project, in this chapter the different conceptions of representation are unpacked. This allows forming judgements about the importance of certain forms of representation, and informing the theoretical framework by highlighting different underlying factors that should be considered. In order to understand what political representation means, it is necessary to look at some of the underlying concepts and the theoretical background. By doing this, the theoretical groundwork for the remainder of the thesis is laid. The objectives for this chapter are to:

- Provide a definition of political representation
- List and discuss different understandings of representation
- Outline a theoretical framework of political representation as a tool to bring together different facets of representation
- Derive generic hypotheses from this framework

In order to achieve these objectives, the components of the concept representation are carefully unpacked. By looking at the different components of the concept, links to more general philosophical issues become apparent. It is
necessary to examine these underlying aspects in order to illuminate the meaning of representation in full. This discussion makes it clear that there are different conceptions of representation, which are examined in a census of different forms of representation. As a result, it is possible to delimit the scope of this project further.

In order to examine the underlying aspects of representation, first, the role of representatives is investigated, and then the kinds of characteristics to represent on are examined further. Having established how and what to represent, this chapter also addresses the question of whom the representatives should represent. This discussion on the nature of representation builds towards a theoretical framework, but also helps to select the forms of representation most relevant for the empirical chapters. The framework itself is a new synthesis of previous contributions, and forms the basis for the empirical analyses in the chapters that follow. Whilst it works towards integrating different facets of representation, the framework does not attempt to provide a comprehensive theory: It is a tool to bring together the different facets and most importantly to inform generic hypotheses. Drawing on the theoretical grounding presented, these generic hypotheses complete the chapter. In the empirical chapters, these hypotheses are picked up and made more specific for the particular form of representation examined. To start with, however, it is necessary to provide a working definition of representation.

What is Representation?

Representation in general can be defined as meaning “to be present on behalf of someone else who is absent” (Britannica, 2006a). When applied to the context of politics, the general view is not much different: “The idea that people, while not in person present at the seat of government are to be considered present by proxy” (Ford, 1925, p.3). Representation thus requires the following: a person or group of persons that should be present, and a person or group of
persons to take their place instead. This process implies a specific purpose for which representation takes place (Fairlie, 1940a, 1940b).

Components of Representation

The classic view of representation starts with citizens who deserve a voice: sovereign citizens. The fundamental moral principle is that the preferences of the citizens should ultimately prevail. However, for practical or other reasons, the sovereign citizens cannot be present at a place, and consequently they elect representatives to look out for their substantive interests (Ford, 1925; Pitkin, 1967; Nordlinger, 1968; Rehfeld, 2006). The classical view thus includes the citizens, a means of selection, and representatives who defend the interests of the citizens. Most classical contributions to political representation emphasize the representation of policy preferences, but the general argument equally applies to the representation of women and ethnic groups.

Rehfeld (2006) attempted to untangle the components of representation in more detail. First, he highlighted the need for a situation that calls for representation. Not all political institutions need to represent citizens. Second, there needs to be what he calls a qualified set: those who are eligible to be elected. In the context of elections, the qualified set consists of the candidates. Third, a certain decision rule is needed, in order to choose from the qualified set. The decision rule can be an electoral formula such as the majority rule, but also includes appointment. The choosing itself is done by the selection agents: those eligible to decide. In democratic societies, the selection agents tend to be the citizens, but this is not necessarily the case. For example, a US ambassador is not elected but appointed by the president (LBJ, 2006). In other cases, it is the monarch who chooses who is to represent the people.

Finally, Rehfeld underlines the fact that a representative needs to be recognized as such by the specific audience. A contested election result illustrates this point well. For example, in spring 2006, the parliament of the Solomon Is-
lands elected Snyder Rini as prime minister. This choice was not accepted by some of the more vocal citizens, resulting in riots (BBC, 2006). The subsequent choice of Manasseh Sogavare was accepted, and only he became a proper representative. However, even with riots at home, a person could act as a representative of a country in front of the UN assembly, for example, if the UN accepts the sent representative (Rehfeld, 2006). This illustrates that legitimacy plays a central role in representation: Where legitimacy is absent, representation cannot really take place.

Many accounts of political representation include an explicit or implicit description of the morally desirable outcome of a representative relationship. Almost all accounts agree that the representatives should act for those they represent. There is, however, disagreement over how much leeway a representative has in this function: the extent to which he or she can use his or her own judgement of what acting for means. In a similar vein, there is no agreement as to who can reasonably represent whom. For example, there is no agreement whether a man can ever really represent a woman. On the one hand, it is argued that interests and opinions are separate entities from one’s demographic attributes (Wittman, 1990; Katz, 1997; Fearon, 1999; Dalton, 2002). On the other hand, it is argued that some aspects of being a woman or being a black person cannot be represented by a person who does not share this attribute (Arscott, 1995; Allwood & Wadia, 2004). Whilst the former approach focuses on different worldviews, the latter focuses on the experience of life for people with a given attribute.

To make matters more complicated, the interests of individuals can rarely be said to be singular. Together with different social roles as well as different and multiple identities come different needs and interests (Squires, 1996; Andrews et al., 2003). For example, a person’s interests as a car driver may differ from that of the same person as an employee, or as a grandparent. For all different roles, there are separate political interests that may not agree. When faced with
the task of choosing a representative, these differing interests may complicate matters, since voters are normally only allowed a single vote. Most contributions to political representation ignore such cross-pressures, or assume the primacy of certain political domains.

Linked with multiple interests is, to a certain extent, the question whether citizens really know best. Again, the literature does not agree (Baum, 2002). On the one hand, citizens are regarded as independent and able individuals, capable of judging their own needs and desires better than anyone else can judge (Williams, 1995; Thompson, 2001). Theodore Roosevelt summed up this view in the following way: “The majority of the plain people will day in day out make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than any smaller body of men will make in trying to govern them” (cited in Barber, 2003, p.261).

On the other hand, the view that citizens are not very capable of knowing or expressing their priorities is also common (Ross, 1943; Schumpeter, 1996 [1976]; Dunn, 1999; Lutz, 2003; Eichenberg, 2007; Kuklinski & Peyton, 2007). The concept of guardianship is often cited as a reason for disregarding the wishes of citizens. Guardianship emphasizes the common good beyond the grasp of the ordinary person. Rather than following the wishes of the citizens, a select group of guardians leads the people (Dahl, 1989). The guardians are distinct mostly by their ability to see the common good and to lead the masses. Consequently, the focus is on the ability of the guardians, and not on how well they reflect the citizens. The two conceptions of the role of government thus aspire to different representative relationships. A government responsive to the wishes of the citizens is only aspired to by one of the camps: The guardians focus on the need to select those most able to lead the country (Ross, 1945; Dalton, 1985; Dahl, 1989).

The distinction between representation as a mirror and representation as guardianship, however, is not mutually exclusive. The argument that the government should be responsive to the needs and wishes of the citizens and re-
flecting the composition of society does not contradict the view that the most able individuals should become representatives. What is necessary to make the two views compatible, is agreement that not all characteristics of the wider population need to be represented. For example, not many would consider it desirable for the government to be run partly by illiterates (Dunn, 1999; Rankin, 1999; Mansbridge, 2005). The claim that the representatives should mirror the population may appeal even to those insisting on guardianship, provided it is limited to the extent that it does not contradict the selection of individuals qualified for the work as parliamentarians. However, by declaring a limited mirror as normatively desirable, it is not clear in what dimensions the mirror should work: what characteristics should be represented. Most of the literature is quiet on this subject.

The concepts of guardianship, sovereign citizens, and multiple interests are picked up for further examination in some of the subsequent sections. By looking at the components of representation, however, links to more fundamental philosophical concepts became apparent. Since they help untangle and frame the concept of representation, it is these philosophical concepts that are now examined more closely. By looking at these underlying concepts, differences and similarities between forms of representation are accentuated.

**Underlying Concepts**

One such underlying concept is the concept of *equality*. It is implicit in the view that citizens are sovereign, meaning that all citizens are considered to be of equal worth. A consequence is that all citizens should be eligible to vote, as well as to stand for election (Rehfeld, 2006). Interestingly, little attention is normally paid to the boundaries of citizenship. The very concept of citizenship is of exclusive nature: rights and responsibilities for those of the population fulfilling certain criteria. Historically, citizenship was much more limited than it is today (Cotteret & Émeri, 1980; Crouch, 1999; Smith, 2002a; Rabb &
From a local state of affairs in ancient Greece, citizenship gradually evolved into the national form we know today. A national focus, however, does not necessarily mean that everyone in a country is considered a citizen. Only in the 20th century have the concepts of citizenship and nationality become largely interchangeable, although the existence of underclasses highlights that citizenship makes people equals on paper only (Gosewinkel, 2002; Smith, 2002b; Lewis, 2004).

Equality of citizens, however, is not a prerequisite for representative government to be implemented. In Britain, for example, university graduates enjoyed a second vote before 1949 (Hermet et al., 1978). Similarly, in most countries prisoners are denied the vote (Birch, 1971), even though they are expected to recognize the outcomes of elections as legitimate without having had a chance to influence the outcome. In this context, it may be useful to emphasize that the concept of citizenship is not limited to voting (franchise), but is also about participation in civic society. Modern conceptions of citizenship do not insist on active participation, and consequently the two concepts have become very similar (Gosewinkel, 2002; Lewis, 2004; Britannica, 2006b). Where the assumption of the equality of citizens is violated, the legitimacy of a representative government can be questioned, such as in cases where members of certain minority groups are hindered from registering to vote.

Based on the view that citizens are essentially equals is the concept of social justice. Just like the argument that all people have the same right to representation, social justice is normally understood to apply only within the boundaries of a group or nation-state (Franck, 1990; Turner, 2002; Caney, 2005). Whereas equality is about the character of social relations, justice is concerned with the quality of these relations. There are, however, different principles of social justice that can be applied to political representation. On the one hand, there are principles of distributive justice, as championed by Rawls (1999). On the other hand, there is Young (1990) arguing for what she calls a justice of difference.
Rawls’ approach regards justice as fairness, and it is based on a thought experiment involving rational actors. The experiment places everyone in society behind what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance where people are unaware of and unable to determine their characteristics, such as class, age, or gender. Placed behind this veil of ignorance, people are asked to distribute goods. Rawls argues that it is rational for people to distribute the good in a way advantageous to the most disadvantaged group, just in case one’s characteristics mean that one belongs to this group (Rawls, 1999). Justice therefore means fairness: People are not discriminated against because of irrelevant criteria such as skin colour or age.

Young’s (1990) argument, on the other hand, contradicts both the logic and consequences of Rawls’ approach. Young focuses on domination and oppression as the basis of injustice. Groups are regarded as oppressed if they are exploited—in a Marxian way—, marginalized and powerless because they cannot take part in decision-making, subject to cultural imperialism, or suppressed by means of coercion or violence. The concept of cultural imperialism, as used by Young, refers to the universalization of the views of the dominant group. Justice is therefore achieved only where all voices can be heard, no matter how dominant one group may be. In contrast to Rawls’ approach to justice, Young’s argument has clear normative implications on political representation. Whereas Rawls’ theory pays attention to the outcome of policymaking, Young’s approach includes an unmistakable claim that all minority groups should be present in parliament.

Most accounts of political representation assume democracy. Whilst democracy might be the preferred means of selecting representatives, it is by no means the only one (Pennock, 1968; Rehfeld, 2006). The appointment of ambassadors to

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2 I follow common usage of the term and convention in the literature on political representation to use gender rather than sex to refer to the differences between men and women (Chafetz, 1984; Walby, 1990).
other countries or international organizations illustrates this very well. Similarly, feudal kings would consult aristocrats from different parts of the country as representative of that area (Ford, 1925). At the same time, democracy does not necessarily imply representation. The few instances of direct democracy at the state level are illustrative of that. It should also be borne in mind that direct democratic decision-making is commonplace in many political units smaller than the state, such as in political groups (Gastil, 1997; Britannica, 2006c).

The reason that democracy is the preferred means of selection in many cases is 
\textit{accountability} (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999; Dunn, 1999). Since the representatives are elected to act for the citizens in the first place, they should be held accountable for their actions. However, there is rarely a clear indication of how representatives should be held accountable. The fact that free elections are held every few years is often considered sufficient a criterion for accountability (Schumpeter, 1996 [1976]; Plotke, 1997; Manin \textit{et al.}, 1999). In elections, a representative may be replaced by someone else, and this implicit threat is thought to work as an incentive for representatives to act for the citizens. Consequently, given the possibility to remove representatives, the result of any free election is regarded as legitimate. On the other hand, followers of the Rousseauian tradition see legitimacy as stemming from the parliament resembling the population as closely as possible (Banchoff & Smith, 1999).

\textit{Legitimacy}, more generally, means that a group of representatives are considered the rightful representatives of the citizens (ibid.). The literature, however, is ambivalent on who is to judge the rightfulfulness of a representative relationship. Rehfeld (2006) focuses on the audience to whom representatives represent the citizens. He substantiates this argument with the example of ambassadors from undemocratic regimes, where the citizens have no possibility to voice their agreement or lack thereof with the chosen representative. This argument, however, is unsatisfactory, as it seems to argue that the most dominant power in a society is generally also the legitimate authority.
Weber, in contrast, argues that a representative relationship can only be legitimate, if those giving up the power accept it as such (Nordlinger, 1968; Grafstein, 1981; Matheson, 1987; Banchoff & Smith, 1999). A representative is the legitimate one, if he or she acts with the authority of those whom he or she represents. This means that any representative elected fairly is a legitimate representative. Although this view is shared by many (Pitkin, 1967), it is not entirely satisfactory either. It is unclear, for example, how those unable to authorize a representative can ever be represented (Rehfeld, 2006). For example, following this approach, the rights of future generations or children cannot be represented. In the latter case, we as society deny them the means to authorize such a representation. Nevertheless, environmental groups often regard themselves as representatives of future generations (Anand, 2003), or a charity may be consulted to speak on behalf of children (Goldson, 2004; Thomson, 2004). Legitimacy can therefore be best defined by combining the two approaches. The lack of agreement by the audience renders representation futile. However, whilst an ambassador negotiating an international treaty may be considered the rightful representative by the other party, without at least passive consent of those he or she represents, the treaty cannot usually be implemented. This means that without legitimacy representation arguably does not take place.³

This section has first unpacked the components of representation, and second explored the underlying philosophical concepts. By so doing, the initial definition of representation could be refined, highlighting the different elements of the representative relationship between citizens and parliamentarians. These different components are implicit in the theoretical framework when the relationship between citizens and representatives is outlined in more detail. It also became apparent that the meaning of representation is shaped by underlying

³By focusing on free and partly free countries, this project focuses on cases where legitimate political representation can be assumed to a certain degree—and throughout the thesis, the focus is on the quality of this representation.
debates. By identifying these debates, this section laid the necessary groundwork for exploring different forms of representation in the subsequent sections, moving beyond a discussion of political representation in general.

**Forms of Representation**

There are different aspects of political life that can be represented, and in this section, the different possibilities are examined in more detail. Two of the most commonly considered forms of political representation are symbolic representation and ideological representation. Symbolic representation is concerned with matching the demographic characteristics of the population (Pitkin, 1967; Birch, 2000; Powell, 2004), whilst ideological representation deals with issue positions, and is concerned with how well the representatives match the ideological views and policy preferences of the citizens (ibid.; Pennock, 1968; Childs, 2002). The study of symbolic representation is normally justified with arguments of group justice; the study of ideological representation links to the central role of interests in politics. In this project, neither of these forms of representation is prioritized, and the allocation of space is not a reflection of normative or intellectual importance. In addition to presenting these fundamental forms of representation in more detail, this section attempts a census, and includes three additional forms of representation: performative representation, formal representation, and procedural representation.

Symbolic representation, to start with, is the extent to which demographic characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, or class, are reflected in parliament (Pitkin, 1968; Squires, 1996; Birch, 2000). Symbolic representation exists between two members of the same group, one in the citizens, and one in the representatives. A male citizen is therefore represented by any male representative, a person from Scotland only by a Scot. Throughout the thesis, I use the term symbolic *dimension* to refer to the different groups in which representation can occur, such as gender, or religious groups. Because of its reliance
on, to a certain extent, externally measured characteristics, symbolic representation is also known as descriptive representation. For the sake of clarity, I use a single term throughout the project: *symbolic representation*.

Symbolic representation is rooted in the normative argument that parliament should mirror the population, and is of concern for a number of reasons. For instance, it is argued that the absence of certain groups in parliament, or their presence in only a reduced number, means that certain views and voices are suppressed. Phillips (1992, p.99) is in no doubt about this:

> When the composition of decision-making assemblies is so markedly at odds with the gender and ethnic make-up of the society they represent, this is clear evidence that certain voices are being silenced or suppressed.

The underlying thought is that whoever is not present in parliament—be it in person or by proxy—has no means to express his or her views. The absence or under-representation of certain groups is a concern to those who believe that the groups identified by demographic criteria have distinct interests. The argument is that there are certain (relevant) views or experiences that cannot be represented by anyone who is not directly affected (Ross, 1943; Schwartz, 1988; Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1995). For example, it is argued, that the experience of racial discrimination cannot be understood unless experienced from the receiving end. Without an understanding of the issue, it follows that there is no appreciation for the importance of certain policy changes, for example. Consequently, certain views and interests are regarded as simply unrepresentable by individuals who are not members of the group concerned.

Whilst the existence of intrinsic interests of groups is probably the most controversial aspect of the argument (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005), the use of experience makes it a more compelling case. It is not the interests a woman has because she was born with two X-chromosomes, but the interests that stem from her experience of being a woman in a particular society. There is some evidence from Norway suggesting that there might indeed be such intrinsic priorities associated with gender, such as birth control. It is sometimes argued
that the increase of women in the Norwegian parliament is associated with substantial differences in policy (Phillips, 1995; Bystydzienski, 1995).

A case for symbolic representation can also be made solely on symbolic grounds (Norris, 1996). The argument in this case is quite different. Rather than looking at particular interests, the focus is on the equality of citizens. If all citizens are of equal status—and thus of truly equal worth—all groups of society have an equal right to being present in parliament. The argument assumes that everyone has a desire to be present in parliament and take part in decision-making. The absence from parliament is then taken as a sign that equality does not fully exist, and the representative outcome is deemed illegitimate. This argument is based on a different conception of the function of parliament, or public life in general. Rather than focusing on the role of parliament as a legislative body, being present in parliament is regarded as a prize. If women and ethnic minorities are true equals to white men, then they deserve full participation in public life (Mill, 1975 [1861]; Phillips, 1992).

Some writers bemoan the lack of women as positive role models in public life in general, and in parliament in particular (Vallance, 1979; Phillips, 1995; Girlguiding, 2009). The argument is that the small subtleties of everyday life help socialize men and women into distinct roles—recreating the gender divide. Following the argument that men and women are essentially equals, the small number of women in visible public posts is a matter of injustice (Sharpe, 1976; Okin, 1994). With the potential to recreate inequalities for future generations, the lack of role models means that remedies to under-representation should not be delayed.

The claim to equal desert to representation links to issues of legitimacy. On the one hand, it can be argued that existential equality means equal desert. The absence of a symbolically representative outcome, then, can be interpreted as a sign of unjust practices:
The extraordinary mismatch between the kind of people who get elected and the gender and ethnic composition of the population they claim to represent remains as a serious blot on the practices of democracy. (Phillips, 1992, p.98)

On the other hand, however, the elected representatives can be regarded as authorized by women and ethnic minorities, because they have helped to vote them in (Duverger, 1955; Dolin, 2004). At this point questions of legitimacy turn messy, but exploring the extent to which such authorization really can be said to take place is beyond the scope of this project—leading to considerations of active and passive consent, or whether viable alternatives are available.

Interestingly, maybe, concerns for symbolic representation could be disregarded if the political processes and society were truly meritocratic. This assumes that talent is equally distributed amongst the various groups, that votes are based on talent, and that enough members from all groups stand for election. In such a case, a more or less symbolically representative parliament is statistically the most probable outcome. Following this argument, the concerns with symbolic representation are only an issue in as much as society departs from the meritocratic ideal type.

The measurement of symbolic representation is straightforward; it can be based on the normative argument that parliament should mirror the population. Consequently, the proportion of the population with a given characteristic is compared with the proportion of the representatives with the same. The more difficult aspect of measurement is picking the aspects that are compared. As outlined in the previous section, there is no agreement on which characteristics a parliament should symbolically represent. There are many possibilities, but there is no agreed normative claim that one symbolic dimension is more pressing than other possibilities (Birch, 1971). Many studies use the common forms of social stratification, particularly those of ascribed status. Whilst the representation of class was a studied in the past (Ross, 1943; Birch, 1971), recent contributions focus on gender, ethnicity, and to a much lesser extent age (Birch, 2000; Childs, 2000). The approach taken in this project is to take the sa-
lience and degree of politicization of social divisions as guidance. Of interest is the degree to which a particular characteristic is salient to the under-represented group in society.

There are two possible approaches to classifying ethnic divisions: The first approach attempts to identify the most salient division in a society, taking a broad understanding of ethnicity. For example, Norris (2004) considers a wide variety of groups an ethnic group, including—depending on the country—language groups, religious groups, national groups, or inhabitants of peripheral areas. The second approach identifies a specific division, without attempting to compare across groups. Ethno-linguistic groups are only compared with other ethno-linguistic groups; inhabitants of peripheral areas are not compared with religious groups. One advantage is that countries with multiple salient divisions can be covered adequately. In this project, the primary aim is to compare groups divided along the same division, and therefore the second approach is taken.

The availability of comparable cross-national data also influences the choice of symbolic dimensions studied. For many of the possibilities, including class and age, there are generally no data available for the representatives. Unfortunately, generally the lack of data is unrelated to the salience of a social division. The absence from this project should not be taken as an indication that social divisions along class or age, for instance, are of no concern. In this project, I consider symbolic representation in terms of gender, ethnic groups, and to a lesser extent religious and language groups.

Whichever social division they focus on, most studies concerned with symbolic representation find an unsatisfactory state of the world: a significant discrepancy between the proportions of the groups in the population and the elected representatives (Norris, 1993; Darcy et al., 1994; Birch, 2000). The main interest of many studies is the proportion of women parliamentarians. In none of the parliaments in free and partly free countries are there as many women
as there are men (Norris, 1993; BBC, 2008; IPU, 2009a). Similarly, interest in ethnic group representation increased in recent years (Rothman, 2004; Richardson, 2007; IPU, 2009b). It is often argued that ethnic minorities are traditionally under-represented (Rothman, 2004; Bird, 2005). In contrast, studies of the representation of other groups, such as occupational strata, were uncommon in recent years.

Writers concerned with women’s rights or social justice in general often celebrate the fact that in many places there are signs of positive change (Norris & Lovenduski, 1993; IDEA, 1998; Zimmerman & Rule, 1998). In the Nordic countries, women have made the greatest inroads, and now occupy a significant number of parliamentary seats (Norris, 1993; IPU, 2006). In other Western European countries, the number of female parliamentarians increased at a slower pace (Vallance, 1979; Arscott, 1995; Lovenduski, 1996; IPU, 2007).

There are places, however, where the number of women in parliament seems to stagnate (UN, 1992; IPU, 2007). The end of Soviet influence in large parts of Eastern Europe and Asia meant the removal of quota systems and with that a significant drop in the number of women in parliaments in the affected regions (UN, 1992; Birch, 2000; Rothman, 2004; Lovenduski, 2005; Dahlerup, 2006). These changes, however, are generally interpreted in a positive light. It is the freer elections and the increased power of parliament vis-à-vis the executive that are thought to outweigh the fact that parliament is now less of a demographic mirror. One aspect is that the so-called communist system did not produce a microcosm, either (Birch, 2000). Another aspect is that for many writers the representation of demographic groups seems to be secondary to the representation of policy positions, since people appear to primarily vote based on policies and opinions (Vallance, 1979; Darcy et al., 1994).

Ideological representation is based exactly on this premise: It refers to the representation of the issue positions and policy preferences of citizens (Pitkin, 1967; Pennock, 1968; Birch, 2000; Powell, 2004). As was the case with symbolic
representation, the normative claim is that parliament should mirror the population as well as possible, this time in terms of political views and issue preferences. Of interest is how well the legislature or a representative matches the positions of the citizens. Most commonly, issue positions are measured on the political left–right scale, even though it is not always very clear what is meant by left and right (Laponce, 1981; Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989; Knutsen, 1995). The concepts, however, are relatively stable within a country (ibid.; Herrera, 1999; Dahlberg et al., 2005). However, other issue domains are also of interest (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997; Pierce, 1999). Throughout the thesis, I use the term ideological domain to refer to the different policy issues in which representation can occur. Ideological representation can be understood to be about shared issue positions as well as shared agendas (Eulau & Wahlke, 1978). This means, of interest can be both the views of people, and the priorities citizens assign to different political issues. In practice, the lack of data for the representatives in most countries means that looking at shared agendas is impossible in this project.

Ideological representation is also widely known as substantive representation (Pennock, 1968; Birch, 1971; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). I have chosen the term ideological representation in order to increase clarity what is referred to, as well as to avoid a normative statement of which form of representation is more important.

Studies of ideological representation normally assume voting behaviour that is best approximated with a spatial approach to voting (Enelow & Hinich, 1990). It is not only assumed that issue positions can be expressed in Euclidean distances, but it is also often assumed that voters act in a way that minimizes the distance between their own position and that of the representative voted for (Downs, 1957; Aldrich, 1993; Pierce, 1999). It is thus the assumption of a Downsian approach to voting.
In this project, I do not examine party representation: how well voters of a particular party are represented by their representatives. One reason is that I explicitly acknowledge other influences on vote choice than voters somehow minimizing the distance to the party they support, as further outlined in the theoretical framework below. The way ideological representation is approached in this project, means that non-voters can be included. The main reason, however, is that party representation addresses a different question: intra-group representation rather than political representation at the national level.

Ideological representation is paramount because of its direct relevance to policies. In addition—it is argued—citizens primarily vote based on issue positions and policy preferences (Vallance, 1979; Mueller, 1988; Darcy et al., 1994). However, the fact that most citizens vote in terms of issue positions does not as such imply moral desirability. Some argue that policy preferences are all that matters, since other distinctions, such as gender or age, are assumed irrelevant (Rankin, 1999). The primacy of policies is summarized by the fact that most parties define themselves in ideological terms—often political left, centre, or right (Dalton, 1985; Wittman, 1990; Britannica, 2006c).

The quality of ideological representation is measured in terms of how well the representatives reflect the issue positions and policy preferences in the population. In practice, a number of measurements may be used to make claims about the quality of congruence between the views of citizens and the representatives. All of these measurements suffer from the difficulty of comparing distributions (Leik, 1966; Holmberg, 1999).

A simple and common measure is the correlation coefficient. The higher the correlation between the issue positions of the citizens and those of the representatives, the better representation is thought to be (Dalton, 1985). This measurement, however, addresses a different question from what is the concern in
this project: namely, how well parties represent their voters. A slightly different measurement of authorized representation is preferred by Powell (2000), focusing on the representation of the opposition. For Powell there is no such thing as over-representation, merely under-representation. He adds the proportion of the vote shares of the parties that become part of the government, plus the seat shares of the parties not in government. This measurement correlates very highly with other measures of vote-seat proportionality.

Ideological representation at the national level can be measured in terms of congruence of groups, reflecting the measurement used for symbolic representation. The proportion of citizens considering themselves left or centre-right is directly compared with those of the representatives doing the same (Pierce, 1999). In many cases, citizens are not thought to make finer distinctions of issue positions than such broad categories (Laponce, 1981; McKelvey & Ordeshook, 1990; Schläpfer & Schmitt, 2005), but such a measure suffers somewhat from the arbitrariness of the categories used to measure concepts such as political left and right. What is more, with the data used for the positions of the representatives, in this project, such a measure is not possible. As outlined in more detail in chapter 3, I rely on party positions to estimate the positions of the representatives. This is done in order to maintain a large and diverse sample with multiple ideological domains.

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4 The use of the correlation coefficient as a measure of representation can be problematic, because under certain distributional conditions, the results could be systematically distorted. This is the case, because a correlation not only measures the strength of a relationship, but also the diversity of sampled districts (Achen, 1977, 1978). In practice, such conditions are very unlikely to occur to the extent that they affect the results substantively (Converse & Pierce, 1986; Herrera et al., 1992; Schmitt & Thomassen, 2000).

5 The 1983 British General Election may be used to illustrate this measurement: 42% votes for the Conservatives (62% of seats), 28% votes for Labour (32%), 25% votes for the Alliance (3.5%), and 5% votes for small parties (2.5%). Powell adds the 42% and 28% from Conservative and Labour voters—disregarding their over-representation—and the 3.5% and 2.5% from the remaining parties to derive a score of 76%.

6 To overcome the arbitrariness of categories, further research would be needed to establish the salient categories for the different ideological domains in different countries. It is conceivable that the categories used to make sense of the political space—and their boundaries—are not the same in different places, and possibly over time. Such boundaries are probably not clear-cut. What is more, for measures where the questions used for the citizens and representative do not exactly correspond, trying an approach based on categories might put too much strain on the scales.
Consequently, in this project, a simple comparison of means is used, possibly the most common measurement in the literature (see for example Weissberg, 1978; Marsh & Wessels, 1997; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999a; Powell, 2000). In chapter 7, I argue that this measurement can be understood as categorical in a minimalistic sense. Compared to a measurement based on arbitrary categories, a comparison of means loses further details of the distribution that might be of interest. However, it can be expected that the two measures of ideological representation are positively correlated, but not necessarily perfectly so.

Regardless of the measure used, studies on ideological representation tend to identify a certain discrepancy between the issue positions of citizens and representatives (Eulau & Wahlke, 1978; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997, 1999a; Powell, 2000). Some studies find very large discrepancies (Pulzer, 1975; Marsh & Wessels, 1997; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999b), others on a smaller scale.

Not many studies conclude that parliamentarians do a relatively good job of representing the citizens, as did Schmitt and Thomassen (2000). However, even of the many studies that consider ideological representation overall unsatisfactory, some find relatively high levels of representation in certain domains (Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999b; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999, 2000). It is either the economic domain (Birch, 2000), or the less specific political left–right (Dalton, 1985; Pierce, 1999), in which members of parliament are found to represent citizens relatively well. This can be interpreted as good representation in the areas people care about (Birch, 2000; Lutz, 2003). On a methodological note, however, Thomassen and Schmitt (1997) note that people are better able to indicate their position on specific questions rather than abstract issues such as European integration.

This note of care links with the argument sometimes put forward, that voters may be unable to vote in the manner assumed by theorists (Converse, 2007). In terms of the assumed or measured ability of citizens, the literature suggests a
whole range of positions. On the one hand, citizens are depicted as uninformed or even incapable (Ross, 1943; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Phillips, 1995; Lutz, 2003; Eichenberg, 2007; Kuklinski & Peyton, 2007). On the other hand, citizens are also described as able to position themselves and political parties in a reliable fashion (Schmitt & Thomassen, 2000).

The different views on citizens’ capabilities have different theoretical implications. For example, the responsible party model is often defended as the most suitable model for political representation, both in PR and majoritarian contexts (Dalton, 1985; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Herrera et al., 1992; Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996; Marsh & Norris, 1997). It is based on the assumption that parties formulate policy programmes for which the citizens vote. If elected, the parties deliver the promised programmes. However, with incapable, uninformed, or uninterested citizens the commonly used responsible party model may not work.

Turning to the representatives, a person elected into parliament may not necessarily act in the way assumed by the voters. The concept of performative representation is used to address this: How do parliamentarians act? Whereas the concepts of symbolic and ideological representation both focus on the composition of parliaments, performative representation considers the actions of members of parliaments (Bartels, 1991; Miller et al., 1999; Birch, 2000; Childs, 2002; Soroka, 2003; Wlezien, 2004; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien & Soroka, 2007; Curtin, 2008). The concept is introduced because symbolic representation and ideological representation do not necessarily lead to performative representation. For instance, being a woman does not necessarily mean that a female member of parliament votes in favour of what are widely considered women’s issues; or a left-wing representative may well vote in favour of privatization of key industries.

The terms policy responsiveness and policy representation are sometimes used to describe the same. However, I use the term performative representation, to re-
reflect the fact that performative aspects of representation may not be translated into policy outcomes. This is for example the case where members of a minority group are outvoted on legislation with direct impact on the group in question. Nonetheless, performative representation is of interest, because it reflects to what extent members of parliament act in the interest of the citizens. In many ways, performative representation adds a further dimension to considerations of symbolic and ideological representation: the insight that sharing demographic characteristics or ideological views may not always be reflected in actions to the same extent.

Whilst adding to the aforementioned forms of representation—symbolic and especially ideological—, performative considerations also complicate the picture considerably. For ideological representation, the issue of multiple interests makes analyses significantly more difficult. It is unclear, against which of many interests a policy outcome should be compared. What is more, the actual impact of policies on everyday life is complicated further by the involvement of various other actors: The responsibility of the actual policy outcome cannot be reduced to parliaments alone. For instance, the impact of select committees, the media, large businesses, or local organizations would also have to be considered. The most common measurements of performative representation involve a comparison of citizens’ views and the voting pattern of parliamentarians, or a comparison of policy preferences with spending decisions in parliament. Such measures are unable to capture the rich nature of performative representation, but may offer a useful approximation.

To some extent, performative representation can also be regarded as approximated by levels of symbolic and ideological representation, since presence in parliament is to some extent linked to performance. In fact, in the literature, the two are often assumed to be strongly correlated (Saggar, 2000; Chaney, 2006; Dodson, 2006; Farrell & Scully, 2007), which highlights that the boundary between beliefs and actions is not clear-cut. This means that in practice the dif-
ference between political representation and corresponding actions can be difficult to disentangle.

Analyses of performative representation are no doubt insightful and worthwhile, but data availability aside, a complete consideration of performative representation is beyond the scope of this project. Whilst performative representation is conceptually clear in the case of ideological representation—the link between policy preferences and policies implemented—in terms of symbolic representation considerations of performative representation require judgements of which policies are in the interest of women or ethnic minority groups, decisions that cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner. In order to retain comparable representative relationships, performative representation is not examined in the empirical chapters. Such comparable representative relationships are essential for the direct comparison between different forms of representation required to address the second research question (*How are levels of representation in different forms linked?*).

More importantly perhaps, a focus on performative representation would mean reducing parliaments to their role in policymaking. This would lead to different conceptions of representation being disregarded. However, as outlined above, it can be argued that based on justice and equality alone the representation of women and ethnic minority groups is of equal importance to the representation of policy preferences. Following this view, presence in parliament is valuable in itself, or esteemed as presenting role models for future generations.

Finally, the selection of cases, as discussed on page 5 above, to some extent caters for potential differences between presence in parliaments and actual performance. The focus in this project is on free and partly free countries, and therefore the cases where presence in parliament is unrelated to power and involvement in policymaking are excluded, such as in many dictatorships across
the world. In this sense, the expected differences between presence in parliament and respective actions should be minimized.

A different form of representation is *formal representation*. It is about acting in a specific situation in the name of somebody else. The relationship to this somebody else may be otherwise absent, or unrelated (Pennock, 1968). This loose definition causes formal representation to encompass a great number of relations. For example, a king or queen often formally represents a country (ibid.; Ford, 1925), but equally, all members of parliament formally represent the citizens of a given country.

More than any other form of representation, formal representation is about legitimation: being the rightful representative (Pennock, 1968). The fact that representatives were selected based on a relatively free election is considered a sufficient criterion to establish both legitimacy and formal representation. For the countries considered in this project, formal representation is thus given in all cases.

The nature of *procedural representation*, to complete the census of different forms of political representation, describes the relationship between votes cast in an election and the resulting number of seats gained per party (Rae, 1967; Grofman, 1983; Powell, 2004). In terms of quality, the sole concern is usually the proportionality between votes and seats. With that, the focus is more on political parties than on individuals. Procedural representation describes a different relationship from the one considered in this project, as will become clear in figure 2 below: It refers to a subset of the relationship examined in the empirical chapters. Procedural representation depends on the electoral system, in particular the electoral formula used (Nordlinger, 1968; Lijphart, 1994, 1999; Katz, 1997; Powell, 2004). A distinction can be drawn between theoretically possible and observed disproportions (Lijphart, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000).
Confusingly, procedural representation is sometimes referred to as formal representation. Another term sometimes used is partisan representation. In order to avoid confusion, when referring to the relationship between votes and seats, I use the term *procedural representation* throughout the project.

Procedural representation is of interest because of its wide-reaching impact on other forms of representation. As explored further below, both symbolic and ideological forms of representation are affected by the aggregation of votes into seats. Assuming that people vote sincerely and choose the candidate closest to their own position, levels of ideological representation may still be relatively low because of vote-seat disproportionality. This is particularly the case in majoritarian systems, where large parties are favoured (Rae, 1967; Grofman, 1983). This is the case, because the electoral system exaggerates the proportions gained by different parties, and for this reason affects the representation of issue positions and policy preferences. Such exaggeration, however, may well be desirable, depending on the vision of representation used. It is often argued that exaggerated majorities are necessary for stable governance. However, proportionality can also lead to stable outcomes (Hogan, 1945; Lijphart, 1999; Farrell, 2001).

This section has outlined a number of different forms of representation, and I argued that both symbolic and ideological forms of representation are of interest. These different forms are largely complementary in nature—separate facets of political representation, which are picked up in separate empirical chapters. Since the different forms of representation are complementary in nature, there is no apparent reason why a parliament could not be both symbolically and ideologically representative. Indeed, this project is also interested in the relationships between different forms of representation. To this end, the

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7 In PR systems, larger parties are also favoured, although to an extent so much smaller than what is typically found in majoritarian systems, that usually no substantively different treatment to smaller parties can be observed (Rae, 1967; Grofman, 1983).
Theoretical framework outlined below integrates different forms of representation. Formal representation, being asserted as such, does not merit further examination in this project. The focus is instead on symbolic and ideological representation, creating a fuller understanding of the nature of parliamentary representation than studies focusing on just one form of political representation. By covering both symbolic and ideological representation, different philosophical motivations are reflected: considering both group justice and policymaking.

Representative Relationships

The different forms of representation can take place in a number of representative relationships: who represents whom. In this section, the role of the representatives is examined in more detail. One of the key debates underlying the question what makes good representation is that of delegation versus trusteeship. It is a question of the proper role of representatives, commonly linked to a speech by Burke (2004 [1774]). In his address to the electors of Bristol, Burke argued that the proper role of a representative is not to be a mouthpiece of the wishes of the constituents, but to use his intelligence and experience to decide what is best for the constituency and the country as a whole. Today these roles are commonly referred to as delegates and trustees respectively.

These two contrasting roles can be best understood as ideal types of the roles of representatives. The discussion about which of these should be aspired to largely reflects different conceptions of why a representative system is used in the first place. Rather than replicating the different views between the needs to mirror the population versus guardianship, the distinction between trustees and delegates can also be considered a separate dimension. The former difference is about the basis on which to select representatives, the latter is about how they should act in parliament. The two are to a large degree interlinked, since a candidate making a good delegate—being a mouthpiece of the popula-
tion or group that is represented—may not be a good trustee. It appears that citizens on the whole prefer delegates—with the implication that any deviation from the ideal of a microcosm is of great concern—, whilst representatives prefer to regard themselves as trustees—giving them more leeway to deviate from the ideal (Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996).

Notwithstanding the role of the representatives, the relationship between citizens and members of parliament can be approached in different ways. The most common distinction is that between collective representation and dyadic representation. *Dyadic representation*, to start with, focuses on the link between citizens in districts and their representatives. The unit of analysis are pairs of constituencies and their—usually single—representative. The representative is expected to follow the opinion of the district, or work in the interests of the citizens of the district. Good dyadic representation is given where the representative does as indicated. With its focus on districts and single representatives, dyadic representation is unable to address symbolic representation adequately.

The use of a dyadic perspective is probably more natural where there are single-member districts, such as in the US. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the nature of the representative relationship is linked to the institutional structure (McLean, 1991; Wessels, 1999a). Weissberg (1978) was critical of the implicit assumption in many representation studies that only the legislator of a district can represent the citizens’ views. He highlighted that in most cases interests and opinions are likely to transect geographical boundaries. What is more, studies of dyadic representation require detailed data of both the individual representatives and the citizens in the different districts. It appears that there are only very few countries for which such data are available for national elections.

Nonetheless, dyadic representation is of importance, because there is more to representatives than their views. Parliamentarians are sometimes actively in-
volved in securing particularized resources for their constituency, such as services or funding (Eulau & Wahlke, 1978). This means that for issues and policies that are geographically bounded, dyadic representation is a valid measure of the extent to which a representative acts for the citizens of a particular district. Furthermore, members of parliament are a point of contact for their constituents, enabling—to a certain extent—communication between citizens and government (Copeland & Patterson, 1998).

Most studies concerned with dyadic representation find a certain degree of misrepresentation between the views of the citizens in a district and that of the corresponding representatives (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Dalton, 1985; Herrera et al., 1992; Bartels, 2002). Because of the fact that most studies of dyadic representation involve single-member districts, symbolic representation is not normally considered.

Collective representation, in contrast, is concerned with the representation of citizens as a whole. Whereas dyadic representation implies the geographical boundedness of interests, collective representation concentrates on representation at the national level. The focus is entirely on the outcome, and little attention is usually paid to how a particular result comes to exist—that is which party or district contributes to the outcome—, although assumptions may be implicit. Representation in this sense can be both of symbolic and ideological nature. Dalton (1985, p.275), focusing on ideological representation, puts it as follows:

When the distribution of public preferences is matched by the distribution of elite views, the citizenry as a collective is well-represented by elites as a collective. Collective correspondence does not address the question of how citizen–elite similarities arise; it merely focuses on the extent of aggregate citizen–elite agreement.

The citizens are regarded as represented by the élite as a whole. It is this aspect of representation as a whole rather than the distribution of preferences as such that is the key aspect of collective representation. Political parties may play an important role in this relationship between the masses and the élite. By choosing a certain party, citizens are thought to vote for the issue positions they pre-
fer. However, even if this party fails to win any seats in the district of a citizen, or the representative of the district in question does not reflect these issue positions, the citizen’s view may be represented by other elected representatives of the party. Given this central role of political parties, collective representation is often the focus in studies about European countries where PR systems are more common (McLean, 1991; Wessels, 1999a). Although collective representation and PR systems may appear to be natural companions, the two are not directly linked (Weissberg, 1978; Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996).

Collective representation is of importance because of its focus on the outcome. It has been argued that citizens themselves are more concerned that their views are represented in parliament, rather than who does this (Weissberg, 1978). Similarly, citizens may be more concerned with their group being represented in parliament than which district the corresponding representative comes from. Burke (2004 [1774]) used the term virtual representation for what is more commonly known as collective representation (Weissberg, 1978). In this sense, both symbolic and ideological forms of representation are well served by collective representation. With that, the underlying reasoning of justice, in terms of both fairness and the inclusion of minority groups, is addressed by collective representation.

To some degree, collective representation is associated with ideas of trusteeship, whilst dyadic representation matches more closely the description of delegation (Weissberg, 1978). Consequently, the different representative relationships largely reflect different visions of what parliaments should do. There is a tension between representation for a specific district, and representation at

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8 Burke used the term virtual representation to contrast it with actual representation. Virtual representation is given when the views of citizens are represented in parliament, no matter who represents them. Actual representation, in contrast, requires particular views to be represented by a member of the group affected. Imagine two districts D1 and D2 with their elected representatives R1 and R2 respectively. Virtual representation is also given when R1 represents the views of district D2, and R2 represents the views of D1. Actual representation would require R1 to represent the views of D1. Virtual representation occurs because for every position in the district there is one in the representatives.
the national level: For geographically bounded issues, the collective perspective used in this project might fail to appreciate significant details, but it can be argued that there are not many such issues where the geographical scope is clearly limited to a district. Ultimately, however, the availability of data means that in this project dyadic representation is not examined empirically.

In addition to collective and dyadic representation, I would also like to introduce a third representative relationship, which I call *token representation*. An individual, or a group with a given characteristic, can be understood as being token represented if there is at least one representative in parliament sharing this characteristic. In this case, a group or issue position is regarded as represented. For example, if I am orange, and at least one representative is orange, I can be regarded as token represented. This view of representation is not concerned with proportions, but takes a binary form.

Token representation can be applied to both symbolic and ideological representation. In the case of symbolic representation, a particular demographic feature is considered; in the case of ideological representation, certain policy positions or agenda preferences are considered the characteristic. In multiparty election, it can be expected that all major issue positions are represented in parliament, considering one domain at a time. Nonetheless, token representation is more intuitional for symbolic representation, where the division between characteristics is clearer. In terms of justice, token representation to a certain extent reflects Young’s (1990) conception of group justice. Insistence on token representation reflects the call for all voices to be heard and included in parliamentary discussions. With every group having the right to be included, token representation somehow assumes that such members of parliaments will speak on behalf of the group.

In this section, I have examined different representative relationships, highlighting that there are different representative relationships that can be considered. Dyadic representation is concerned with pairs of districts and their
representatives, whereas collective representation focuses on how parliament as a whole represents all citizens. In addition, I have introduced the concept of token representation, which is concerned with whether a group or issue position is represented or not. Whilst theoretically both dyadic and collective representation may be of interest (Birch, 1971; Weissberg, 1978; Herrera et al., 1992), the data requirements of the dyadic variant are a considerable constraint: In most cases, such data are not available for national elections. What is more, symbolic representation can only be reasonably understood in terms of collective representation. Guided by considerations of legitimacy and justice, in this project the focus is on collective and to a lesser extent token representation.

Importance of Representation

Based on the moral principle that the preferences of the citizens should ultimately prevail, there are clear philosophical demands for the full integration of all sections of the population in order to reflect the make-up of society. High levels of political representation, however, are not merely a moral principle. As a symbol of equal treatment, higher levels of representation can work to reduce political alienation and increase trust (Sisk & Reynolds, 1998; Saideman et al., 2002; Bieber, 2004; Bochsler, 2006; Alonso & Ruiz, 2007; Farrell & Scully, 2007). The view that higher levels of symbolic representation can reduce societal conflict is commonly presented for the representation of ethnic groups. The argument is that without representatives in parliament, members of minority groups are less likely to accept the outcome of elections as legitimate, and thus more prone to conflict. This means that higher levels of symbolic representation are associated with political stability more generally (Van Cott, 2005; Reynolds, 2006), although the way minority groups are integrated may be as crucial as their presence in parliament (Sisk & Reynolds, 1998; Reynolds, 2006).
Some studies report that an increased inclusion of women and ethnic minori-
ties in parliament has led to changes in the political agenda (Phillips, 1995; By-
stydzinski, 1995; Van Cott, 2005), whilst others find no such association (Gray,
2003). It is inherently difficult to measure changes to the agenda, and attrib-
ing observed changes to any single factor is bound to be controversial. As out-
tlined above, in order to observe whether the increase of female representatives
is associated with women’s interests on the agenda, assumptions are needed
what women’s issues—or the interests of ethnic groups—are. For women, of-
ten the feminist agenda is equalled to women’s interests, but this may con-
found the interests of feminists with the multiple interests of women in
general (Squires, 1996; Andrews et al., 2003; Waylen, 2008).

Sometimes it is argued that a certain threshold needs to be reached before nu-
merical presence translates into changes in parliament. This argument usually
draws on a case study by Kanter (1977) who demonstrated that the composi-
tion of groups affects the behaviour of group members. Whilst the presence of
a single woman technically fulfils the requirements of women’s voices being
present, Kanter’s study showed that such token representation is often futile.
She demonstrated that in groups dominated by one kind, the minority often
simply adopts the views and values of the dominant other. In rare cases, the
increased visibility leads to over-achievers. Differences are likely to be empha-
sized and stereotyped. With a more balanced group composition, Kanter ob-
served different kinds of behaviour. However, it is unclear to what extent
these findings can be applied to national parliaments (Mackay, 2004; Mateo
Diaz, 2005; Yoon, 2005; Childs, 2006; Trimble, 2006).\(^9\)

Higher levels of symbolic representation can also be regarded as an indication
of the status of the respective groups in society. The key argument here is that

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\(^9\) Kanter’s (1977) argument is based on different communication styles and group interaction depending
on the actual group composition. Given the focus of the research on group behaviour in large companies,
her work is silent on the representation of particularized views.
the number of women in parliament, for example, is a reflection of women’s real position in the public sphere (Thomas, 1994; Squires, 1996; Childs, 2000; Kimmel, 2004). Indeed, in countries where the number of female parliamentarians is high, the number of women in public positions of responsibility also tends to be high (Vallance, 1979; Thomas, 1994). In this sense, it can be argued that high levels of symbolic representation are indicative of a society with good gender and race relations: Identifying the factors shaping levels of representation may also help understanding and ultimately improving the status of women and minority groups.

A Framework of Political Representation

Up to this point, most of this chapter has focused on disentangling the different aspects of parliamentary representation. By so doing, various links to underlying philosophical concepts were outlined. For the purposes of this project, political representation describes the relationship between citizens and their representatives in national parliament. This relationship covers both group membership—symbolic representation—and in the case of ideological representation issue positions. In both cases, there is a normative principle that parliament should reflect the groups and preferences in the population.

However, when examining political representation in national parliaments, examining the nature of representation on its own does not help to explain the different levels of representation observed in practice. The theoretical framework presented in this section helps to bring the different facets of representation together, by identifying factors that are thought to influence levels of representation. With that, the framework provides the theoretical grounding to address the first research question (How can we explain differences in the levels of representation?).

Whilst this section is dedicated to developing an integrated and coherent theoretical framework of political representation, it does not claim to provide an
exhaustive or unifying model of political representation. In other words, if one of the factors identified is in reality unrelated to levels of representation, the remainder of the framework is unaffected. The framework may also help to recognize how different forms of representation might be linked, valuable to address the second research question (How are levels of representation in different forms linked?).

The framework presented in this section covers both symbolic and ideological representation and assumes a collective relationship between citizens and parliamentarians. Both symbolic and ideological representation are approached with the same starting point—social justice. The same institutional and cultural environment is thought to influence both forms of representation, but there are also differences that are highlighted. The framework is introduced gradually in order to discuss relevant views without losing sight of the overall idea. Ultimately, the theoretical framework allows the generation of testable hypotheses that form the basis for the subsequent empirical chapters. The framework outlines the variables in question, and discusses the associated mechanisms in the main text where appropriate.

In this project, political representation refers to the relationship between citizens and parliament. As outlined in figure 1, this describes a collective representative relationship: Citizens are represented by parliament as a whole.

*Figure 1: Basis of Political Representation*

As a next step, it is necessary to consider the nature of this relationship: how representation is created. This is outlined in figure 2: The chain begins on the left with citizens. Each citizen considers the options available, and makes a vote choice. Here the options are to cast a particular vote, but also not to vote at all. The votes are counted and aggregated into parliamentary seats—completing the chain.
Figure 2: Elements of Representation

Figure 2 may also be used to highlight the difference between parliamentary representation—the topic of this project—and procedural representation. Parliamentary representation is concerned with the entire relationship between citizens and parliament, whereas procedural representation considers a subset: the relationship between votes cast and seats gained—the right-hand side of the diagram. It is often implied that the first step outlined in figure 2 is negligible for parliamentary representation, but as outlined below this may lead to a partial treatment.

Based on this fundamental relationship between citizens and parliament it is now possible to consider influencing factors. As outlined in figure 3, different variables are thought to shape the overall representative relationship at different stages.

Figure 3: Variables Influencing Political Representation

Starting on the right of the diagram in figure 3, the electoral system and other key institutions have a significant influence on the relationship between vote choice and the resulting composition of parliament (Hogan, 1945; Benjamin, 1998; Lijphart, 1999; Alvarez & Nagler, 2001; Farrell, 2001; Taylor, 2005; Farrell & Scully, 2007). Of greatest concern here is the proportionality of the system: how the number of votes translates into seats in parliament. Both ideological representation and symbolic representation are affected by this factor (Rae, 1967; Grofman, 1983; IDEA, 1998; Taylor, 2005; Johnston et al., 2006). Assuming
that citizens vote sincerely, disproportionality between votes and seats means that voters of some of the options or parties are under-represented in parliament. Symbolic representation may be affected if different groups are not equally present in all the parties, such as when left-wing parties tend to have a larger number of female candidates. The proportionality between votes and seats itself is largely influenced by the district magnitude, the electoral formula, the ballot structure, and the number of parties.

The district magnitude describes the number of seats per district; and the larger it is the more proportional outcomes tend to be (Rae, 1967; Katz 1997; Farrell & Scully, 2007). The electoral formula determines how votes are counted, and it influences the proportionality between votes and seats, but not necessarily in a linear manner. In proportional representation systems, parties are often required to reach a certain threshold—a certain number of votes—to be entitled to any seats at all. Such thresholds are included to prevent parties from splitting for strategic reasons, but they also reduce the proportionality of the outcome. The number of parties present in an election tends to correlate with vote–seat disproportionality (Katz, 1997). The ballot structure—open or closed lists, for example (Rae, 1967; Farrell & Scully, 2007)—, and the number of parties (Katz, 1997) are two further factors that may influence vote–seat proportionality.

The electoral system, however, is not the only factor thought to shape political representation. The processes leading to vote choice are directly influenced by the candidates available. For example, a voter with communist tendencies may not be offered the choice of like-minded candidates, and some writers bemoan the lack of choice available to the voters (Ross, 1943; Pulzer, 1975). Similarly, suitable candidates may not come forward and stand for election, a fact that might be more of an issue for symbolic representation, as outlined below.

Furthest on the left in the diagram, the formation of vote choice is given as influenced by cultural attitudes. The intuition here is that the vote of an individ-
ual is the product of endogenous views—including party identification—and influences of the social environment (Fiorina, 1976; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Yoon, 2004; Galligan, 2005; Fuchs, 2007). Of interest are the predominant attitudes in society towards the role of women as political leaders, or towards marginalized groups in society. These are attitudes reminiscent of sociological liberalism (Crouch, 1999), reflecting the general outlook on life and the roles regarded as appropriate for different groups in society. In the case of ideological representation, such views and attitudes in society may affect the salience of different domains: the issues that are widely considered important.

Having outlined three different areas where the representative relationship between citizens and parliaments is influenced by outside factors, as a next step underlying causes and mechanisms are looked at. To this extent figure 4 adds further details to the diagram in figure 3.

*Figure 4: Underlying Factors for Representation*

Again starting from the right, the electoral system and its key institutions are regarded as fixed. Whilst such a view is not tenable in the long term (Lijphart & Grofman, 1984; Schwartz, 1988; Reynolds et al., 1997; Sisk & Reynolds, 1998; Bogaards, 2004), for the purpose of this project where a cross-sectional perspective is used, such a position can be defended. By insisting on short-term stability of the electoral system, the possibility of change in the long-term is explicitly acknowledged (Norris, 1993; Zimmerman & Rule, 1998; Colomer,
2004), although in established democracies such changes are relatively rare (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2003; Colomer, 2004; Cox, 2006; Farrell & Scully, 2007).

For the candidates available at an election, two underlying factors are commonly suggested. Firstly, the political élite are thought to have a considerable impact by means of candidate nomination, or more generally by being in control of internal party structures. The political élite essentially act as gatekeepers, which may negatively affect candidates from minority groups, or in the case of ideological representation candidates with certain views (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; IDEA, 1998; Bylesjö & Seda, 2006).

Another factor affecting the candidates presented to the voters is the so-called supply of suitable candidates. This simply refers to the number of suitably qualified candidates coming forward, willing to stand for election (Randall, 1987; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Norris & Franklin, 1997; Childs, 2000). The likelihood of hopefuls coming forward is influenced by the social background of the individual, which influences the resources and motivations available (Norris, 1993). Another influence may be socialization and the internalization of gender roles (Froman, 1961; Mueller, 1988; Darcy et al., 1994; Leyenaar, 2004; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2005; Lawless & Fox, 2005; Moore, 2006; Jennings, 2007). Potential candidates are likely to weigh up anticipated hurdles and the necessary investments against the demand for women or ethnic minority candidates and with that the chances of success (Norris, 1993; Leyenaar, 2004).10

On the left in the diagram in figure 4, the level of development, religion, and historical regional differences are suggested as influences for cultural attitudes: prescriptive gender roles, or attitudes towards marginalized groups in society. The predominant religion of a country is thought to affect or reflect generally held views, particularly views on the appropriate role and behaviour of differ-

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10 As will become apparent in chapter 3, because of data availability this variable can only be tested in the context of gender representation.
ent groups in society (Weber, 1958 [1905]; Chafetz, 1984; Huntington, 1991; Bystydzienski, 1995; Henig & Henig, 2001; Rabb & Suleiman, 2003; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Mateo Diaz, 2005). In terms of development, the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries is often stressed, paralleling the trend towards post-material values in more highly developed societies (Peterson, 1990; Knutsen, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Matland, 1998; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Welzel, 2007). This shift is thought to increase concerns for the rights of ethnic minority groups and women (Schmitt, 1990; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Moser, 2004). This shift in attitudes may be caused by the tendency to take for granted the fundamental concerns of security or economic stability as development progresses. The attitudes of interest are reminiscent of the concept of sociological liberalism: support for a peaceful cooperation and coexistence of different groups in society, often linked to ideas of equality and social justice (Crouch, 1999).

Regional differences, finally, may reflect historical differences. For example, access to trade routes, relative isolation, or involvement in seafaring can be thought to influence attitudes in a wider sense. The intuition here is that regular contact with other cultures and particular work settings fostered a certain degree of open-mindedness, reflected in present-day attitudes towards different groups in society (Bystydzienski, 1995; Forbes, 1997; Emerson et al. 2002; Rabb & Suleiman, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The argument is made for changes in attitudes both at the individual and group level. Whilst regional variables incorporate historical cultural differences, unfortunately they also encompass institutional and economic factors. Despite this, however, regional differences are a suitable measure of cultural differences: Regional variables are highly correlated with other factors such as the predominant religion or attitudinal variables (p<0.000), as further outlined in chapter 3 (page 85). Indeed, regional variables are frequently used as a measure of the cultural attitudes relevant to the representation of women and ethnic minorities, although
normally this is justified on a theoretical basis (Paxton, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Contreras, 2002; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003; Nanivadekar, 2006; Tripp & Kang, 2007). ¹¹

Also included in figure 4, as dotted lines, are influences of cultural attitudes and the electoral system on candidates. ¹² This is done to reflect the idea that the élite’s choice or preference of certain candidates is influenced by the electoral system and key institutions in place. The argument here is simply that the probability of a candidate succeeding in an election depends on the system used, and that the élite take into consideration such effects. This includes the presence of quotas, but also different considerations. For example, it is often argued that women are not chosen to stand as candidates in national elections, because the party leadership consider them an electoral risk: given the system in place, they estimate the chance of a women being elected smaller than that of a man in the same place (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 2000; McLeay, 2006; Young, 2006).

In the case of ideological representation, the link from attitudes to candidates describes a political climate and attitudes in society that may limit or prevent certain parties to be formed. For example, communist or openly racist parties or candidates may not come forward for elections. In the case of symbolic representation, this link is more about individual candidates coming forward, such as women and members of ethnic minorities. Only in a society where their role in public life is widely supported, suitably qualified members may come forward in significant numbers.

¹¹ The list of suggested underlying factors should not be considered exhaustive, and influences can be expected particularly from advocacy work—for which no reliable data seem to exist. The presence of a women’s movement does not indicate any particular level of activity. For advocacy work, it seems possible that the prevalent attitudes in society affect the level of activity.

¹² Not included in the diagram is a direct influence of the electoral system on vote choice, which would represent considerations of strategic and tactical voting.
It might be expected that in freer and more established democratic systems, the political élite are more experienced and therefore better able to judge the influence of the system on the expected success of candidates in a given electoral system (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989; Huntington, 1991; Crigler, 1996; Herrera, 1999). This is the case because experience enables them to learn and improve their expectations. This is included in figure 5 under *freedom*.

**Figure 5: Framework of Political Representation**

![Diagram of Political Representation](image)

In addition to the factors outlined so far, the levels of representation achieved in other dimensions and other places are thought to affect cultural attitudes to a limited extent, as visible in figure 5. The idea is that higher levels of representation in one form may influence views on how other dimensions of representation should be. For example, in a country where ethnic minorities are successfully integrated in parliament, this may not only lead to women demanding better representation, but also to the wider population supporting a parliament more inclusive of women (Huntington, 1991; Phillips, 1993; Allwood & Wadia, 2004; Tereskina, 2005). A similar argument can be made for ideological representation, where election results in one country may affect elections in other countries by influencing the salience of certain issue domains.

In the same vein, as outlined in figure 5, attitudes towards women as political leaders or marginalized groups in society may be shaped by events in other countries. Such effects may be expected in particular amongst neighbouring
countries, but cultural or institutional links may lead to similar results. The influence of neighbouring countries was noted in particular for the inclusion of women. The argument is that once one country successfully integrates more women in parliament, attitudes in neighbouring countries are equally affected (Matland & Studlar, 1996; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2005; Baldez, 2006; Aroújo & García, 2006). However, both the influence of neighbouring countries and levels of representation in other dimensions describe a temporal effect. In this project a cross-sectional design is used, which makes it impossible to include these considerations systematically in the empirical analyses, although chapter 4 includes a limited analysis over time. What is more, it may be argued that the political élite rather than the population at large are affected most by these factors, because they are more likely to be connected than the general population.

The overall argument is that attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society are shaped by many factors. However, a consideration of a single underlying variable is necessarily a partial treatment of cultural attitudes. Instead, if possible, capturing relevant cultural attitudes in an immediate sense should be more successful in explaining differences in parliamentary representation. This is not to say that the underlying factors are of no importance, but a recognition that they may be too confounded to be included separately in the empirical analyses. This is also reflected in high levels of collinearity in the analysis on page 45 above.

In figure 5, quotas and related interventions are considered part of the electoral system and its key institutions. Quotas are probably only a relevant factor for symbolic representation; the different forms such interventions can take are

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13 Unfortunately, there appear to be no adequate data to examine the representation of ethnic groups over time.
described on page 78 in chapter 3. Whilst there are other views, in this project quotas are regarded as instigated by the élite (Simms, 1993; Childs, 2000; Sawer et al., 2006). The idea of quotas should be understood in a wider sense to include both voluntary and statutory measures designed to increase symbolic representation. In its widest sense, this includes the presence of parties geared towards a specific demographically defined social cleavage, such as religious or ethnic parties. This is not to exclude cross-party quotas and reserved seats, but to widen the spectrum of considered measures.

The influence of quotas on levels of representation is two-fold. On the one hand, quotas and related measures may directly affect the relationship between votes cast and seats gained. Indeed, they are implemented for this purpose: changing the effects of the electoral system without necessarily affecting the proportionality for parties. In India, for example, there are reserved seats for Dalits (McMillan, 2005; IDEA, 2006). On the other hand, quotas and related measures may affect the selection of candidates. This is particularly obvious with voluntary party quotas. In Sweden, for instance, the Liberal Party reserves at least 40% of all candidate places to either men or women (IDEA, 2006).

There are two different arguments for the introduction of quotas. On the one hand, there is the fast-track approach. In this case, slow progress towards higher levels of symbolic representation is recognized, but judged too slow. Quotas are then introduced to achieve higher levels of representation without

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14 Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004), for example, state that the propensity of implementing quotas as such is linked to positive attitudes in the population towards women and ethnic minorities in power. The presence of quotas in neighbouring countries has been suggested as another factor increasing the likelihood of implementing quota systems (Aroújo & García, 2006). This suggests a path of contagion. Similarly, more established democracies seem to be more likely to implement quotas (Schwindt-Bayer & Palmer, 2007). In some cases voluntary party quotas may become associated with the notion of progress as such (ibid.). Of the parties, it is often parties on the left who are first to introduce quotas, possibly a reflection of their focus on inclusiveness (Duverger, 1955; Matland, 2006; McLeay, 2006; Paxton et al., 2006).

15 Dalits are often called untouchables—people in India who fall outside the four castes, considered to be below them. In the Indian constitution, the term scheduled caste is used.
having to wait for what is often projected to be decades if not longer (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Lovenduski, 2005; Dahlerup, 2006). Fast-track arguments are most common for gender representation. On the other hand, there is the blockages argument, more common for ethnic group representation. The argument is that some factor prevents levels of symbolic representation to increase, and quotas or affirmative action are instigated to break through such barriers. In the literature, forward-looking fast-track arguments seem to be preferred (Dahlerup, 2006).

Both approaches to quotas assume that the best way to achieve higher levels of symbolic representation is by asserting and politicizing difference. The argument is that disadvantaged or minority groups require special rights—that is rights specific to the group. The role of the electoral institutions is regarded as helping to accommodate different groups. As an alternative, it can be attempted to moderate differences between groups, an approach more commonly considered with ethnic divisions. The argument is that disadvantaged groups require equal rights—such as a general prohibition of discrimination. In this case, the electoral institutions focus on managing inter-group differences by encouraging a majority with positions sympathetic to the disadvantaged or minority population. The debate over which approach is preferable goes back to Lijphart (1977) and Horowitz (1985).16

As a short-term goal, assimilation and moderation of difference seems to be unrealistic, if some (vocal) members of the disadvantaged or minority group choose to assert their difference. There is also a danger that the disadvantaged group is marginalized, as their preferences can be outvoted by the dominant group. What is more, in many cases, assertion of difference is an international right—reflected in rights to self-determination or language use in schools.

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16 The two approaches also differ in their preference of dyadic and collective representation. The accommodation of difference is associated with collective representation, whilst managing conflict is possibly linked to dyadic representation (see also page 33).
Such claims to self-control, however, do not rule out moderation of conflict in the long term, although there is a danger that group differences can be accentuated by the accommodation of difference in the short-term. Asserting difference may be a tool to overcome blockages, after which assimilation can be the preferred approach. Such an approach may be necessary, since a focus on assimilation and moderation from the onset may mean—because of domination through universalization—that the root of the differences is ignored (Young, 1990; Phillips, 1993; Williams, 1995).

Turning to the role of political freedom as a modifying variable, political freedom is associated with many other factors presented in figure 5. The level of political freedom is thought to affect the formulation of attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society, the supply of candidates, the formulation of vote choice—through the information on the candidates available—, as well as the actions of the élite. At each stage, the role of political freedom may be small, but is always of theoretical importance (Rule & Zimmerman, 1994; Paxton, 1997; Reynolds, 1999; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Diamond, 2002). It may be its role in enabling political communication, making sure citizens and members of the élite are able to express their views openly, which may ultimately affect levels of political representation. In a more fundamental sense, the lack of political freedom stands for the oppression of certain groups: such as ethnic minorities, citizens of the opposition party, or those with particular views. In all cases, political representation will be affected. In fact, the role of political freedom is considered so central that it influenced case selection for this project where only free and partly free countries are considered. With this, oppressive regimes and countries where parliaments are mere lip-service to democracy should be excluded. The extent to

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17 Assimilation is not an option where a group is actively discriminated against and may be disenfranchised. This might be more of an issue in the unfree countries excluded from consideration in this project.
which a political system is established can also be approximated with the age of democracy: the number of years since democracy was established.

A further factor included in figure 5 is the consideration of salience: the awareness of and importance given to different ideological domains and symbolic dimensions. This means that the importance assigned to certain issue domains or the awareness of certain social cleavages may differ from country to country, or even from citizen to citizen. The salience may be affected by the level of development, the composition of society, religion, regional differences, as well as levels of representation in other places. The composition of society is included since in nearly homogenous societies, little importance may be assigned to this fact. For example, in a country where nearly everyone shares the language, language as a political factor may not be very salient and politicized.

Similarly, the level of development can be considered a factor shaping salience: In particular the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries is often highlighted (Inglehart & Norris, 2003), to some extent mirroring the difference between material and post-material values (Inglehart, 1997). Regional and religious differences may stand for different public roles considered desirable for women and ethnic minorities, meaning that different significance is given to their inclusion in political life (Mateo Diaz, 2005). In addition, religions with prescriptive worldviews tend to highlight certain issue domains, such as social issues. In the case of symbolic representation, however, public roles perceived as desirable in some cases may be challenged by what is happening in neighbouring countries, or with other demographically defined groups (Matland & Studlar, 1996; Baldez, 2006; Aroújo & García, 2006).

The theoretical framework summarized in figure 5 outlined variables that are thought to influence levels of representation. Where possible, the accompanying text introduced the mechanisms that might be in operation, although the
empirical analyses are not able to test the mechanisms as such.\textsuperscript{18} Having introduced the various variables, however, it is also necessary to examine the causality of cultural factors. In line with all the literature considering political culture in one form or another, the theoretical framework cannot completely resolve issues of causality (Fuchs, 2007). In particular for levels of symbolic representation, the argument is not only that attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society affect levels of representation (Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003; Leyenaar, 2004), but also that such attitudes may be influenced by the actual number of women or members of ethnic minorities present in parliament.

The argument from attitudes to levels of representation is well rehearsed: Cultural attitudes in society are thought to influence both demand—by the voters and at the stage of candidate selection within parties—and supply, as in candidates coming forward (Chafetz, 1984; Norris, 1993; Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Leyenaar, 2004; Galligan & Tremblay, 2005). At the same time, particularly in the case of gender representation, it is argued that a small part of the attitudes towards women as political leaders is shaped by the level of representation in national parliaments. In this case, members of parliament are regarded as role models (Goffman, 1976; Thomas, 1994; Arcenaux, 2001; Leyenaar, 2004; Tinker, 2004; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2005; Chynoweth, 2006; McAllister, 2006; Dovi, 2007; Girlguiding, 2009). However, there are a great number of other influences on cultural attitudes, including the prevalent religion of a country, the level of development, or historical regional differences, and role models from visible public positions other than parliament (Duverger, 1955; Sharpe, 1976; Goffman, 1976; Sunstein, 1996; Chynoweth, 2006; Fuchs, 2007).

\textsuperscript{18} Some of the stipulated mechanisms, particularly with regard to cultural attitudes are difficult to test, even with qualitative work that explores the influences on people’s vote decisions. This is the case because of unconscious decisions, or social desirability biases.
Unfortunately, in most cases I am unable to address this issue of reverse causality with the data available. In the chapter on gender representation, however, I include a limited analysis of representation over time. This analysis suggests that attitudes towards women as political leaders are causally linked with levels of gender representation, and casts doubt on the argument that levels of representation at a previous point in time have a significant influence on current attitudes towards women as political leaders, at least for the time examined.

Evidence that social changes are causally prior to the corresponding political changes also comes from Togeby (1994). Togeby used longitudinal data from Denmark to support the view that attitudinal changes are indeed causally prior to changes in the levels of symbolic representation. With a time span of 30 years, Togeby’s study should cater for the warning that the effects of presence in parliament may take time to be picked up (Phillips, 1995; Stimson, 2007). The argument Togeby outlines is that initially changes in education and the employment status of women influence the attitudes of the individuals concerned. As a next step, these individuals change their behaviour within the family and their immediate environment. Sooner or later, however, the individuals with changed attitudes will face inequalities that they cannot change themselves. These encounters lead to political activism and ultimately changes in mainstream attitudes. The underlying argument is that cultural attitudes changed to fit changes in the social structure (Chafetz, 1984; Togeby, 1994).

With regard to the casual direction of cultural factors, this argument is further indication that attitudes towards the role of women in society can be regarded as causally prior to levels of representation. This is not to deny that the presence of women and ethnic minorities in parliament can affect attitudes towards women as political leaders or marginalized groups in society to a certain degree, but to highlight that the main effect is that such attitudes facilitate levels of political representation.
In this section, I have developed a theoretical framework of political representation. Starting with the relationship between voters and representatives, the underlying causes and mechanisms were carefully outlined. The framework was designed with both symbolic and ideological representation in mind, but different areas may be emphasized in each case. This means that different forms of political representation are regarded as separate facets of political representation. Nonetheless, the basic procedure for both forms of representation is assumed the same. For this reason, some similarities between levels of symbolic and ideological representation can be expected. Consequently, the framework is also useful for addressing the relationships between different forms of representation.

By using this theoretical framework different influencing factors are considered, essentially catering for differences in the countries looked at. By so doing, it should be possible to better understand and explain the differences in the levels of symbolic and ideological representation observed across the world. With cultural attitudes and institutional factors, two broad areas were identified as potential influences. Unfortunately, some of the individual factors are difficult to capture empirically. Whilst largely absent in the empirical analyses, these factors feature more prominently in the concluding discussion in chapter 8. This way a more complete understanding of political representation can be gained.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the theoretical framework just outlined, it is possible to derive a number of hypotheses. Given the different forms of representation considered in this project, the hypotheses outlined in this section are still of general nature, and in the empirical chapters, hypotheses that are more specific are drawn from the ones outlined here.
The proportionality between votes cast and seats gained, to begin with, is a key feature of electoral systems. Assuming that most voters cast a sincere vote expressing their preferences, disproportionality may lead to misrepresentation in parliament. Therefore, it can be expected that systems that are more proportional lead to higher levels of representation (H1).

The electoral system is not only defined by its formula. Certain institutional settings, such as the district magnitude, affect the probability of women and minority candidates to be included. The concept of party magnitude has been suggested as a summary of such effects (Matland, 1993). Because of such factors, higher levels of symbolic representation can be expected in places where the institutional setting encourages the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities (H2).

Linked to institutional factors is the experience of working within certain parameters. This can be approached with political freedom, as indicated in figure 5, but also with the age of democracy. All the involved actors in the representative relationship, from voters to the élite, need some time to understand the effects of the electoral system and its key institutions. What follows is that political communication—and with that the efficiency of the system—is improved in more established democracies: Levels of representation are expected to be higher in more established democracies (H3).

Political freedom is thought to affect all the stages of political representation outlined in the theoretical framework above, particularly the vote choice of the citizens, and the actions of the élite. The key role of political freedom may lie in its ability to ensure that citizens and representatives can express their political views openly, enabling better political communication. The expectation that follows is that there is a positive correlation between the level of freedom and the level of political representation (H4).

Whilst quotas for all kinds of groups can be envisaged, in practice quotas and similar measures are introduced to address the under-representation of ethnic
minority groups and women. In some sense, the presence of quotas can be considered part of the institutional setting (H2). Given the role of quotas as forms of political engineering to increase levels of symbolic representation, quotas are treated as a separate factor in this project. Quotas and related measures work in parallel to the electoral system and key institutions, with the sole intention to improve the representation of certain groups. Given their specific aim, it can be expected that the presence of quotas or similar measures is associated with higher levels of representation of specific groups (H5).

Factors revolving around candidates work on a different basis. They affect the supply of suitably qualified candidates, as well as the actions of the élite. Of these, only the supply of candidates is tangible, and is thus the only aspect addressed in the empirical chapters. In places where not enough candidates come forward, it is impossible to achieve high levels of representation, even if there is demand by the voters. The potential supply of qualified female candidates can be approximated by variables capturing the level of education of girls, or the involvement of women in the labour force. In either case, where there are more suitably qualified candidates, levels of symbolic representation can be expected to be higher (H6).

Cultural aspects, in contrast, can be thought of addressing the demand for candidates: the vote intention. The concept of demand here includes the willingness to support women or candidates from ethnic minorities. Turning the idea of supply on its head, there might be many suitably qualified candidates from minority groups, but citizens less inclined to cast their vote in their favour. Alternatively, expressed in positive terms, a population more positive towards ethnic minority groups is more likely to include these in positions of

19 Unfortunately, I have no reliable data on ethnic minorities, and this hypothesis can only be addressed in chapter 4.
power. These attitudes are thought to affect the propensity of citizens to vote for a woman or a candidate from a minority group.

As outlined in the theoretical framework, several factors are thought to shape attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society: religion, the level of development, as well as regional differences. The predominant religion of a country is thought to affect particularly the representation of women, as many religions come with clear views on the proper role and behaviour of the two sexes. The level of development may reflect the rise in post-material values as levels of development increase. Regional differences, finally, may work based on historical differences. For levels of symbolic representation, the expectation is that in a society where attitudes are more positive towards women or minority groups in public positions, levels of representation tend to be higher (H7).

At the same time, it can also be expected that cultural factors affect levels of ideological representation. On the one hand, the perceived importance of ideological domains might be affected. The underlying argument is that in a country dominated by a particular religion, certain issue domains may be emphasized, which in turn affects vote patterns. A similar effect can be expected because of the influence of post-material values in more developed countries. On the other hand, religious parties might play a significant role. Because of the prescriptive worldviews associated with the religion, Catholic parties tend to be conservative on social issues. In all countries, it can be expected that some voters cast their vote based on social identity or party identification rather than issue positions. In predominantly Catholic countries, this means that a significant number of voters may vote for Catholic parties despite disagreeing with the social positions of the parties. Consequently, their views

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20 The theoretical framework outlined also recognizes the importance of the level of symbolic representation achieved in other places and in other dimensions. Unfortunately, such influences are intangible in a cross-sectional design, and no reliable over-time data appear to be available.
on social issues are not represented as well as they could be. For other domains, such as political left–right, Catholic parties may not differ notably, meaning that this expected difference is probably restricted to the representation of social issues. These influences are included on the left-hand side of figure 5 in the previous section, leading to vote choice. As with the other variables, with the data available, I am only able to test this association at the national level. The argument outlined in this paragraph can also be made for predominantly Muslim countries: Levels of ideological representation can be expected to be lower in predominantly Catholic and Muslim countries (H7).

By outlining the different underlying variables shaping cultural attitudes, it becomes apparent that there are multiple overlapping dimensions—the importance of each may vary from country to country. For this reason, an immediate measure of attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society can be thought to lead to a better appreciation of the effects, also reflected in a better model fit. As with other measures of cultural attitudes, positive attitudes towards women and members of minority groups can be expected to be associated with higher levels of symbolic representation (H8).

In addition to cultural attitudes, the actual composition of society may be a factor influencing the levels of political representation achieved in different countries. On the one hand, a country divided by ethnicity may be more concerned with the representation of ethnic groups than for example one divided by religion only. On the other hand, in a country where most citizens share the same ethnic identity, the scope to exclude or significantly under-represent a large group of society is reduced. In either case, it can be expected that the ethnic composition of a society affects levels of ethnic group representation, but the latter association is expected to be stronger with measurements that do not account for the make-up of society: Levels of ethnic representation can be expected to be lower in societies that are more heterogeneous (H9).
Disregarding the make-up of society, it can be expected that levels of symbolic representation in different dimensions are linked because of the shared variables and mechanisms involved. In fact, Taagepera (1994) and Lijphart (1999) argue that because of shared mechanisms the measurement of one may be a reasonable approximation of the other should no data be available. In their case, the proportionality between votes and seats is highlighted. Heath et al. (2005) argue that both women and ethnic minorities are relative newcomers to national parliaments, and can thus be expected to face the same challenges (see also Rule & Zimmerman, 1994). A similar argument can be made based on a concurrent awareness of the under-representation of women and ethnic minority groups (Kostadinova, 2007). The resulting expectation is that *levels of gender representation are positively correlated with the levels of ethnic minority group representation (H10).*

For the same reason, the shared variables and mechanism that are thought to influence all forms of ideological representation, it may be expected that *levels of representation in different ideological domains correlate positively (H11).* The intuition here includes shared underlying factors, such as the influence of the electoral system, as well as a political environment that facilitates high levels of ideological representation in general—for instance reflected by the level of political freedom.

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter suggests the same underlying variables and mechanisms for both ideological and symbolic forms of representation. Both forms of representation are thought to be influenced by the electoral system and its key institutions; for both forms of representation the age of democracy or the level of development were identified as underlying factors. Therefore, because of the shared factors, it can be expected that *levels of ideological and symbolic representation are positively correlated (H12).* As in the previous two hypotheses, the argument is a generic one, but the frame-
work identified a number of shared mechanisms and variables for the different forms of representation.

The following table summarizes the generic hypotheses outlined in this section. The table also indicates which form of representation is thought to be affected. Hypotheses on symbolic representation are refined and tested in chapter 4 on gender representation and chapter 5 on ethnic group representation, whereas hypotheses involving ideological representation are refined and tested in chapter 6. Chapter 7 deals with the hypotheses on the relationships between different forms of representation.

Table 1: Summary of the Generic Hypotheses

<table>
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<th>Form of Representation</th>
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Chapter Summary

This chapter started by examining the concept of political representation in detail. I rooted concerns with political representation in questions of group justice and legitimacy. In order to examine the same representative relationships in all the empirical chapters, this project focuses on collective representation: the representation of citizens by parliament as a whole. By looking at the components of representation, it was possible to identify different forms of political representation that are of interest: symbolic representation, which is concerned with demographic differences, and ideological representation catering for differences in issue positions and policy preferences. This understanding of political representation led to the development of a theoretical framework where various factors were identified as influences on levels of po-
political representation. Broadly, these factors are the electoral system, candidates, cultural attitudes, as well as the salience of issue domains and demographic divisions.

Building on the theoretical framework, the chapter outlined a number of generic hypotheses derived from the framework in question. With the theoretical foundation of this chapter, it is possible to return to the research questions in the empirical chapters. Following the first research question (*How can we explain differences in the levels of representation?*), the first three of the empirical chapters address differences in levels of representation—looking at gender representation, ethnic group representation, and ideological representation respectively. This is followed by a chapter where the relationships between different forms of representation are discussed, addressing the second research question (*How are levels of representation in different forms linked?*). First, however, it is necessary to examine the data and methodology used in this project.
Chapter 3

Data and Methodology

Before the hypotheses presented in chapter 2 can be tested in the empirical part of the thesis, it is necessary to look at the exact measurement of symbolic and ideological representation as well as the data used. A number of different data sources are employed in this project, and in this short chapter, the main sources are discussed. The objectives for this chapter are to:

- Explain the measurement of symbolic and ideological representation
- Outline the key data sources used in the subsequent empirical analyses

Many of the variables used in this project are shared across the empirical chapters, and presenting them here allows the main chapters to be more focused. I not only outline the data used, but also describe them in more detail to assess their suitability for testing the outlined hypotheses. The discussion of data sources is divided into a part on the depended variables, and one on the explanatory variables. In addition to the variables outlined in this chapter, I have also considered different operationalizations for most of the variables. For example, for the electoral formula I tried classifications with more categories, or categorizing the formulas according to different schemas. Aside from small N issues in some instances, no major difference could be determined for these different operationalizations, and the results reported in the thesis are in no instance affected in a substantive way.

Measuring Representation

To start with symbolic representation, in this project, the level of representation is measured as the difference between the proportion of citizens with a
given attribute, and the proportion of representatives with the same. Gender representation is measured as the difference of the proportion of women in the population \((\Pi_{z,f})\) and the proportion of women in the parliament \((\Pi_{r,f})\): 

\[ Q_G = 1 - |\Pi_{z,f} - \Pi_{r,f}| \]

where \(Q_G\) denotes the quality of gender representation. The subtraction from 1 is used so that a higher values of \(Q_G\) stand for higher levels of representation.

Where there are more than two categories, such as in the case of ethnicity, the measurement can be generalized as 

\[ Q_E = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |\Pi_{z,i} - \Pi_{r,i}| \]

with \(i\) being a categorical variable. For ethnicity, each category \(i\) stands for a different ethnic group, and \(\Pi_{z,i}\) for the proportion of this particular ethnic group in the population. Again, the subtraction from 1 is necessary to ensure that higher levels of representation are marked by higher values of the representation score \(Q_E\).

The division by 2 is used to standardize values between 0 and 1. This measure corresponds to the *Rose index* (Mackie & Rose, 1991). This measurement does deliberately not include any components for the make-up of society in order to keep the measurement simple and comparable. As will become apparent in chapter 5, the scope for under-representation is larger in more homogenous societies, and for that reason a control variable is used alongside this measurement.\(^{22}\)

The measure \(Q\) is different from comparisons based on a single group, such as all ethnic minorities combined, or measures looking at a specific group, such as Italian-speaking Hungarians. Rather than focusing on a single ethnic minority group, the measure \(Q\) allows an assessment of how well parliament reflects all the ethnic groups found in the population. In this sense, the measure is concerned with the normative claim that parliament should mirror the population overall.

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\(^{22}\) In addition, chapter 5 will also make use of a measurement that is not sensitive to the make-up of society to ensure that there is no inference from the ethnic heterogeneity of a country.
The measure $Q$ is a measure of proportionality, similar to the Gallagher index of least squares (Gallagher, 1991, 1992). Differences between the measure $Q$ and the Gallagher index occur, because the Gallagher index is sensitive to splitting groups: The more groups that are considered, the larger the resulting value relative to the Rose index—referred here to as the measure $Q$. For example, if there are 80% blue and 20% orange in the population, but all the representatives in parliament are blue, both formulas lead to the same result (0.8). However, if I then differentiate between 10% dark orange and 10% light orange, the two measures lead to slightly different values. The Gallagher index will result in a value of 0.83, whilst the measure used in this project is unaffected (0.8). In the case of ethnic group representation, only the latter is satisfactory, because distinctions between ethnic groups may not always be clear. However, the in practice differences are insignificantly small.\textsuperscript{23}

Turning to levels of ideological representation, in this project, a simple comparison of means is used, possibly the most common measurement in the literature (see for example Weissberg, 1978; Marsh & Wessels, 1997; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999a; Powell, 2000). As outlined in chapter 2, because of data availability, it is impossible to use the exact same measure for levels of ideological representation than for levels of symbolic representation.\textsuperscript{24} The level of ideological representation in a country is measured as the difference between the mean position of the citizens in a specific domain ($\bar{Z}_k$) and the mean position of the parties, weighed by party strength in parliament ($\bar{R}_k$): $Q_k = 1 - |\bar{Z}_k - \bar{R}_k|$. As originally outlined in chapter 2, the positions of parties are used to approximate the positions of individual representatives for reasons of data availability, which are addressed in the subsequent section. The policy positions in each domain $k$ are measured on scales ranging from 0 to 1. As with

\textsuperscript{23} Further measures of proportionality are discussed in the context of vote–seat proportionality on page 76.

\textsuperscript{24} The comparability of measurements is discussed further in chapter 7.
the measures of symbolic representation, a subtraction from 1 is used so that higher values reflect higher levels of representation. The measurement does not include a salience component, to maintain comparability to measures of symbolic representation as much as possible. Salience is considered separately in chapter 7.

Powell (2000) is somewhat sceptical of using mean positions, defending the median position as theoretically more significant, in both majoritarian and PR systems. This concern with the median voter is goes back to Black (1948), popularized by Downs (1957). The mean and median position reflect vaguely different concerns: Whereas minimizing the distance to the median citizen minimizes the size of the opposition, minimizing the distance to the mean reduces the distance to the policy preferences (Achen, 1978; Powell, 2000). To some extent, this difference reflects different starting points: from the parties in the case of the median, from the citizens in the case of the mean. Whilst a competitive party system may lead to representation of the median voters, representation of the mean voter might be considered a fairer outcome. In practice, however, for the countries covered in this project, the differences between the two measures are insignificant, and none of the results reported is affected.

Data for the Dependent Variables

Symbolic Representation Scores

In order to calculate symbolic representation scores, data on the composition of the population and the parliament are required. The number and percentage of women in parliaments across the world is collected and made available by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2006). The data are provided by the parliaments themselves, and there are no definitional issues involved. The percentage of female members of parliaments is as of July 2006, and covers single or lower chambers. Upper chambers are not covered in this project, because where there are two chambers, members of the upper chamber are frequently
appointed rather than elected by the public. In order to assess the composition of the population, the percentage of women in a country is taken from *Encyclopædia Britannica* (2006d).

Ethnicity is the source of much segregation and discrimination (Jenkins, 1997; Murji, 2002; Gunaratnam, 2004), and is covered in a separate chapter. I understand ethnic groups as groups of people who are related through kinship and have an awareness of a shared culture and ancestorship. This means that ethnicity refers to self-declared group membership (Jenkins, 1997). Despite elements of choice—ethnicity being what one identifies with—ethnic identities are rather stable (Green, 2005; Hoddie, 2006). For this reason, a systematic analysis of ethnic groups is possible.

I have collected new data on the ethnic composition of parliaments. These data are based on official parliamentary documentation, official biographies, as well as information provided by parliamentary contacts. I contacted all parliaments, with an overall response rate of 27.2%. The data give the percentage of parliamentarians in each ethnic group, whereas the ethnic groups recognized vary from country to country, according to which divisions are salient. A very small number of parliamentary webpages include the ethnicity of parliamentarians in the respective biographies, from which percentages can be calculated. The data I collected were complemented with data by Alonso and Ruiz (2007), Reynolds (2006), as well information included in country reports published by the *U.S. Department of State* (2006). Alonso and Ruiz collected data for 16 countries in Eastern Europe; Reynolds covered a range of countries across the

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25 Despite this, where two chambers are present, gender representation scores for the lower chamber and the upper chamber tend to be similar ($r=0.48$, $p<0.001$).

26 Setting the proportion of women in the population to 50% rather than taking more accurate estimates does not affect the results noticeably; the resulting representation scores correlate very highly ($r=0.99$, $p<0.000$). If the proportion of women in the population is assumed 50%, the proportion of women in parliament itself can be taken as a measure of representation.

27 For the Netherlands I have additional data from Latner & McGann (2005), for Brazil from Johnson (1998).
world; and the Department of State reports cover most countries. Rather than single estimates, Alonso, Ruiz, and Reynolds use averages for two or even three elections where applicable. All the data are based on the number of parliamentary seats.

Because of the multiple data sources, I have two or even three data points for many of the countries covered in this project. In no case can apparent discrepancies between the sources be determined: The data seem robust, and the substantial results of the statistical calculations are not affected by substituting data sources. The results presented in chapter 5 can be replicated with subsamples that remove any of the data sources—including the U.S. Department of State, which tends towards an ethnoracial definition of ethnicity, or Alonso and Ruiz who seem to prefer a more ethno-linguistic approach. The fact that the results can be replicated irrespective of the data source is not entirely surprising, given that in most cases the different sources agree on which ethnic groups are salient, and what proportion of the representatives belong to each group. The corresponding data for the population are taken from national statistics, Britannica (2006d), and Fearon (2003). In some cases, I had to combine small ethnic sub-groups into larger groups to match the classifications used for the representatives.28 Although citizens may have a stronger claim for representation, I was forced to use data on the population rather than exclusively citizens for many countries because of availability. I cannot determine a case where this difference appears significant enough to distort the reported findings. The results of multiple sensitivity analyses and robustness tests suggest that no single case drives the results presented in this project.

Appendix 2 outlines the levels of ethnic group representation in 113 national parliaments, and lists the ethnic groups that were identified in each country. It lies in the nature of the concept that classifying ethnic groups can be problem-

28 It is for this reason that a measurement insensitive to splitting and combining groups is necessary.
Data 69

atic. The measurement used in this project has the advantage that the classification of ethnic groups can vary from country to country, and the most salient ethnic divisions are used in each country. The data sources used tend to agree on which ethnic divisions are salient in a country, but when in doubt about classification, I have also tried alternative classifications. However, the resulting ethnic representation scores are similar, often almost identical, and the results presented in this project are not significantly affected.

Ideological Representation Scores

In order to calculate ideological representation scores, data on the issue positions of the citizens and the representatives are required. In most countries, there are no reliable data on the positions of members of parliament on different issues. The weighted averages of party positions are a reasonable approximation for the positions of representatives, particularly when considered as a part of the parliament as a whole. However, even obtaining party positions on different issues is often difficult. The Comparative Manifestos Project—based on content analyses of party manifestos—has collected data on party positions in different domains for a number of years (Volkens et al., 1995). Whilst systematic in itself, the imposition of a single classification across countries can be problematic; at times leading to unexpected results contradicting common-sense placements, since concepts like left and right come with different substantive meaning in different places.

Benoit and Laver (2005) use averages of expert opinions to position parties, using the largest expert-based survey to date. Not only are their values more reliable than manifesto-based data (Benoit & Laver, 2006, 2007), but they also avoid confusion about what the different positions are called. This is the case because the meaning of the used scales is relatively consistent within a single country. Since I am interested in comparing party positions with the positions of citizens within a country—and not with positions of other parties in differ-
ent countries—, the Benoit and Laver data set offers a reasonably documented source of party positions. The data were collected in 2002 and 2003, originally covering 47 countries in Europe, North America, Japan, Russia, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand. Of these, 42 free and partly free countries cover a reasonable number of different policy domains.

By using party positions to estimate the position of parliamentarians, it is possible to utilize the large and diverse sample of countries covered by Benoit and Laver. Given that I look at larger groups of representatives, it seems reasonable to assume that the position of the mean representative of a particular party comes close to the party position. The use of expert estimates of party positions blurs to some degree the boundary between ideological representation and performative representation, as also indicated in chapter 2. This is offset by the quality and reliability of the data, and the fact that national elections can be covered.29

Benoit and Laver position the parties in 40 domains, on average 12 for each country. Not all domains were used in all countries because issues such as EU policy are meaningless in non-European countries. The main domain used in this project is a generic left–right scale where the interpretation was left to the experts (“Please locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account.”). Seven other domains are also included: including a social scale (“Favours/opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia.”), and one on the environment (“Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. Supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment.”).

Further domains are privatization (“Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry. Opposes all state ownership of business and indus-

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29 There are data available that cover the positions of Members of the European Parliament in multiple dimensions (Thomassen, 1994; Wessels, 1996). Using these data, however, would mean to focus on second-order elections, and reducing the scope of the project to European countries only.
try.”), nationalism (“Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national consciousness, history, and culture. Strongly promotes a national rather than cosmopolitan consciousness, history, and culture.”), the role of religion in politics (“Supports religious principles in politics. Supports secular principles in politics.”), views on immigration (“Favour policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society. Favour policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants to return to their country of origin.”), and deregulation (“Favours high levels of state regulation and control of the market. Favour deregulation of markets at every opportunity.”).

In order to increase the sample size, for the generic left–right scale, data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES; Sapiro & Shively, 2007) were also used for countries not covered by the Benoit and Laver data. For the many countries where there are estimates in both the CSES and the Benoit and Laver data set, the representation scores correlate highly. The Benoit and Laver values correlate more highly with how the citizens as a collective locate the parties in the CSES data ($r=0.68$, $p<0.01$) than with what the CSES experts do ($r=0.35$, $p<0.1$). Given that CSES expert positions often rely on a single estimate, this is not entirely surprising. In this project, CSES data and Benoit and Laver data were pooled for the left–right domain: CSES data are used for seven countries not covered by Benoit and Laver. These pooled data on left–right representation rather than the other domains form the basis of most analyses in chapter 6. The sample for the left–right domain includes 49 cases, for the other domains between 17 and 41 cases are included.

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30 The CSES is a large-scale cross-sectional electoral survey. It was designed to advance the knowledge of electoral behaviour. There are currently two completed modules (Sapiro & Shively, 2003, 2007), and in this project I will utilize the more recent one. The data were collected as part of national post-election surveys in 37 countries. The pooled sample has 64,256 cases, with variable but standard response rates of 28% (Netherlands) to 66% (Germany).

31 The Chapel Hill expert surveys (Hooghe, 2005) offer another source of party position for countries in the European Union. The positions in this data set correlate highly with the positions used in this project ($r=0.58$, $p<0.01$), further suggesting that the measures used are robust. The Chapel Hill data do not cover any country not already covered by Benoit and Laver or the CSES.
In order to calculate representation scores, the positions of the representatives—approximated by party positions—are compared to the positions of citizens. Data on the citizens’ policy positions were taken from the *World Value Survey* (WVS, 2006). This data set not only covers the countries studied, but also includes variables that directly or very closely match the classification used by Benoit and Laver. For each domain, the best possible match was used, but as outlined below, in some instances concerns remain. Table 2 compares the question wordings used in both cases. For the left–right positioning, the self-positioning question was used (“In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”). This question directly corresponds to the one used by Benoit and Laver: The positions of the citizens and representatives are compared on the same question, meaning that the resulting representation scores should be valid.

For the social domain, a scale was constructed including question on what kinds of neighbours the respondents would not tolerate (“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” using the items: “People with a criminal record,” “Heavy drinkers,” “Emotionally unstable people,” “Homosexuals,” “People who have AIDS,” and “Drug addicts.”). The choice of items reflects issues included in the Benoit and Laver questionnaire, but for reasons of coverage in the WVS data, some closely related issues were also included. The question used by Benoit and Laver leaves much room to the experts to decide which social issues to consider; a comparison is thus complicated. However, the resulting scale for citizens has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87, indicating that social issues may be less messy than feared.

For privatization, a question corresponding to Benoit and Laver was used, maintaining the key phrase of state ownership (“Private ownership of business and industry should be increased. Government ownership of business and in-
dustry should be increased.”). At first sight, the question for the parties addresses the issue in absolute terms, whilst the citizens’ question refers to privatization relative to the present state of affairs. The values become somewhat more comparable assuming that the levels of privatization in none of the countries have reached the possible maximum.

For deregulation, a question on competition was used, being the closest possible item in the WVS (“Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.”). This question is comparable to the one used for the party positions, because both questions assume a contrast between competition and the regulation of markets.

In order to measure positions on environmental issues, a question on economic growth is used. The key phrases of economic growth and environment are used both in the question for the citizens and the parties, and the key idea of prioritizing one over the other is maintained (“Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.”). The questions used for the citizens and the party positions correspond very closely, meaning that the representation scores for this domain should be valid.

Nationalism is measured with a variable contrasting tradition with high technology—maintaining the key ideas of national tradition and openness to new developments—, whilst for religion in politics a question on belief is used, a question closely reflecting the wording used by Benoit and Laver (“How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office.”). Views on immigration, finally, are captured with a question on whether migrants should
assimilate or keep their own customs and traditions, with the keyword *integration* shared by the WVS and the Benoit and Laver questionnaire. In all these instances, the comparability between questions is imperfect, and the resulting representation scores are approximations at best.

For all the policy domains included in the Benoit and Laver data, *World Value Survey* questions with the same or very similar wording were chosen. The fact that key phrases and concepts are shared in almost all cases should maximize comparability, as presented in table 2. However, as outlined above, in some cases conceptual problems remain. The three domains with the highest levels of congruence between questions for citizens and parties—left-right, social issues, and environment—are used predominantly in this project, and the results do not rely on the other domains. In order to calculate the representation scores, the positions of both the citizens and parties are rescaled to correspond to each other. Rescaling is relatively unproblematic in this case, since in each domain the positions of both the citizens and the parties are measured on scales without midpoint.
### Table 2: Comparing Question Wordings for Ideological Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Benoit &amp; Laver (Élite)</th>
<th>World Value Survey (Citizens)</th>
<th>Key Aspects Maintained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left–right</td>
<td>Please locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account.</td>
<td>In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?</td>
<td>Left–right; ‘generally’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social issues</td>
<td>Favours/opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia.</td>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?</td>
<td>Issues of liberal policies; attitudes to non-traditional life-styles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth.</td>
<td>Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.</td>
<td>Perceived trade-off between protecting the environment and economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry. — Opposes all state ownership of business and industry.</td>
<td>Private ownership of business and industry should be increased. Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.</td>
<td>State ownership of industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national consciousness, history, and culture.</td>
<td>We should emphasize tradition more than high technology. — We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.</td>
<td>Openness to non-traditional influences; perceived trade-off between progress and national history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion in politics</td>
<td>Supports religious principles in politics. — Supports secular principles in politics.</td>
<td>Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office.</td>
<td>Idea of separating religion from politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society. — Favours policies designed to help asylum seeks and immigrants to return to their country of origin.</td>
<td>Immigrants and their customs and traditions: Maintain distinct customs and traditions. — Take over the customs of the country.</td>
<td>Assimilation and integration into local culture contrasted with isolationist multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregulation</td>
<td>Favours high levels of state regulation and control of the market. — Favours deregulation of markets at every opportunity.</td>
<td>Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. — Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.</td>
<td>Markets and competition contrasted with the perceived need to regulate economic activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 The actual items included are described in the main text on page 72.
Data for the Independent Variables

In chapter 2, I outlined a number of variables that are thought to influence levels of political representation. For many of these factors different measurements are available, and various possibilities are listed in this section. For reasons of collinearity—as outlined at the end of this chapter—the multivariate analyses in the empirical chapters only include one of the possible measures. This section introduces variables that cover different aspects of the electoral system, the presence of quotas, the supply of candidates, the composition of society, cultural attitudes, and whether a democracy can be counted as established. The use of these variables is discussed in the empirical chapters.

Electoral System

Aspects of the electoral system are captured in a multitude of ways, but many approaches revolve around the proportionality between votes and seats (Farrell & Scully, 2007). A key aspect of the electoral system is the electoral formula. The classification of electoral formulas is taken from Colomer (2004), and no major change in electoral formula was recorded since. For the purposes of this project, the number of categories is reduced, because some electoral formulas are very rare. A distinction is made between PR system and majoritarian ones. Following Shugart and Wattenberg (2003), mixed systems were also classified as either PR or majoritarian, depending on their tendency. The result is a binary variable, although as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I have also tried different classifications and different ways to resolve mixed systems, which all lead to the same substantive results as presented in the empirical chapters.

It is also possible to measure the proportionality between votes and seats directly; and there are many different measures. The measures can be largely divided into absolute and relative measures (Gallagher, 1991; Benoit, 2001). All absolute measures are based on the difference between votes gained and seats
allocated, whilst relative measures derive from a fraction, dividing votes gained by seats allocated. Many of the measures, such as the **Loosemore-Hanby index**, are based on one of the electoral formulas, which can make them biased in certain circumstances (Gallagher, 1991). The **Gallagher index** of least squares is an alternative that is not based on an electoral formula (ibid; Lijphart, 1994; Benoit, 2001), but in practice, different indices tend to be very highly correlated. In this project, data are taken from Farrell (2001) and vote-seat proportionality is measured using the **Gallagher index**, based on averages for the 1990s. Whilst vote-seat proportionality might be a better measure of proportionality than the electoral formula, it is only recorded for 47 countries.

One aspect of the electoral system that affects its proportionality is the district magnitude. It describes how many seats are elected in each electoral district. Based on Farrell (2001), district magnitude is conceptualized as a categorical rather than continuous variable: Countries are classified into single-member districts (SMD), multi-member districts (MMD), and national districts. Many majoritarian systems come with single-member districts; and national districts are only found in PR systems. The data were checked against Colomer (2004), and include Croatia’s change from mixed to proportional representation. District magnitude is recorded for 78 countries.

The effective threshold is another factor shaping the proportionality between votes and seats, and it is in fact a function of the district magnitude. It approximates the number of votes a party requires in order to gain at least one parliamentary seat, by taking the midpoint between the most favourable and least favourable circumstances (Lijphart, 1994). Thresholds for countries with single-member districts were all set at 0.35. The values were taken from Farrell (2001) and Norris (2004), covering elections between 1996 and 2001.

Different aspects of the electoral system are the number of parties and the ballot structure. The actual number of parties present in an election was counted based on *Election World* for the most recent election before July 2006 (Derksen,
The effective number of parties weighs the parties by their size, and is in general preferred as a measurement of how fragmented a party system is. Data on the effective number of parties were taken from Farrell (2001), Lijphart (1999) and Norris (2004). These values are averages for the 1990s, or where available the most recent election. The number of effective parties is recorded for 74 countries. Turning to the ballot structure, there is a fundamental difference between systems with preferential voting and those without. Data were taken from LeDuc et al. (2002) and complemented by data from Norris (2004). No major change of ballot structure was recorded since, and 57 countries are covered.

**Quotas**

There are many ways to implement quotas: voluntary quotas within parties, statutory quotas imposed by law, as well as reserved seats. The existence of gender quotas is documented by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2006). These data are both reliable and the documentation detailed. For example, the documentation includes changes in quotas over time, allowing a precise matching between the existence of quotas and individual elections. Coded as gender quotas were voluntary party quotas, statutory or legal quotas, and reserved seats. This means that in this project a number of related actions are not considered: official aims of a party to include more women or ethnic minority candidates, the presence of women’s sections, separate women’s parties, and the appointment of women—something that happens in some unfree countries not considered in this project. For ethnic groups, I coded reserved seats, voluntary party quotas, and the appointment of ethnic minority parliamentarians. Reserved seats mean separate rolls for specific groups: depending on the setup, the entire population or only members of the

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Matland (1993) further introduced a related concept of party magnitude. Party magnitude is derived at by dividing district magnitude by the effective number of parties: $P=M/N_{eff}$. 
group are allowed to vote for these specific seats. Not coded as ethnic quotas were exemptions from thresholds, and districting along ethnic divisions; specific ethnic parties were coded into a separate variable. For both gender and ethnic quotas, the coding is limited to interventions that are conceptually clear and for which reliable data are available.

In addition to the presence of quotas, I have coded the proportion reserved for women candidates in each instance—ranging from less than 10% to 50%—, although the reported results are not affected by this difference in the size of quotas. Unfortunately, no reliable data on the enforcement of the various quotas appear to exist: what happens when voluntary or statutory quotas are not met. The data available from IDEA (2006) are patchy, and the presence of an enforcement mechanism does not necessarily mean that sanctions are enforced.

I have crosschecked the presence of quotas and the respective year of introduction against Dahlerup (2006) and Derksen (2006), information provided by individual parties on their websites, as well as the literature on specific countries (see for example Gingras, 1995; Bystydzinski, 1995; Allwood & Wadia, 2004; Yoon, 2004; Leyenaar, 2004; Galligan & Tremblay, 2005; Baldez, 2006; Sawer et al., 2006). The year of introduction is important for the over-time analysis in chapter 4. Data on the presence of quotas and reserved seats for ethnic minority groups were taken from Htun (2004), IDEA (2006), and Norris (2004). I have crosschecked these against a number of sources, including Matland (2006), Bieber (2004), and Derksen (2006). The analyses in the empirical chapters utilize a binary variable on whether special arrangements for women or ethnic groups are present or not, the simplest operationalization—giving the same substantive results as more elaborate alternatives.

Supply of Candidates

It is impossible to achieve high levels of representation if not enough candidates come forward. Unfortunately, there appear to be no reliable data for the
participation of ethnic groups in education or the labour force. This means that candidate effects can only be tested in chapter 4. The potential supply of qualified female candidates is commonly approximated by the level of education of girls, or the involvement of women in the labour force. The most commonly used variable is the percentage of girls enrolled in secondary education (World Bank, 2006). The data are as of 2005 for most countries, but in some cases up to 10 years before that. Data on the economically least developed countries are recent because the UN tracks progress as part of the Millennium Development Goals. These country-level data are in most places the best estimates available, and 97 countries are covered. The intuition is that where the proportion of girls in secondary education is higher, the supply of suitably qualified women candidates should also be higher.

An alternative approach is to focus on the proportion of women in the labour force. The argument is that in countries where women are free to participate in the labour force, there are fewer constraints on women for participation in the public sphere in general. The UN Statistics Division (2006) includes measures of both labour force participation in general, and participation in professional jobs more specifically. The latter measure is sometimes preferred, as involvement in non-professional jobs may not necessarily stand for potential participation in political life. 99 countries are covered by these variables.

Composition of Society

Another factor that is thought to influence levels of representation is the heterogeneity of a society in demographic terms: the extent to which a country is fractionalized into different ethnic groups. This variable is used as a control in chapter 5. The measure of heterogeneity is based on the proportion $P_i$ of different ethnic groups in a country. There are different yet very similar measures that are commonly used for the level of heterogeneity $H$ of a society: $H = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2$ (Ordeshook & Shvetsava, 1994) or the measure used in this pro-
ject $H = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2$ (Fearon, 2003). The more difficult aspect is obtaining reliable data to calculate the heterogeneity score. Such data are collected by a range of institutions, using different methods and crucially different definitions. Data from the *Atlas Narodov Mira*, a vast ethnographic work from Soviet times, are often used, but are now outdated. Efforts that are more recent make use of reputable reference works, such as *Britannica* or the *World Factbook*, carefully crosschecking the size of groups.

Such data are available from Fearon (2003) or Alesina et al. (2003). Fearon (2003) additionally offers an alternative set of heterogeneity data, by considering how different the various groups in a country are: cultural heterogeneity. This measure not only considers the number and size of different ethnic groups in a country, but also their cultural similarity by considering the linguistic difference between groups. The more distant two languages are in the linguistic tree, the larger the significance of the ethnic difference is assumed to be. Fearon’s data are a significant step forward in estimating the significance of social cleavages, but the data still cannot completely disentangle relevant and irrelevant cleavages (Laitin & Posner, 2000; Posner, 2004).

I use Fearon’s (2003) data set, because identifying relevant cleavages is not only beyond the scope of this project, but in some cases also intricate. For instance, it is possible to distinguish between historical ethnic diversity and ethnic diversity due to more recent migration. It is conceivable that political representation is affected by this difference. However, in practice the distinction is not clear-cut. What is more, from a justice point of view, ethnic minority groups have a right to be integrated, regardless of the history that makes them minorities.

Another variable concerned with the composition of society is the clustering of ethnic groups. Information about the geographical distribution of ethnic minorities is based on whether clustering was mentioned in the country profiles in *Britannica*. For example in Austria the country profile mentions Hungarians
“living mainly in Burgenland”, and Slovenes “living mainly in Kärnten” (Britannica, 2006e), which I coded as clustered. The variable distinguishes between no clustering where none was mentioned, a tendency of clustering, and heavy clustering where the country is largely divided along ethnic divisions or ethnic minority groups are concentrated in certain areas. This classification is equivalent to the one used by Mozaffar et al. (2003) for countries in Africa. Whilst this measurement may be relatively crude, it covers all countries and offers a reasonable approximation.34

_Cultural Attitudes_

The theoretical framework highlights the influence of cultural variables: Liberal attitudes in society are expected to lead to higher levels of representation. Of interest are attitudes that reflect sociological liberalism (Crouch, 1999). In order to measure cultural attitudes, a number of variables are used. Attitudes relevant to gender representation and ethnic group representation are measured using questions from the _World Value Survey_ (WVS). These questions capture positive attitudes towards women in politics and marginalized groups in society. For gender representation, the national mean of responses to the statement “Men make better political leaders than women.” is used, because of its direct relationship to gender representation. Responses to this question correlate very highly with other questions related to women’s status in society: agreement with the statement “a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (r=0.80, p<0.000), approval of the women’s movement (r=0.50, p<0.01), or agreement that it is a problem if a woman earns more than her husband does (r=0.49, p<0.001). This makes the question used both a valid and reliable measure of liberal attitudes related to women’s participation in the public sphere.

34 There is a corresponding variable in the _Minorities at Risk_ data set (Minorities at Risk Project, 2008), but as acknowledged by the project, it suffers from internal inconsistencies and unreliability. The classification of groups seems to follow rather different reasoning in different countries.
Turning to attitudes relevant to ethnic group representation, the focus is on attitudes towards marginalized groups in society. The World Value Survey asks respondents what kinds of neighbours the respondents would not tolerate (“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”). One of the questions available specifically asks about people of a different race, but these estimates appear unreliable: Substantively higher values are obtained when people are asked about a specific ethnic group rather than others in general.

For this reason, a 10-item scale is calculated, using a range of potential neighbours as the basis: people with a criminal record, people of a different race, heavy drinkers, emotionally unstable people, Muslim, immigrants or foreign workers, people with AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews. This is not to imply that different ethnic minorities actually were criminals or otherwise deviant, but that there is a tendency to treat them in a similar manner. The scale in principle ranges from 0 to 10, depending on how many kinds of people were mentioned as unacceptable neighbours (Cronbach’s α=0.93). I have inverted the scale so that a higher score on this scale indicates that a respondent is more tolerant towards marginalized groups in society. The national means are used, ranging from just under 2 to about 6, meaning that there is significant variance between countries.

Unfortunately, the coverage of the World Value Survey is limited, and the questions used are not asked in all the countries. In order to include cultural attitudes for all countries covered in this project, it is necessary to approximate cultural difference with underlying variables: religion, region, and the level of development. In the theoretical framework in chapter 2, these variables were identified as being causally prior to attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society.

Of these alternative measures of relevant cultural attitudes, the predominant religion of a country was coded following the example of Inglehart and Norris
The measure distinguishes between Catholic and Protestant countries, as well as Muslim countries, with the remainder combined as other. In predominantly Catholic and Muslim countries, more prescriptive gender roles are expected. The category other also includes countries where no religion dominates, such as in Germany. For analyses with a small number of cases, I coded an additional variable where a distinction between Christian and non-Christian countries is made. In this case, predominantly Catholic and predominantly Protestant countries are combined. Approaches that are more detailed are difficult, because of the small number of cases in many categories. Unfortunately, this commonly used variable of the predominant religion suffers from classification issues in some countries, as well as its inability to incorporate levels of religiosity.

A different approach is the use of regional differences, and the classification of different regions was taken from Kenworthy and Malami (1999). The regional boundaries are somewhat arbitrary: Western Europe, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand as one group of Western countries; Nordic countries; Eastern Europe; Asia and Pacific; Middle East and Northern Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; and Latin America. Caribbean countries are classified as Latin American. No justification for regional codes is generally given, but very similar coding is used in other studies (Moore & Shackman, 1996; Paxton, 1997). A study of the historical influences to justify such regional boundaries is unfortunately beyond the scope of this project.

A final approach to measuring cultural attitudes is the use of the level of development, which can be done in two different ways. Firstly, the Human Development Index conceptualizes development in its wider form, not restricted to economic development. This comparative measure captures life expectancy, education, and the general standard of living (UNDP, 2005). Secondly, the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries (Inglehart & Norris,
2003; Norris & Inglehart, 2004) is used. The argument is that particularly the shift from industrial to post-industrial society affects attitudes towards women in society, and thus influences gender representation. This shift is equally thought to affect attitudes towards ethnic minorities, although the measurement of development is inherently difficult. In the empirical chapters, regional differences are used in order to maximize the samples, but the conclusions are equally based on analyses based on variables that measure attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society directly.

The use of regional variables as a measure of cultural attitudes can be justified on empirical grounds, because of their explanatory power for the cultural attitudes. Positive attitudes towards women in politics can be explained statistically with the prevalent religion and whether a country can be classified as post-industrial or not ($R^2=0.69$). Institutional variables, the age of democracy, and the level of freedom are not significantly associated with the attitudinal variable ($p>0.1$). Once adding regional variables, neither religious nor developmental differences remain significant ($R^2=0.85$), suggesting that regional differences approximate these two factors. The story is very similar when statistically explaining attitudes towards marginalized groups in society: religion and post-industrialism are significant covariates ($R^2=0.67$), with other factors being insignificant ($p>0.1$). When adding regional variables, post-industrialism remains a significant covariate ($p<0.05$), suggesting that for the countries covered, regional differences also account for religious differences, but not entirely for developmental ones ($R^2=0.89$).

**Established Democracy**

The question whether a democracy can be considered as established or still in its infancy is addressed by a variable on the age of democracy. As such, this is a reliable indicator, but there might be problems with the definition: When does a country count as a democracy? Data were taken from Colomer (2004),
stating for how many years a democracy has existed. Where democracy was established multiple times in a country, the latest date of establishing the democracy is taken, such as after a spell of dictatorship. In order to differentiate between old and new democracies, I follow Farrell’s (2001) and Colomer’s (2004) approach to classify the age of democracy in the countries studied in a consistent manner. A country where democracy was established in the 20 years before 2006 is considered a new democracy: Old democracies are countries where democracy was established before 1986. The military coup in Thailand took place in 2006 after the data were compiled, and Thailand is thus included in the data.

Data from Freedom House (2006), finally, are used to capture influences of political freedom, a different dimension of considerations whether a democracy is established. These data are based on expert judgements, but a rigorous and standardized approach is used. This should minimize the level of subjectivity involved in the data, and allow comparability. Regional experts and scholars make use of information provided by reputable newspapers and organizations to judge the freedom enjoyed by the population. Captured in the variable used are the political rights of the population. The evaluations are for 2006 and cover all 131 countries.

**Collinearity**

In the multivariate analyses in the empirical chapters, collinearity between the outlined explanatory variables becomes a concern. Some of the variables measure aspects of the electoral system or cultural attitudes that are closely related, and in some cases, I have multiple operationalizations available for the same concept. It was therefore necessary to identify key dimensions. This was achieved based on the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, and confirmed by factor analyses. For the purposes of this project, the effects of the electoral system can probably be reduced to proportionality. This factor is ca-
tered for using the electoral formula. Other measures such as the district magnitude or measures of vote-seat proportionality are sometimes preferred, but ultimately the availability of data clearly favours the use of the electoral formula, to which these other factors are closely related.

In terms of institutional factors, special measures for women and ethnic minorities are treated separately. Voluntary quotas or statutory provisions are indeed factors independent from the electoral formula. All variables addressing cultural aspects are closely associated. In order to maximize the number of cases, regional differences are used—in line with amongst others Paxton (1997), Moore and Shackman (1996), and Kenworthy and Malami (1999). However, as outlined in hypothesis H8, there is a strong theoretical reason to capture attitudes towards women as political leaders and marginalized groups in society directly. Unfortunately, by so doing the sample size is reduced significantly. Consequently, multivariate analyses in chapter 4 and chapter 5 are carried out once with all cases and a single underlying variable that approximates attitudes through regional differences, and once with fewer cases and an immediate variable of relevant cultural attitudes.

In addition, the factors of the age of democracy and political freedom are also included, on the basis that they may be modifying variables affecting many of the other influences, as outlined in the theoretical framework in chapter 2. Both empirically and theoretically, all the identified key dimensions are reasonably independent. For many of the variables, in particular those of the electoral system and the provision of quotas, I also have tried different operationalizations, but the substantive results in the empirical chapters are unaffected.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have outlined the key variables that are used in the subsequent empirical chapters, and discussed their measurement. A detailed disuc-
sion of the data used in this project to operationalize both the dependent variables—measures of representation—and the explanatory variables helped to assess the suitability of these sources. The collinearity of some of the explanatory variables was addressed, and key components were identified. This means that the empirical chapters utilize appropriate model specifications.
Chapter 4

Gender Representation

Despite constituting half the population, in most countries women remain greatly under-represented in positions of power and decision-making, such as in national parliaments. In this first empirical chapter, the influence of institutional, cultural, and other factors on levels of gender representation is examined. As outlined in chapter 2, gender representation is of concern because of justice—the view that all humans are of equal worth. The focus in this chapter is on the macro level, and the analyses are comparative in order to tease out significant patterns. The objectives for this chapter are to:

- Present the levels of gender representation in different countries
- Retest explanations explaining levels of gender representation
- Use direct measures of cultural attitudes to improve the prediction
- Consider the effectiveness of gender quotas

In order to achieve these objectives, this chapter initially covers previous research, the data used, and methodological aspects specific to this chapter. The levels of gender representation achieved in free and partly free countries are then presented, but the main part of the chapter is dedicated to examining the contributing factors. By considering both institutional and cultural aspects, it will be possible to appreciate the effectiveness of gender quotas whilst also catering for directly measured cultural attitudes for the first time, as far as I know.
Previous Research

There have been several attempts at explaining the difference in the proportion of female parliamentarians amongst countries. The role of institutional factors is usually highlighted, but socioeconomic aspects affecting the supply of candidates are also frequently considered. Cultural factors, in contrast, are far less frequently studied than the other two, even though many studies recognize the role attitudes towards women in public positions may play without testing this directly (Paxton, 1997; Arcenaux, 2001; Yoon, 2004; Norris, 2004; Bessell, 2005; Galligan, 2005; Galligan & Tremblay, 2005; Kardos-Kaponyi, 2005; Novosel, 2005; Abou-Zeid, 2006; Clay, 2006). Many studies focus exclusively on Western societies or advanced industrial countries.

Institutional factors, such as the electoral system, are the most common explanation for the variance in the level of gender representation across countries. With the exception of a few (Oakes & Almquist, 1993; Moore & Shackman, 1996), almost all studies find the electoral formula to be a good predictor, with PR systems associated with higher levels of representation than majoritarian ones (Darcy et al., 1994; Matland & Taylor, 1997; Paxton, 1997; Ballington, 1998; Yoon, 2004; Leyenaar, 2004; Galligan & Tremblay, 2005; Grey & Sawyer, 2005). Many even find it to be the single most important factor (Rule, 1987; Norris, 1987; Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999).

PR systems may lead to higher levels of representation because of their larger districts (Lijphart, 1994; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994; Katz, 1997), a factor also commonly supported for the representation of women in parliament (Rule, 1987; Sainsbury, 1993; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). Although rarely spelled out, what is at work here is the probability that a vote goes to a woman. Assuming that there are only a few women contenders, the likelihood that a woman is elected is increased where more candidates are picked.
Matland (1993) argues that party magnitude—the district magnitude divided by the number of parties—is causally closer to levels of gender representation than the underlying district magnitude. In addition to the effects of district magnitude, assuming that men are more likely to take the top spot of party lists than women are, where there are fewer parties competing, the likelihood that a woman is elected is increased by reaching further down the party list. Combining the two effects, it is also apparent why, as Matland acknowledges, the effects of party magnitude are temporarily limited. The association is weak where levels of gender representation are low. In this case the likelihood of that a woman is elected is low in any case. As levels of representation increase, so does the association. Once women are as common as candidates as men are, and they are equally likely to appear at the top of party lists, the association once again decreases. The likelihood that a woman is elected in this case approaches 50%.

Left-wing parties used to matter, but in recent years, this no longer seems to be the case (Skjeie, 1991; Norris, 1993; Darcy et al., 1994; Matland & Studlar, 1996). In the past, left-wing parties were more likely to include women on their lists, and higher up on party lists. Additionally, quotas for women are generally found to work (Ballington, 1998; Childs, 2000; McAllister & Studlar, 2002; Yoon, 2004; Htun, 2004; Lovenduski, 2005; Dahlerup, 2006; Sawer et al., 2006; Tripp & Kang, 2007). Gender quotas usually take the form of voluntary party quotas. This means that a political party decides to include at least a certain proportion of women candidates, often a value between 20 and 30 percent. In most cases, these quotas are voluntary commitments, with no further consequences if the target is not achieved (Htun, 2004; Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005).

Socioeconomic factors are often suggested as contributing variables, even though the mechanisms involved are perhaps less clear and are rarely spelled out. It is probably the supply of qualified women that is affected (Yoon, 2005).
Socioeconomic factors, such as the proportion of women in higher education are thus approximations of the true number of suitably qualified women in the wider population. Of the possible proxies, economic development—as measured by the GDP—does not seem to be a good predictor (Moore & Shackman, 1996; Paxton, 1997). Women’s share in the labour force, in contrast, is often found to be associated with the proportion of women in parliament (Rule, 1981; Norris, 1985, 1987; Oakes & Almquist, 1993; Matland, 1998; Mateo Diaz, 2005), especially women in professional jobs (Rule, 1987; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994; Moore & Shackman, 1996; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Paxton & Kunkovich, 2003).

Educational variables are also sometimes included, in particular the proportion of girls in secondary education (Rule, 1981, 1987; Norris, 1987; Oakes & Almquist, 1993; Matland, 1998). The evidence for such educational variables, however, is mixed, with only some studies finding an association between school attendance and political representation (Norris, 1985, 1987). The reason for this may be that educational variables concentrate on the academic ability, not incorporating women’s participation in public life in general. As such, the proportion of women in professional jobs covers all aspects of supply: qualifications, plus the willingness of women to put themselves forward for public roles of responsibility. Measures of supply may therefore also incorporate cultural aspects that affect the likelihood of candidates coming forward.

There have been different approaches to try to capture the influence of cultural attitudes on gender representation more specifically. On the one hand, the focus can be on any of the underlying factors, on the other hand it may be attempted to capture cultural attitudes directly. In terms of the underlying factors, regional dummy variables are sometimes used (Moore & Shackman, 1996; Paxton, 1997; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Reynolds, 1999). Although not normally spelled out, regional variables may capture cultural differences due to different historical experiences.
Another way is to look at religion, in particular Catholicism (Rule, 1987; Paxton, 1997; Leyenaar, 2004; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005). Here, religion is highlighted for its prescriptive views on the role of women in public life. Apart from predominantly Catholic countries, Muslim countries may also be expected as culturally restricting women’s access to the public sphere. Both the public and the political élite may be affected by such views, resulting in the entry of women into politics being made more difficult (Kunovich & Paxton, 2005).

A different approach is to look at women’s position in society, and related attitudes (Norris, 1985, 1987; Norris & Inglehart, 2001, 2004; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003; Yoon, 2004). The intuition here is that such attitudes are influenced by a multitude of factors, including religion and historical differences. The level of development may also play a role, although it is not commonly treated as a covariate in its own right (Matland, 1998). With a direct measure of cultural attitudes, however, the link to the proportion of women in parliament is clearer: women are more likely to come forward as candidates in a more supportive environment, the élite are more likely to support women candidates, and the electorate are more likely to vote for women standing for election. The few studies that included a direct measure of attitudes towards women in politics all found very strong associations, with more positive views linked to higher levels of representation.

Because of this direct influence, a direct measure of attitudes towards women in politics is in many ways preferable over measures that capture underlying factors. In this chapter, I use a direct measure of attitudes towards women in politics where feasible, but I also pay attention to different measures that might approximate cultural attitudes, enabling conclusions for all free and partly free countries.
Hypotheses

To start with the electoral system, there are different aspects that are thought to affect levels of gender representation. The underlying argument is that systems that are more proportional lead to higher levels of representation. The electoral formula is a key factor, influencing the levels of proportionality: *PR systems can be expected to be associated with higher levels gender representation* (H1). The proportionality of the system can also be approached using the presence of electoral thresholds as a variable. This factor is related to the electoral formula, influencing the proportionality between votes cast and seats gained in addition to the effects of the electoral formula (Rose, 1978; Kolinskiy, 1993; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Blais & Massicotte, 2002): *Lower thresholds can be expected to be associated with higher levels of gender representation* (H2a). What is more, the proportionality can also be captured using measures of vote-seat proportionality, such as the *Gallagher index* (H2b).

In addition to the proportionality of the electoral system, other institutional factors are also thought to affect the likelihood of women being included in parliament. Of these the district magnitude or the number of parties are sometimes highlighted. Larger districts are beneficial to women and ethnic minorities since more candidates are elected from each list, including candidates placed further down the list. This means that larger districts increase the likelihood of including women candidates, and with that, *a positive correlation can be expected between the district magnitude and gender representation scores* (H2c). The electoral formula largely caters for this effect, since PR systems tend to come with larger districts than their majoritarian counterparts do. A separate effect on the likelihood of women being elected can be expected for the number of parties. Assuming that men are more likely to take the top spot on party lists than women are, where there are fewer parties competing, the likelihood of including a woman is increased by reaching further down the party list. There-
fore, the number of parties can be expected to correlate negatively with gender representation scores (H2d).

Linked to factors of the electoral system is the experience of working within certain parameters. A longer tradition of democratic rule means that there was more time to incorporate demands of women’s inclusion in parliament. The intuition is that the involved actors over time learn to effectively deal with such demands. Consequently, a positive correlation can be expected between levels of gender representation and the age of democracy (H3). Another suitable approximation can probably be gained by using the time since women’s suffrage. For reasons of consistency with other chapters, the age of democracy is used here, although the same substantive results are achieved with the variable of women’s suffrage.35

In a similar vein, the level of political freedom can be understood as an indicator of how well a democracy is established. Political freedom facilitates political communication, suggesting that there is a positive correlation between the level of freedom and the level of gender representation (H4).

Quotas are another factor considered, and in the case of gender representation, these measures for the inclusion of women are generally implemented on a voluntary basis (Htun, 2004). Whilst this means that enforcement of such targets may be an issue, it can be assumed that the presence of quotas increases the number of female candidates at least to some extent. Therefore, in places where parties implement gender quotas, the number of women in parliament can be expected to be higher (H5).

The supply of suitably qualified candidates is another factor considered. In places where not enough qualified women come forward as candidates, it is impossible to achieve high levels of representation, even if the élite and voters

35 The number of years since women gained the right to vote was taken from UN statistics (UNDP, 2005), and covers 119 countries.
would support more women in parliament. The potential supply of qualified candidates can be approximated by capturing women’s involvement in the labour force. It can be expected that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of women in the labour force and the level of gender representation (H6).

Turning to cultural variables, many factors are expected to affect the level of gender representation in one way or another. The argument is that attitudes towards women in public positions of power and responsibility are shaped by religious, regional, and developmental differences (H7). This effect may be largest in predominantly Catholic countries (H7b). Somewhat different in nature is the influence of the level of development on cultural attitudes, where the shift from industrial to post-industrial countries is often highlighted—at the same time a shift to post-material values. In the case of gender, post-material values mean greater concern for women’s issues, which can be expected to translate into higher levels of parliamentary representation. In each case, the underlying argument is that where attitudes towards women as political leaders are more positive, the level of gender representation can be expected to be higher (H8).

As argued in connection with the theoretical framework in chapter 2, cultural attitudes measured directly should lead to better predictions than measures relying on causally prior factors. This is the case since the different factors influencing cultural influences are synthesized in a way that is better captured at an immediate stage. In the case of gender, this means that supportive attitudes towards women in politics are expected to correlate positively with the level of gender representation. It can also be expected that a direct measure of attitudes towards women as political leaders is more strongly associated with levels of gender representation than measures of underlying factors (H8b).
Data and Methodology

Data

The data sources for the key explanatory variables used in this chapter were outlined in chapter 3. For the institutional factors, established reference works are drawn on, and in most cases, the classifications used are clear. Data on the presence of party quotas are mostly based on the *Quota Project* (IDEA, 2006), and crosschecked against various other sources, including party websites and handbooks of elections. For the direct measure of cultural attitudes, a question from the *World Value Survey* (2006) is used, asking respondents whether they agree that men make better political leaders than women. This question directly captures the essence of the attitudes in question—explicitly covering gender. This single question leads to a slightly better model fit than scales that incorporate related items. I use the shorthand *attitudes towards women in politics* throughout the chapter to increase readability.

Measurement

When addressing gender representation, the proportion of women in parliament is the most common dependent variable (Rule, 1981, 1987; Norris, 1985, 1996; Matland, 1993, 1998; Darcy et al., 1994; Lovenduski & Norris, 1996; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Moore & Shackman, 1996; Paxton, 1997; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). In this chapter, I use an approach formulated in more gender-neutral language—as such equally concerned with the representation of men and women. The representation scores used consider the proportion of women in the population. However, when it comes to interpreting the results, for the countries included in this chapter, the representation scores used can be interpreted in the same manner as the proportion of

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36 In terms of justice, it is equally possible to argue for exactly 50% representation disregarding the exact proportion in the population, because men and women are equals. However, once extending this logic to ethnic groups in the subsequent chapter, the consequences may become perverse.
female parliamentarians. In almost all countries, the substantial difference between measures controlling for the proportion of women in the population and those not is small or negligible. The values correlate at a rate of 0.99 (p<0.000). Of the countries included in this chapter, there is a significant difference only for Kuwait, where the percentage of women in population is just under 40%. However, setting the proportion of women in Kuwait to 50% or excluding the country does not affect the overall results reported in this chapter.

Formally, the representation score $Q_G$ is calculated as the difference between the proportion of women in the population ($\Pi_{Z,f}$) and the equivalent in the elected members of parliament ($\Pi_{R,f}$). The representation score is thus: $Q_G = 1 - |\Pi_{Z,f} - \Pi_{R,f}|$. The representation scores calculated theoretically range from 0 to 1. In a country where the percentage of women in the population is exactly matched by the percentage of women in parliament, a representation score of 1 would be achieved. In a country where there are no female representatives in parliament, in contrast, the value for $Q_G$ is around $\frac{1}{2}$. This is the case because all men in the population are reasonably represented by the men in parliament.

**Findings**

**Levels of Representation**

A noticeable variance of representation scores can be observed between countries. Figure 6 presents the distribution of representation scores in 131 free and partly free countries, reporting single and lower chambers. There is no apparent difference between the levels of gender representation in lower and upper chambers. The representation scores for all countries can be found in appendix 1. As visible in figure 6, the inclusion of women more or less in proportion to the population is uncommon. The highest value is achieved in Sweden, with a
representation score of 0.95. At the same time, however, the complete absence of women is also rare.

The presence of at least one woman in the national parliament is the definition of token representation. This is the case in almost all free and partly free countries. In 2006, the exceptions were Kyrgyzstan, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. In Kyrgyzstan, two women lost their court case, and the parliament was left with no women for the time being (IDEA, 2006). Freedom House apparently took the Tulip Revolution in 2005 as change enough to upgrade the classification of Kyrgyzstan from unfree to partly free (Freedom House, 2006). In a similar vein, the Solomon Islands are still recovering from a coup. Whilst a number of women stood for parliament in the most recent elections, none of them was elected. A single-member system is sometimes blamed for this absence of women in parliament. The other countries with no women in parliament are all microstates in the Pacific. Although they are free countries as classified by Freedom House, they all come with very small parliaments. A single seat in such small chambers may constitute as much as 7% of all the seats available.

As originally outlined in chapter 2, the proportion of women in parliament is sometimes taken as an indication of women’s status in society in general (Thomas, 1994; Squires, 1996; Childs, 2000; UNDP, 2005; European Commission, 2006; Hollstein, 2006; Lopez-Carlos & Zahidi, 2006; Social Watch, 2008). This assertion has not been tested empirically, but there are strong correlations between the level of gender representation and commonly used measures of women’s status in society. These include the participation of girls in secondary education.

**Figure 6: Distribution of Gender Representation Scores**

![Chart showing distribution of gender representation scores](image)

Notes: The distribution of gender representation scores in lower and single chambers in free and partly free countries. N=131.
education, as well as the more sophisticated WEF Gender Scale (Lopez-Carlos & Zahidi, 2005; r=0.61, p<0.000), or the UN Gender Empowerment Index (UNDP, 2005; r=0.72, p<0.000). These scales combine measures of economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, control over economic resources, as well as health and wellbeing of women.

**Bivariate Analysis**

Initially, in this section I examine bivariate associations between the level of gender representation and individual explanatory variables. To some extent, this allows a comparison with previous studies where single factors are sometimes tested. Moreover, the bivariate analysis constitutes initial hypothesis testing. To start with the proportionality of the electoral system, the electoral formula is often highlighted, covering the difference between PR and majoritarian systems (H1). Indeed, the level of gender representation in countries with PR is higher (\( \hat{\beta} \), p<0.001). The mean representation score for countries with PR is 0.70 as opposed to 0.61 for majoritarian systems. Treating the electoral formula as a continuous variable—rather than the difference between PR and majoritarian systems—, using a 8-point scale based on Farrell (2001) and Colomer (2004), the correlation between gender representation and the electoral formula is 0.32 (p<0.01). This means that mixed systems appear to fall between PR and majoritarian systems. Whilst PR is no guarantee for high levels of representation, majoritarian systems never do very well in terms of gender representation; and the highest scores are exclusive to countries with PR.

Other aspects of proportionality are also of interest. For the district magnitude, national districts are linked to higher levels of gender representation (\( \hat{\beta} \), p<0.001; H2c). The correlation between party magnitude and the level of gender representation is also significant (\( \hat{\beta} \), r=0.25, p<0.05). Given that there is no clear association between the number of parties and the level of gender representation (r=0.09, p>0.1), the reported associations of party magnitude here ef-
fectively reflect the effects of district magnitude. Similarly, higher electoral thresholds tend to be linked to lower representation scores (r=−0.58, p<0.01). The overall proportionality between votes and seats also appears to be a significant factor (r=0.33, p<0.05). Similarly, levels of representation are higher in more established democracies (H3). In relation to gender representation, this can be understood as the age of democracy (r=0.32, p<0.000) or the time since women gained the right to vote (r=0.29, p<0.001). There is also a statistically significant correlation between political freedom and the level of gender representation (r=0.27, p<0.01).

Another aspect of the electoral system is the presence of preferential voting but no significant association can be determined (p>0.1), contradicting previous research based on smaller samples (Sainsbury, 1993; Reynolds et al., 1997; Le-Duc et al., 2002).37 Gender quotas are often hailed as a means to improve the representation of women in parliament (H5). In countries where one or more parties have gender quotas, the representation score is higher by 0.06 (p<0.01). This is equivalent to about 6 percent more women in parliament.38

Institutional factors apart, the supply of suitable candidates may be an issue (H6). The most commonly used measure is the proportion of girls enrolled in secondary education (r=0.23, p<0.05). In line with Kenworthy and Malami (1999), I find women’s share in professional jobs (r=0.24, p<0.05) to be a stronger correlate for women’s representation than women’s share in paid work more generally (r=0.07, p>0.1): Where the pool of suitable female candidates is larger, the level of representation tends to be higher.

37 The interaction term between the presence of preferential voting and attitudes towards women in politics is statistically not significant (p>0.1). Adding the variable of preferential voting to model 4 on page 106 does not increase the model fit significantly, nor is the variable significant (p>0.1).

38 Similarly, the number of parties with gender quotas is associated with the representation score (r=0.39, p<0.01). Gender quotas using statutory means rather than as voluntary party quotas seem to improve gender representation to the same magnitude as their voluntary siblings (p<0.05).
Turning to cultural variables, the inclusion of a regional variable is a common way to approximate cultural differences. Nordic countries are often singled out, but the argument applies worldwide. Compared to the base category (Western Europe, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), all the regional variables are significantly different (p<0.01). Levels of gender representation are higher in Nordic countries, whilst other regions fare worse. Looking at religious differences as a proxy of cultural attitudes, compared to the base category (Protestant countries), only Muslim countries come with significantly lower levels of gender representation (Δ Q_G = 0.08, p<0.05). This result contradicts the importance of Catholicism reported by some previous studies (Rule, 1987; Paxton, 1997; Leyenaar, 2004; H7b), whilst maintaining the significance of religion as a factor overall.

The level of development is another factor associated with levels of gender representation. Using the Human Development Index the correlation is significant (r=0.28, p<0.01), especially when excluding partly free countries (r=0.40, p<0.000). In a similar vein, post-industrial countries are associated with higher levels of gender representation than industrial countries (Δ Q_G = 0.10, p<0.000).

Capturing cultural attitudes more directly, using the national means from a World Value Survey (2006) question on women as political leaders, seems to confirm that positive attitudes towards women in society are linked to higher levels of representation (r=0.71, p<0.01). This supports findings of other studies that include a direct measure of attitudes towards women with the slightly newer data used in this project (Norris & Inglehart, 2001, 2004; Paxton & Kunovich, 2003).

**Multivariate Analysis**

Having found support for the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 using bivariate associations—both the electoral system and cultural variables are
associated with levels of gender representation—; the levels of gender representation are now examined using multivariate regression analysis. In a first step, I include all countries in the analysis. Next, the chapter makes use of an arguably better variable, a step that invariably reduces the number of countries that can be considered. As outlined in chapter 3, for reasons of collinearity, variables capturing the key dimensions of electoral institutions and cultural aspects are used in this section.

In a first step, the modelling is designed to maximize the number of cases in the analysis. Table 3 outlines the results of three multivariate models. Starting with the electoral formula, additional variables are introduced to increase the model fit. Model 1 includes both the electoral formula and variables capturing the presence of gender quotas. Both voluntary party quotas and their statutory counterparts are included. These measures tend to be voluntary in nature, or implemented without serious sanctions for non-compliance (Htun, 2004; Matland, 2006). The percentage of women in parliament is about 8% higher in countries with PR systems than in countries with majoritarian systems. The effects of voluntary party quotas are equivalent to about 3% more women in parliament (p<0.1), whilst the stronger association of statutory quotas is statistically not significant (p>0.1). In none of the models are the other factors substantially affected by whether all statutory quotas or only enforced ones are included.

Model 2 adds considerations of political freedom and the age of democracy. The age of democracy is given in 100 years, since the size of the effect is so small. Considering the other variables in the model, the effects of political freedom seem negligible (p>0.1). The age of democracy, in contrast, appears to be a significant yet substantially small factor. The results of model 2 suggest that it takes just over a decade for the number of women in parliament to in-
crease by about 1%. Given the low number of female parliamentarians in many countries, this seems a very small effect.\textsuperscript{39}

**Table 3: Multivariate Models of Gender Representation I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mj/MMM (Base)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/MMP</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quotas</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.081 *</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.023 *</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory Quotas</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.066 *</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.001 *</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western (Base) ¹</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.003 *</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East ²</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.468</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at $p<0.05$, + significant at $p<0.1$. The age of democracy is given in 100 years. ¹ The base category includes Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ² The Middle East also includes North-African countries. N=131.

Once adding the age of democracy, the predicted effects of gender quotas are reduced, but remain significant covariates ($p<0.1$). Trying to cater for the supply of candidates, adding variables on education or labour-force participation does not increase the model fit, and the additional variables are statistically insignificant ($p>0.1$). The same is the case for subsequent models. It appears that the supply of suitably qualified candidates is a negligible factor.

A slightly lower model fit ($R^2=0.35$) can be achieved by substituting the age of democracy for the *Human Development Index* (HDI), as did Norris and Inglehart (2001). The other variables in the model are not notably affected by this substi-

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\textsuperscript{39} The interaction between the age of democracy and the electoral formula is not significant ($p>0.1$) and does not add to the model fit. In addition, I have also tested various other interaction effects, with no significant results. The only significant exception is discussed on page 105. In particular, no significant interaction could be observed between institutional and cultural factors.
tution of measures of how well a democracy is established. The variables of freedom and the HDI are not significant, but after including the interaction between the two factors, both the interaction and the HDI are significant (p<0.05). This suggests that political freedom is necessary for the effects of development to work.

Model 3 includes a variable to capture attitudes towards women in politics. In order to maintain the full sample, this is approximated by means of regional differences. The predicted effect of having PR rather than a majoritarian system is reduced, but remains statistically significant (p<0.01). Once adding the regional variable, party quotas no longer seem to make a significant difference (p>0.1), whilst the stricter statutory variant still seems to work (p<0.05). Using measures of quotas that consider the size of the quotas—the proportion reserved for women—does not change this finding.

The factor that is probably affected most by the introduction of regional variables is that of the age of democracy. Rather than being a large positive factor, model 3 suggests that the age of democracy has little significant impact. Instead, regional differences seem to matter most. Nordic countries have higher levels of gender representation than elsewhere, whilst all other regions have lower levels of gender representation compared to the base category of Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Some of these differences are marked and most of them are statistically significant.40

Now in a second step, the nature of attitudes towards women in politics is investigated in more detail. Hypothesis H8b stipulates that cultural attitudes measured more directly than regional differences should lead to a better model fit. Unfortunately, such considerations of a direct measure result in a

40 Differences in the predominant religion of a country are another approach to consider cultural differences. Substituting regional with religious differences in model 3 leads to a lower model fit (R²=0.42), but the differences are all significant (p<0.01). The only substantive difference to the reported model is that the age of democracy remains a significant factor in this case, although with a smaller estimated effect.
reduced sample. Table 4 includes model 3 with only the countries where data on measured attitudes towards women in politics are available. This smaller sample includes a disproportionate number of Eastern European countries. A key difference is that in the reduced sample, the variable on the electoral system is no longer a significant factor, although the size of the estimated effect remains the same. This difference is due to the sample, because the electoral system is also not a significant variable in model 2 when restricted to the reduced sample. Another difference is that the estimated effect of statutory quotas is reduced in the model in table 4 (p>0.1), perhaps indicating issues of enforcement in some of the countries in the reduced sample. For all the other variables, substantively the results are the same, with differences being negligibly small. The coefficients for the different regions remain almost unchanged, even though in some cases the number of cases is considerably small. This means that the results from the smaller sample are likely to apply to all free and partly free countries.

\[
\begin{array}{lcccccc}
\text{Table 4: Multivariate Models of Gender Representation II} \\
\text{Model 3 (reduced sample)} & \text{Model 4} \\
\hline
\text{Constant} & 0.67 & 0.05 & 0.000 * & 0.72 & 0.05 & 0.000 * \\
\text{Electoral Formula} & & & & & & \\
\text{Mj/MMM (Base)} & . & . & . & . & . & . \\
\text{PR/MMP} & 0.04 & 0.03 & 0.142 & 0.02 & 0.03 & 0.367 \\
\text{Quotas} & & & & & & \\
\text{Party Quotas} & 0.01 & 0.00 & 0.160 & 0.01 & 0.01 & 0.297 \\
\text{Statutory Quotas} & 0.02 & 0.02 & 0.326 & 0.02 & 0.03 & 0.511 \\
\text{Freedom} & 0.00 & 0.01 & 0.723 & 0.00 & 0.01 & 0.266 \\
\text{Age of Democracy} & 0.01 & 0.03 & 0.722 & 0.00 & 0.04 & 0.483 \\
\text{Cultural attitudes: Region} & & & & & & \\
\text{Western (Base)} & . & . & . & . & . & . \\
\text{Nordic} & 0.14 & 0.04 & 0.001 * & . & . & . \\
\text{Eastern European} & -0.06 & 0.03 & 0.070 * & . & . & . \\
\text{Asia and Pacific} & -0.09 & 0.05 & 0.076 * & . & . & . \\
\text{Middle East} & -0.15 & 0.06 & 0.080 * & . & . & . \\
\text{Sub-Saharan Africa} & 0.11 & 0.06 & 0.080 * & . & . & . \\
\text{Latin America} & -0.04 & 0.03 & 0.210 & . & . & . \\
\text{Attitudes: Women as Leader} & & & & 0.19 & 0.04 & 0.000 * \\
\text{R}^2 & 0.53 & 0.58 & 0.58 & 0.58 & 0.58 & 0.58 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Notes: * significant at p<0.05, + significant at p<0.1. Model 3 is identical to the one used in table 3, but only includes the cases also used in model 4. N=48.
Model 4 differs from model 3 in that a direct measure of cultural attitudes is used, directly measuring attitudes towards women as political leaders. As such, the link to political representation is closer than with underlying cultural variables, such as the regional differences included in model 3. The introduction of this variable not only increases the model fit significantly, but also overrides all the other variables: The estimated effects of the electoral system become smaller when attitudes are considered. The overriding nature of the cultural variable reflects findings by Paxton and Kunovich (2003). However, here I also consider quotas as an institutional factor, which seems to make no difference when directly controlling for attitudes towards women in political roles (p>0.1). It is not possible to include regional variables and the variable on women as political leaders because of significant collinearity issues.

The variable on liberal attitudes towards women in politics is measured using a 4-point scale, averaged for each country. The scale is centred to ease the interpretation of the other coefficients in the model. The range across all countries is about 2 points on this scale. In a society where the national mean differs from another by 1 point, the number of women in parliament is affected by about 19%. In other words, a country where the average position towards women is most liberal is estimated to include about a fifth more female parliamentarians than an average country; a country with least liberal attitudes a fifth fewer women than an average country.

Norris (2004) uses an indirect measure of cultural attitudes—the predominant religion of a country—, and suggests that political factors are more significant than cultural factors, as indicated by the standardized values. Based on model 3, using regional or religious variables, and model 4 using a direct measure of attitudes towards women in politics, it appears that the conclusion needs to be reversed (see also Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). With the data used in this project, I am unable to replicate Norris’ findings.
Adding the time since women’s suffrage to the final model, as did Norris (2004), does not increase the model fit, nor is the variable significant (p>0.1). None of the coefficients in any of the models is significantly affected by this additional variable. Adding regional or religious variables to model 4—ignoring collinearity issues—does not notably change the coefficients already in the model, and none of the additional variables is significant. This finding disagrees with Paxton and Kunovich (2003) who found that Nordic countries remain significantly different even once considering attitudes towards women.

Similarly, a variable categorizing countries into industrial and post-industrial can be used to replace the age of democracy in model 4, with no substantial effect on the reported coefficients. This suggests that the variable on the age of democracy to some extent may capture the effects of modernization outlined by Inglehart and Norris (2003). Because of collinearity issues, it is impossible to include both variables at the same time.

By limiting the focus to countries with majoritarian systems, it is possible to substitute the variable of statutory quotas with one capturing the presence of reserved seats. In contrast to other quotas, reserved seats affect the number of elected parliamentarians, not just those standing for election. By their very nature, reserved seats are enforced. Doing this substitution in model 4 suggests that indeed reserved seats are a significant factor (p<0.05), even after controlling for attitudes towards women in politics. However, the number of countries with reserved seats for women is just 3: Bangladesh, Botswana, and Tanzania.

The multivariate analyses in the previous paragraphs are based on different samples, and in this section, I address the robustness of the findings in a number of ways. Firstly, using an analysis over time, I further examine the relationship between cultural attitudes and the levels of gender representation. Secondly, using different subsamples, I hope to illuminate the effects of sample restriction in table 4.
Robustness of Findings: Changes over Time

In a first step, I attempted to capture changes over time. Unfortunately, the availability of data is an issue, because questions capturing attitudes towards women in public life were only added recently to attitudinal surveys, such as the World Value Survey. Nonetheless, even when using a smaller timeframe, changes in the level of gender representation over time can be expected to be associated with changes in the key variables. I compare values for 2006 with 1995 for reasons of data availability.

Paxton (1997) also compares changes of gender representation over time. The analysis in this robustness test, however, differs in a number of ways: rather than relying on proxies, in this section attitudes towards women in politics are measured directly. In addition, I consider the implementation of gender quotas—probably the most commonly suggested intervention for increasing the number of women in parliament. Paxton finds no effect for supply-factors, but suggests that the presence of PR systems and ideology in its wider sense are significant.

Looking at changes over time, there were no major changes in electoral formulas in the time period studied. Evidence from outside the time-span covered in this section—such as the change of formula in New Zealand—casts doubt on the suggestion that the electoral formula on its own is clearly associated with sustained increases in the number of women in parliament.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{41}\) There was a change in Croatia from a mixed to a PR system during the time considered (Colomer, 2004), but one case is not enough to make any kind of inference. The most notable substantial change in electoral system in democratic societies in recent years was probably in New Zealand. The change to PR in New Zealand in 1996 is associated with an increase of 8% more women in parliament (Grey & Sawer, 2005; IPU, 2007). This is significantly more than the about 3%, by which the proportion grew in preceding elections, beginning in the 1970s. However, the large increase in 1996 could not be sustained: In 2001, the election after the change of electoral formula, no further increase in the proportion of women in parliament could be achieved, and including the most recent elections in 2008, the average increase is still about 3% per election (\(^{1}\)). In other words, the proportion of women in 2005 and 2008 would have been expected based on the linear trend starting in the 1970s, irrespective of the change in electoral formula. If there was a clear effect attributable to the change of electoral formula, it is unclear why there was no further increase in 2001. Similarly, it is unclear why the proportion of women did not continue to increase in a linear fashion from the 1996 result. It is therefore difficult to speak of an electoral system effect with any
Changes in freedom were operationalized by subtracting the 1995 values of the Freedom House Index from those of 2006. Countries that became freer are associated with higher levels of gender representation, but not significantly higher than countries that did not ($\Delta Q_c = 0.06$, $p>0.1$). Party quotas are documented by IDEA, and changes since 1995 were recorded into a separate variable. Changes in the attitudes towards women as political leaders were obtained by comparing the mean values of 2004 and 1995. These are the best matching time points possible with World Value Survey data. Changes in attitudes were recorded for 17 countries.

The number of parties introducing quotas in the period considered is relatively small. In most countries there were no changes; in 14 countries one or more parties introduced voluntary gender quotas between 1995 and 2006. Of these, 13 have increased their level of gender representation. The exception is Botswana where two parties introduced quotas, but both failed to reach their target (IDEA, 2006). However, the estimated effect of party quotas is small, and there is no significant difference to countries where no party introduced gender quotas ($p>0.1$). A different case is Iceland where the number of parties with quotas decreased, whilst the number of women in parliament increased.

In contrast, there is a relatively strong correlation between changes in attitudes and changes in the level of gender representation ($\gamma$, $r=0.46$, $p<0.1$). Counter to this correlation, in Bangladesh an increase of women in parliament was achieved by means of reserved seats for women (IDEA, 2006; IPU, 2006). With the data available, it is impossible to say whether the decreased support for women politicians in the population is linked to the establishment of reserved seats. In the cross-national analysis, quotas and reserved seats are not significantly associated with attitudes. Similarly, in the Philippines an all women’s confidence. In France, there was a short trial of PR in 1986, but it did not result in above average gains for women in parliament. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the change to PR led to no noticeable change in the proportion of women in parliament.
party was successfully elected in the period considered (ibid.), accounting for almost all the changes. In India, a possible backlash in attitudes or party political reasons might have prevented an increase of women in parliament.

Unsurprisingly, the proportion of women in parliament in 1995 is strongly associated with the proportion of women in parliament in 2006 ($r=0.88$, $p<0.000$). The proportion of women in parliament in 1995 is also associated with positive attitudes towards women in politics in 2006 ($r=0.73$, $p<0.000$). This association, however, does not hold when controlling for the prevalent religion, region, or the level of development. When regressing attitudes towards women in politics in 2006 on regional differences, the level of development, and the proportion of women in parliament in 1995, only the first two variables are significant covariates.\(^{42}\) This casts doubt on the argument that the proportion of women in parliament in the past has a significant impact on present attitudes towards women in politics, at least for the period considered.

Although the evidence is limited, the analysis over time in this section suggests that the findings reported in this chapter are robust: Where attitudes towards women as political leaders become more liberal, levels of gender representation tend to increase. This finding is in line with Paxton (1997), who used religion and other proxies as measures of ideology. The analysis here also fails to find a clear indication that the introduction of quotas is associated with higher levels of gender representation. So far, I have interpreted this lack of association as an indication that quotas may not be successful. Following the blockage argument, the lack of association in the cross-sectional analysis may mean that quotas have worked, and that without quotas it would not have

\(^{42}\) This substantive result can be replicated with different model specifications and control variables. The age of democracy, the level of political freedom, the electoral system, and the proportion of women in parliament in 1995 are not significantly associated with attitudes towards women as political leaders in 2006 ($p>0.1$). In contrast, the predominant religion of a country, regional differences, and the level of development are all good predictors for attitudes towards women as political leaders in 2006 ($p<0.05$), in line with the argument in chapter 2.
been able to break through such barriers. However, if such blockages exist, in the analysis over time the introduction of quotas should be associated with an increase in the level of gender representation. The results here indicate that in countries where quotas were introduced, the level of gender representation did not increase significantly more than in countries where no quotas were introduced, casting doubt on the argument.

**Robustness of Findings: Subsamples**

In a different analysis, I tried to address the nature of the reduced sample used when measuring attitudes towards women in politics directly. To this extent, I reran the analyses with a subsample of OECD countries. OECD countries are free and economically developed countries, often referred to as highly industrialized countries or advanced industrial countries (AIC). In the multivariate analysis, the OECD subsample leads to similar results to the main analysis in this chapter. Replicating model 2 in table 3, only the electoral formula and the age of democracy are statistically significant variables (p<0.05). Once introducing the regional variables, the age of democracy is no longer significant, in line with the analysis above. Similarly, gender quotas do not appear to be associated with higher levels of gender representation once controlling for regional differences. However, in contrast to the overall analysis, in the OECD subsample the presence of PR systems remains a significant factor even when controlling for attitudes towards women as political leaders (p<0.05).

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43 In order to cater for possible sampling bias concerning the presence of quotas, I used propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) to address the effectiveness of gender quotas in the full sample. Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that the propensity of implementing quotas should be linked to positive attitudes towards women in power, but no such association can be determined (p>0.1). This may be the case because contrary to Norris and Inglehart’s assumption attitudes towards women in power are not necessarily uniformly distributed in the population. Empirically, the best prediction of the presence of quotas was achieved using the **Human Development Index** (HDI), political freedom, as well as the time since suffrage was gained (R²=0.26). Using propensity score matching, the sample could be improved, but the presence of quotas remained insignificant. This suggests that quotas may not be the driving force to more women in parliament, possibly an extra step to reflect advances elsewhere in society (Freidenvall et al., 2006).
The fact that the electoral formula is a significant factor in the OECD subsample may indicate sampling issues for the reduced sample used in table 4. However, when excluding Nordic countries from the OECD subsample, the variable on the electoral formula no longer remains significant; and the results reflect those reported in the overall analysis in table 4. This suggests that when it comes to the representation of women—apart from the Nordic countries—there appears to be no substantive difference between OECD countries and free and partly free countries. Results for the electoral formula remain unclear, because in the reduced sample the variable was not significant, despite the sample being reasonably large. The suggestion that new democracies are substantively different because the parliamentary system was set up when gender issues were already salient (Norris, 1987, 1993; Leijenaar, 1993) seems unsupported, because, once controlling for regions or attitudes towards women in politics, the variable for the age of democracy is insignificant in all samples considered.

In addition, I have tested the robustness of the reported findings using a subsample of countries with a population of at least a million—excluding microstates. The results are not significantly affected by the exclusion of these small countries. The same is the case when restricting the countries under consideration to those with a population of at least five million.

Section Summary

In this section, I have used multivariate regression analyses to consider the effect of various variables on levels of gender representation. Using regional variables, the electoral system seems to have a positive impact on levels of gender representation, whilst quotas are not associated with higher levels of representation. When measuring attitudes towards women in politics directly, the significance of institutional factors seems to wane, although this largely reflects the reduced sample. I have tested the robustness of the reported findings
in an analysis over time, and with various subsamples. The effects of the electoral formula remain unclear, but it appears that cultural factors shape levels of gender representation—particularly attitudes towards women in politics. However, given that electoral systems are relatively stable, only changes in attitudes can account for changes over time.

Discussion

The initial results in this chapter—based on bivariate analyses—indicate that there are a number of candidates for explaining differences in the levels of gender representation, which fits well with the theoretical framework in chapter 2. Variables measuring aspects of the electoral system, and with that vote-seat proportionality, seem to confirm that the electoral system is a factor that affects gender representation. The gender quotas introduced in countries across the world, appear to be successful: The number of female representatives is larger in countries where there are quotas relative to countries without. Similarly, variables thought to approximate cultural attitudes are associated with differences in gender representation scores. Causally, attitudes towards women in politics are more immediately linked to gender representation than other cultural variables, and are highly correlated with the level of representation.

In the multivariate regression analysis, the inclusion of cultural variables leads to a surprising result. Whilst the relationship between attitudes and gender representation to a certain degree may be commonsensical, the size of the effect is surprising. Once considering cultural aspects, the effectiveness of gender quotas is in doubt: the presence of quotas is no longer associated with higher levels of representation. Considering the size of the quotas—for example whether 20% or 40% are reserved for women—does not change this finding. Sanctions for failing to reach the target set out by the quota do not appear to make a difference; this might be because the data I have may be patchy and
do not measure whether the sanctions are actually enforced. What is more, this lack of association between the presence of quotas and levels of gender representation also appeared in the analysis over time: the introduction of quotas is not associated with an increase in the levels of gender representation greater than in countries where no quotas were introduced. This weakens the blockage argument that quotas may have worked and are for that reason no longer significant in the cross-sectional analysis that forms the main part of this chapter. Given the fact that gender quotas are a common measure implemented with the aim to address the low proportion of women in parliament, this lack of association between quotas and the level of gender representation is significant for policymakers interested in increasing the number of female representatives. The results do not necessarily mean that quotas fail to work as such; but indicate that their effect may be more cosmetic. Unenforced voluntary gender quotas may merely reflect a society embracing the idea of having more women in politics, an extra assurance rather than jump-starting a process. Alternatively, quotas might point to élites that are more liberal: more supportive of women in politics than the public. In this case, quotas might help avoiding lower levels of representation. Rather than being a reflection of the society, quotas may thus be a reflection of the attitudes of the political élite—something I unfortunately have no data on. This would explain why there is no association between attitudes in the public and the presence of quotas in the cross-sectional analysis, contrary to the predictions by Inglehart and Norris (2003). Unless the presence of women in parliament affects attitudes towards women in politics, the increase in female members of parliament will probably be largely restricted to the time it is enforced by reserved seats or enforced quotas. The drastic drop in the number of female parliamentarians in former communist countries after the change illustrates this point further (UN, 1992; Tinker, 2004; 44) Because of incumbency effects, the effects of quotas can be expected to last longer than their actual enforcement, but only to a limited extent.
Lovenduski, 2005; Dahlerup, 2006), although institutional settings tend not to change very often.

The introduction of reserved seats—such as in Bangladesh—or other forms of enforced electoral engineering in order to increase the level of gender representation may have an immediate impact (Reynolds et al., 1997; Jacquette, 1997; Kostadinova, 2002; Norris, 2004; O’Flynn & Russel, 2005; Taylor, 2005); but surely those advocating such affirmative action are concerned with the lasting effects. Based on the analysis in this chapter, it appears that trying to change attitudes towards women in politics may be an effective way to approach changes to levels of gender representation. This factor may be effective because it influences both the supply and demand side: more women coming forward as candidates, as well as an increased possibility that women are selected by the parties and the voters. Further research is needed to understand the factors that influence attitudes towards women in politics over time: changes in the level of development, advocacy work, or different variables. Whilst enforced quotas may be used to increase the number of women in parliament, such actions risk backlashes in the population (Wilentz, 2003; Mansbridge, 2005; Grey, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006; McSmith, 2008). Moreover, the impact of women in parliament as role models is contested (Phillips, 1995), but the effects may just be too slow to be easily captured (ibid.; Stimson, 2007). To consider such influences is beyond the scope of this chapter.

The robustness of findings was tested in a number of ways, and—once controlling for regional differences or attitudes towards women in politics—the effectiveness of unenforced gender quotas became doubtful in each case. The fact that, contrary to many previous studies, the electoral formula was not a sig-

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45 Preferential treatment based on demographic characteristics is deemed unjust in the Rawlsian theory of justice (Rawls, 1999). In contrast, quotas are largely compatible with Young’s theory (Young, 1990; Bacchi, 2006). Williams (1995) argues that the liberal tendency to think away differences considered irrelevant fails, because it ignores rather than addresses differences.
significant variable in the reduced sample in table 4 was explained with sampling issues, although it seems difficult to suggest a systematic effect for the electoral formula. Looking at the subsample of OECD countries, I argued that it is possible that some cultural aspects are erroneously associated with the electoral formula. For instance, it may be that part of the cultural heritage of Nordic countries becomes associated with the electoral formula. When removing Nordic countries from consideration, no significant differences between countries with PR and majoritarian systems remain in the subsample of OECD countries.

These findings do not affect the overall message of this chapter that cultural attitudes appear to be the key drivers for gender representation. What follows is that studies entirely focusing on institutional factors probably overestimate the effects of the electoral system, in particular the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas. The effects of positive attitudes towards women in politics may also extend to aspects of the supply of suitable candidates, as indicated in the theoretical framework in chapter 2. Whilst in the cross-national analyses variables on the supply of candidates remained insignificant, it is possible that the supply of potentially suitable candidates—as captured in levels of education of engagement in professional work—is secondary to the aspect of actually coming forward as a candidate. Whilst the former clearly is a necessary factor, given the relatively small number of parliamentary seats in a country, the variables may be too generic. In contrast, a supportive environment—as approached in terms of attitudinal variables—appears to be the dominant factor in terms of supply. Unfortunately, with the data available, it is impossible to untangle separate effects of supply.

The variable on attitudes towards women as political leaders works best on statistical grounds. This follows the reasoning that the variable is more immediately linked to political representation than other variables thought to cap-
ture attitudes towards women in politics. However, causally prior measures of cultural attitudes—such as regional or religious differences—lead to similar results, with the exception that the electoral formula is a significant covariate. This is important, because for the direct measure of cultural attitudes the causal direction may not necessarily be clear. Although contested, increased numbers of women in parliament may lead to positive attitudes towards women in public life. In this sense, it could be argued that positive attitudes towards women in politics are partly the result of higher levels of gender representation in previous legislatures.

However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the more significant influence is from attitudes to representation rather than the other way round. The examination of changes over time highlighted cases where levels of representation increased without corresponding changes in attitudes, most notably in Bangladesh with the implementation of reserved seats. The resulting higher levels of gender representation are in fact associated with slightly less positive attitudes. At least in the short-term, higher levels of representation did not seem lead to attitudes that are more positive. In contrast, in other places changes towards more positive attitudes are associated with higher levels of representation. In these places, however, there are no other obvious causes for the increased levels of representations—such as reserved seats, or an all women’s party.

What is more, the theoretical framework underpinning this project suggests that representation is primarily caused by relevant attitudes rather than the other way round. Having successfully outlined underlying factors for cultural attitudes, ranging from religion to the level of development, and demonstrated

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46 The exact measure of cultural attitudes does not seem to matter, as also indicated at the beginning of the chapter. Since the underlying argument is linked to attitudes akin sociological liberalism, the variable measuring attitudes towards marginalized group in society may also be considered for levels of gender representation: The substantive results of this chapter are not affected.
their statistical association, adds further weight to the claim that the main influence is as indicated. Empirically, this view is also supported by the fact that these underlying variables are significant predictors in their own right, although as expected in a somewhat weaker form. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the main direction of influence is as outlined.

The view that institutional factors mediate cultural ones is unsupported statistically, where relevant interactions remain insignificant variables. The exclusion of unfree countries from analysis in this project can be regarded as an admission that on theoretical grounds the institutional setting is expected to have a large impact. However, it appears that in most countries the political élite are able to adjust to the institutional setting—reflected in the lack of association between levels of gender representation and the electoral system.

The dominance of cultural factors can also be found at the more fundamental level of token representation. Token representation is given where there is at least one woman in parliament, which includes most countries. For the few countries where women are completely absent, cultural and particularly religious factors appear to be the key inhibitors. It is possible to speculate that political freedom is another significant factor, albeit not in the sample of free and partly free countries used in this project.

The multivariate analyses suggest that attitudes towards women in politics are the dominant influence on levels of gender representation, although the electoral formula may also be a significant factor. I suggested that, to a certain extent, in free and partly free countries the political élite are able to adjust to the institutional setting. Whilst I argued that overall gender quotas are not associated with higher levels of representation at the national level, enforced measures—such as reserved seats, or some statutory quotas—clearly are able to shape gender representation. On this basis, it would be wrong to dismiss institutional factors, despite the dominance of attitudes towards women in politics as an explanatory factor.
Chapter Summary

In this first empirical chapter, I have started by outlining the different levels of gender representation in free and partly free countries across the world. After investigating a number of bivariate relationships, multivariate analyses were used to examine the effects when various factors are considered at the same time. The strong effects of the electoral formula and quotas are reduced once considering regional differences. Quotas do not appear to be associated with higher levels of representation, particularly when considering attitudes directly. This consideration of quotas and cultural attitudes at the same time sets this chapter apart from previous work capturing attitudes towards women directly. By comparing the findings against a full sample of free and partly free countries, the chapter suggests that the dominance of cultural factors applies to all cases. At the same time, the role of the electoral formula was recognized, although only cultural attitudes can account for changes in the levels of gender representation over time.

A number of measures were taken to ensure the robustness of the findings, including a limited consideration of changes over time and subsample analysis. The analysis over time adds further doubt that the introduction of unenforced quotas on its own is associated with higher levels of gender representation, whilst supporting the association between attitudes towards women in politics and levels of representation. This does not mean that institutional factors are dismissed, since adequately enforced measures are clearly able to shape gender representation. The next chapter examines symbolic representation in terms of ethnicity to complement the findings in this chapter.
Chapter 5

Ethnic Group Representation

Ethnic minority groups are marginalized and under-represented in national parliaments in many places. Although theories of justice emphasize the under-representation of ethnic minorities and the under-representation of women to the same extent, the political representation of ethnic groups is far less frequently studied. In this chapter, I examine the covariates of high levels of ethnic group representation, complementing the previous chapter with a different dimension of symbolic representation. Being of comparative nature, as far as I know, this chapter breaks with the established literature where single country studies are the norm (Messina, 1989; Anwar, 1994; Geissner, 1997; Ramet, 1997; Johnson, 1998; Saggar, 2000; Pantoja & Segura 2003). Bird (2005) compares three developed countries, but she stays clear of a numerical assessment; Banducci et al. (2004) compare the situation in the US and New Zealand; whilst Reynolds (2006) only addresses individual groups, focusing entirely on the role of the electoral system. The systematic comparative consideration of ethnic group representation in this chapter should lead to a better understanding of why levels of representation vary across countries. The objectives for this chapter are to:

- Present the levels of ethnic group representation in different countries
- Identify correlates for the different levels of representation
- Consider the effectiveness of quotas for ethnic groups

After considering previous research, this chapter outlines the data and methodology to the extent that is relevant to ethnic group representation. The levels
of representation in different countries are presented, but the main part of this chapter is dedicated to examining the contributing factors. As far as I know, this is the first time ethnic group representation is being approached empirically in a multivariate cross-national manner.

**Previous Research**

Research into ethnic group representation is notably sparser than into gender representation. Most of the literature concerned with ethnic group representation regards representation at the local level and does not cover representation in national parliaments (Engstrom & McDonald, 1982; Welch, 1990; Saggar & Geddes, 2000; Garbaye, 2000; Boussetta, 2001; Togeby, 2005). In single-nation studies, the focus is often on a specific minority group, or ethnic minorities as opposed to the majority population.

The presence of ethnic minorities in parliament is primarily sought for reasons of legitimacy and justice (Milne, 1981; Van Cott, 2005). Many members of ethnic minorities think that their interests can only be appropriately represented by another group member (Ross, 1943; Schwartz, 1988; Phillips, 1992; Williams, 1995). However, higher levels of ethnic group representation are also linked to better integration: Where levels of representation are higher, fewer members of ethnic minorities feel alienated by the political system (Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Norris, 2004; Banducci et al., 2004). Reynolds (2006) follows a similar line of thought, arguing that only where minority communities are properly included can ethnic conflict be avoided. Minorities in many places are systematically excluded from significant decisions, such as electoral reform, government, or drafting of a new constitution. It is argued that where certain ethnic groups are excluded, such as the Roma in many European countries, the potential for future conflict remains (Ramet, 1997; Rothman, 2004).

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47 In Britain, however, higher levels of representation at the local level did not lead to reduced alienation from the system overall (Saggar, 2000).
Reynolds (2006) suggests the electoral system as a factor that can foster cooperation between members of different ethnic groups at the national level: working towards a stable and peaceful democracy. The electoral system and its key institutions are also mentioned in other studies (Engstrom & McDonald, 1982; Welch, 1990; Saggar, 2000; Spirova, 2004; Bieber, 2005; Togeby, 2005; McMillan, 2005; Bochsler, 2006). Togeby (2005) in particular highlights the role of preferential voting in combination of a proportional representation system, although no adequate comparison to other cases is included.

With a focus on Britain, Anwar (1994) highlights the geographical concentration of many ethnic minority groups. This means that within certain districts, the importance of ethnic minorities as voters is increased; they may even form the majority locally. In such cases, political parties often actively woo ethnic minority voters. Nonetheless, ethnic minorities remain grossly under-represented in parliament (ibid.; Bogaards, 2004). Togeby (2005) outlined a similar story for local councils in Denmark, with the difference that members from ethnic minorities are comparatively well represented at the local level.

Political parties also feature in Bird’s (2005) account of visible minorities in France, Denmark, and Canada. The argument is that historically minority groups tend to be under-represented in almost all countries, which includes ethnic minorities. Bird outlines the use of ethnic minority candidates in some areas, where parties actively promote an alternative to the ‘traditional’ white candidate for strategic reasons. Messina (1989), again focusing on Britain, argues that racial difference is still largely absent in the mainstream political discourse, despite increasing demands for inclusion. This is echoed by Saggar and Geddes (2000).

Socioeconomic constraints are another factor sometimes cited (Geissner, 1997; Chaney & Fevre, 2002), although their influence may be difficult to capture. Saggar (2000) outlines the complex interplay of class and ethnicity, and warns of attributing all difference to ethnicity. Banda and Chinkin (2004) also high-
light how different minority statuses often interlock: A member of an ethnic minority may also be disadvantaged because of his or her religion, for instance.

The influence of cultural attitudes on levels of ethnic group representation is often implied, such as when historical under-representation and discrimination are touched upon (Geissner, 1997; Darity & Mason, 1998; Saggar & Geddes, 2000; Murji, 2002; Moser, 2004). Johnson (1998), for instance, examines the role of Black Brazilians in their national parliament, where attitudes that regard non-Whites as less suited for public office are still commonplace. The experience of discrimination, often perhaps unintentional discrimination, may inhibit members from ethnic minority groups from coming forward (ibid.; Saggar & Geddes, 2000).

What unites all studies on ethnic group representation is that they find a significant under-representation of ethnic minorities in positions of power. Despite this, the popular view that ethnic minorities are completely excluded from positions in power is sometimes an exaggeration of the state of affairs (Alba & Moore, 1982). What is more, as outlined below, there are single ethnic minority groups that are numerically over-represented, despite ethnic minorities overall being under-represented in the same country.

Hypotheses

Unfortunately, the literature on ethnic group representation in national parliaments is sparse. However, it is conceivable that both women and ethnic groups are under-represented in positions of power for similar reasons. Consequently—as reflected in the theoretical framework in chapter 2—the same hypotheses can be applied to gender representation and ethnic group repre-

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48 Despite this, the popular view that ethnic minorities are completely excluded from positions in power is sometimes an exaggeration of the state of affairs (Alba & Moore, 1982). What is more, as outlined below, there are single ethnic minority groups that are numerically over-represented, despite ethnic minorities overall being under-represented in the same country.
sentation (Taagepera, 1994; Lijphart, 1999; Heath et al., 2005). In broad terms, this means that both the electoral system and cultural aspects can be expected to contribute to levels of ethnic group representation. These general expectations also reflect the findings of single-country studies (Welch, 1990; Geissner, 1997; Saggar, 2000; Saggar & Geddes, 2000; Spirova, 2004; Moser, 2004; Bochsler, 2006).

Following the theoretical framework, aspects of the electoral system and its key institutions can be expected to influence levels of ethnic group representation. The corresponding hypotheses (H1 to H4) are applied to ethnic group representation: Higher levels of ethnic group representation are expected in countries with more proportional systems, particularly PR. Other institutional aspects are also thought to be associated with higher representation scores, such as low electoral thresholds, or larger districts. Higher levels of representation, finally, are also expected in more established and freer democracies.

Quotas are measures introduced in some places to increase the level of ethnic group representation. In practice, in the case of ethnicity, such quotas normally take the form of reserved seats rather than the voluntary party quotas found for gender representation. However, the expected impact of these interventions is unchanged: *Where ethnic quotas are implemented, the level of ethnic group representation can be expected to be higher* (H5).

The theoretical framework in chapter 2 highlighted the role of cultural attitudes. The intuition is that where attitudes in the population are supportive of ethnic minority groups, members of ethnic minority groups are more likely to be included in positions of power. Such cultural attitudes are thought to affect the propensity of citizens to vote for a candidate from a minority group, but also the processes of candidate selection within the parties. Following the theoretical framework in chapter 2, it can be expected that variables shaping cultural attitudes—religion, the level of development, regional differences, as well as post-industrialism—are associated with levels of ethnic group repre-
sentation (H7). However, wherever possible a direct measure of relevant attitudes is preferred: A variable on attitudes towards marginalized groups in society is used, as outlined in more detail in chapter 3. This variable on attitudes towards marginalized groups in society is highly correlated with attitudes towards ethnic minorities in places where such questions are asked, but is preferred over other measures for reasons of data availability. The underlying argument is that attitudes that are more positive towards marginalized groups in society are associated with higher levels of ethnic group representation (H8).

The measurement of ethnic group representation used in this project does not control for the heterogeneity of society, because all ethnic groups have a right to be included in parliament. In a society where ethnic minorities form a significant proportion of the population—a more heterogeneous society—the scope to exclude ethnic minorities from parliament in a significant number is larger. With the measurement used, it follows that in more homogenous societies the level of ethnic group representation can be expected to be higher (H9a). The importance of this factor stems not so much from contributing towards higher levels of representation, but from its role as a necessary control because of the characteristics of the measurement used.

A related factor is the geographical concentration of ethnic minorities. Where ethnic groups are concentrated, locally, members from ethnic minorities may no longer be in the minority and are more likely to be elected (Anwar, 1994; Ruiz, 2002; Bogaards, 2004; Norris, 2004; Bird, 2005; Togeby, 2005). A local concentration of minorities has the same effect as if the society overall was more homogeneous. This effect is caused by the nature of the electoral system (Taylor, 2005; Latner & McGann, 2005; Bochsler, 2006): Where minorities are geographically concentrated, levels of ethnic group representation can be expected to be higher (H9b). The effect of geographical concentration is expected to be more significant in majoritarian systems.
Data and Methodology

Data

The main data sources used in this chapter were outlined in chapter 3, and a list of all ethnic representation scores can be found in appendix 2. These representation scores compare the proportion of ethnic minority groups in the population and the parliament. For many of the countries, I have more than one estimate, but the different sources tend to agree on which ethnic divisions are salient in a country, and in their estimates, how many citizens and representatives fall into each group. The independent variables used in this chapter include the electoral formula, highlighting the difference between PR systems and majoritarian systems. With the district magnitude, electoral thresholds, and the number of parties other institutional aspects are also considered. The make-up of societies is captured using Fearon’s (2003) measure of ethnic heterogeneity, a measure of how diverse a population is in terms of ethnic groups. Cultural factors are approximated using regional differences, and where feasible addressed using attitudes towards marginalized groups in society.

Unfortunately, there appear to be no reliable data on the supply of suitably qualified candidates from ethnic minorities. Where collected, such data—measuring participation in education or the labour force—tend to use nationality rather than ethnicity as the basis (OECD, 2006; ILO, 2007). The resulting indicators unfortunately allow no reasonable conclusions about the supply of candidates. This absence of data should not be interpreted as a lack of association.

Measurement

The level of ethnic group representation is measured as the difference between the proportions of citizens and parliamentarians in certain ethnic groups. Rather than imposing external categories, the measure used caters for the most salient ethnic differences in each country. Formally, the ethnic representation
score \( Q_E \) is calculated as the difference between the proportion of each ethnic group in the population (\( \Pi_{Z,i} \)) and the equivalent in the elected members of parliament (\( \Pi_{R,i} \)). The measure is thus \( Q_E = 1 - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |\Pi_{Z,i} - \Pi_{R,i}| \). It is suited for all countries, regardless of the size of the minority groups in the population. The representation scores theoretically range from 0 to 1. A representation score of 1 is achieved in a country where the proportions of the different ethnic groups are perfectly reflected in parliament. As outlined in chapter 3, this measure is a generalized form of the one used for gender representation, meaning that representation scores should be comparable.

The measure of ethnic group representation deliberately does not control for the heterogeneity of society: Rooted in arguments of justice, ethnic minority groups should have a right to be included no matter what their size. Particularly Young’s (1990) argument emphasizes the need to include all ethnic groups. Nonetheless, in more homogenous societies the meaning of the representation score \( Q_E \) may be less significant than the corresponding value of token representation \( T_E \). Bearing in mind that—apart from San Marino—no country comes without ethnic minorities, values of the representation score \( Q_E \) remain meaningful. Moreover, the multivariate regressions in this chapter control for the level of heterogeneity.

In most of the chapter representation scores \( Q_E \) are used, but as outlined in chapter 2, there are also other ways of conceptualizing representation. Given that ethnically not all countries are equally homogenous, a different measure can be considered. By calculating the proportion of ethnic minorities in parliament (\( \Pi_{R,m} \)) divided by the proportion in the population (\( \Pi_{Z,m} \)) a measure of relative representation can be derived at: \( R_E = \Pi_{R,m} / \Pi_{Z,m} \). The variable \( m \) in this case denotes all ethnic minority groups combined. Such \( R \)-scores are simply a statement of what proportion of the minority population is included in

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49 The assumption is that both women and ethnic minorities are groups in a similar sense.
parliament, irrespective of its size. The values range from 0 where ethnic minorities are absent in parliament, to values greater than one, where they are numerically over-represented. The latter happens for some individual ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{50} R-scores are insensitive to the heterogeneity of society overall, and are therefore useful to assess the influence of heterogeneity on levels of representation measured by Q-scores. The substantive results reported in this chapter can be replicated with R-scores.

The Representation of Individual Ethnic Groups

R-scores can also be calculated for individual ethnic groups in a country. In this case the proportion of a specific ethnic group in parliament (\(\Pi_{R,k} \)) is divided by the proportion in the population (\(\Pi_{Z,k} \)), giving: \(R_{E,k} = \Pi_{R,k} / \Pi_{Z,k} \) for the group in question. In the remainder of this section, I examine the representation of individual ethnic groups, but the main part of this chapter is concerned with levels of representation at the national level.

In most cases, ethnic minority groups are under-represented in national parliament. The aim of this section is to discuss interesting cases to present a more nuanced view of ethnic group representation. There are, for instance, a few cases where individual minority groups are numerically over-represented, because the single seat they gained in parliament leads to a greater representation in parliament than in the population (\(\Pi_{R,k} > \Pi_{Z,k} \)). This can be observed, for instance, for Africans in Australia, Arabs in Belgium, Jews and Poles in Latvia, Hungarians in Slovenia, or Chinese in Trinidad and Tobago. Some of these groups may not be over-represented when representation is averaged over a number of elections, but other cases are likely to reflect historical rea-

\textsuperscript{50} R-scores for all ethnic minorities combined are included in appendix 2. In a few cases, measurement might be an issue, such as in France where data for the parliament include seats from overseas territories, but no equivalent data is recorded for the population. In Guyana, I only have incomplete data on the population, which probably leads to an underestimation of minorities in the population, and thus their seeming over-representation in parliament. The inclusion of these cases does not appear to influence the reported results significantly.
sons. An interesting problem may be observed in Denmark and Slovenia. In both countries, there are specific provisions for minority groups. In Denmark, the two seats for the Faroe Islands and Greenland are over-proportionate in relation to the population, but a single seat would lead to a more significant under-representation. In Slovenia, it is similarly a question of including or excluding the Hungarian minority ($\Pi_{Z,k} < \frac{1}{2}$, with $S$ denoting the number of seats in parliament).

In a few countries, only one of multiple minority groups is included in parliament. For example, in Georgia the Adkhars—being the largest minority group—are the only group included. In proportion to their population size, they are over-represented, but the majority population is more significantly over-represented in parliament. Similar cases can be found in Macedonia where Albanians are the only minority group in parliament, or Slovakia where Hungarians are included, but no Roma. In some instances, only certain ethnic minority groups are officially recognized as such, which leaves others absent for considerations of inclusion in parliament. This may be particularly significant where reserved seats are in place for ethnic minority groups, and the lack of official recognition means lack of reservation for some of the groups.

In both Canada and the Ukraine, one of the ethnic minority groups is over-represented in parliament: the Chinese in Canada, and the Russians in the Ukraine. In both cases, it seems likely that the ethnic groups in question are disproportionately found in the parts of society from where members of parliaments are often drawn from—the highly educated. In South Africa, the White minority are over-represented, possibly because of historical reasons (Reynolds, 2006).

It is also the case that some ethnic minority groups are well represented. In Slovenia, the Italians are present in parliament—helped with special provisions. No such provisions can be found for instance in Trinidad and Tobago where Africans are present in parliament in proportion to their population size,
or Hungarians in Romania. The most common occurrence for individual groups, however, is under-representation of the minority group. A complete absence in parliament is common, and it would be unwieldy to list all cases, in a world where under-representation of minority groups is the norm.

Using R-scores to examine the representation of individual ethnic group representation presents a rich and detailed picture, and it appears that the representation of particular ethnic groups in parliament is largely intrinsic to the countries. Compared to the analyses in this chapter—which are based on the representation score $Q_e$—no additional insights can be gained as to which variables influence overall levels of ethnic representation in national parliaments.

**Findings**

**Levels of Representation**

With the data available, ethnic representation scores can be calculated for 97 countries, and token representation can be quantified for 113 countries. As in the previous chapter, only free and partly free countries are included. The mean representation score is 0.95, with a standard deviation of 0.06; the range is 0.28. Figure 7 reproduces the distribution in graphical form. The levels of ethnic group representation are generally considerably higher than the levels of gender representation. However, in contrast with gender, there are many countries where the population is ethnically relatively homogeneous. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the skew visible in figure 7 is not problematic: the
more homogenous countries do not drive the results reported in this chapter.\textsuperscript{51} The distribution for countries that are more heterogeneous than average is somewhat similar to the overall distribution: Values are concentrated towards the upper end of the scale, but the distribution is flatter (4.0). As discussed further below, the representation score will invariably be comparatively high in relatively homogenous societies, but a control for heterogeneity will be used to cater for this characteristic of the measurement. The representation scores for all countries can be found in appendix 2.

In terms of token representation, in 75\% of the national parliaments, at least one member of an ethnic minority group is present. In the countries that are more heterogeneous than average, this value is 94.6\%. This indicates that in most countries, members from ethnic minority groups are in one way or another present in parliament, particularly in countries where they form a more substantial part of the population. In some of the more homogenous countries, ethnic minority groups appear to be too small to claim even a single seat.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Bivariate Analysis}

In a first step, I examine bivariate associations. To some extent, this allows a comparison between the findings of single-country studies and the cross-national design used here. One factor suggested as a significant correlate with levels of ethnic group representation is the electoral formula (Reynolds, 2006). However, no significant difference can be determined: The levels of ethnic group representation achieved in countries with majoritarian systems are com-

\textsuperscript{51} Statistical tests indicate that the skewed distribution here and in other instances is not a matter of concern, and the presented results are robust.

\textsuperscript{52} The presence of some minority parliamentarians should not distract from their proportional general under-representation. Nonetheless, token presence can be interpreted in a positive way: In the countries examined here, minority voices are not generally entirely absent. In many cases minority groups managed to break into the territory of decision-making and power, perhaps somewhat legitimizing the parliament and state. However, a single or small number of parliamentarians may also be admitted only to symbolically include the minority group, without efforts to work further towards equality and justice.
parable to those with PR ($p>0.1$). This lack of association can also be found with different operationalizations of the electoral formula.

In a similar vein, no significant association can be determined for the district magnitude ($p>0.1$), the effective number of parties ($r=0.11$, $p>0.1$), the presence of preferential voting ($p>0.1$), or effective thresholds ($r=0.04$, $p>0.1$). No apparent correlation exists between the level of vote-seat proportionality and that of ethnic group representation ($r=0.10$, $p>0.1$). It therefore appears that the nature of the electoral system has little impact on the level of ethnic group representation.

In terms of how well a democracy is established, little difference can be determined between old and new democracies ($p>0.1$). Whilst the worst cases seem to be exclusive to new democracies, the level of ethnic group representation achieved in some of the more established countries—such as the US—is significantly lower than what is achieved in many new democracies. Similarly, differences in political freedom are not significantly associated with levels of ethnic group representation ($p>0.1$).

As outlined above, the actual make-up of society is of interest when considering the level of ethnic group representation. The measure used in this chapter deliberately ignores the heterogeneity of society, and for this reason, on one level, this variable is needed as a control. However, there is more to ethnic group representation than just this. Many countries with high heterogeneity manage to include ethnic minorities in parliament more or less in proportion. Some countries may be so divided that ethnic divisions become highly politicized, which may be reflected in the level of parliamentary representation. The high correlation between the level of heterogeneity and the level of ethnic group representation means that a study not considering the actual make-up of society may seriously misinterpret the relevant factors ($r=0.49$, $p<0.000$). Another aspect of the make-up of society is the geographical clustering of mi-
nority groups, a variable which is not significantly associated with levels of ethnic group representation (p>0.1).

The presence of statutory provisions for ethnic minority groups as such is not associated with higher levels of representation (p>0.1). At first sight, this might be surprising, since quotas are implemented exactly for improving representation. However, as aforementioned, the salience and politicization of ethnic divisions may differ from country to country. Indeed, when only looking at the countries that are more heterogeneous than average, the difference between countries with and without quotas increases (p>0.1). Whilst the difference is still not statistically significant, countries with statutory provisions for ethnic minorities seem to avert the worst cases of under-representation.

What is more, quotas do not always reflect the proportion of ethnic minorities in the population, and quotas are frequently applied to some minority groups in society only. Consequently, the overall effect of quotas is reduced—even when quotas are enforced. This does not mean that quotas are necessarily ineffective for the groups the quotas are designed for.

The influence of cultural factors on ethnic group representation appears intricate. For many of the underlying influences, no clear pattern can be recognized. When it comes to ethnic group representation, the predominant religion of a country is not associated with differences in the level of representation (p>0.1). Levels of representation are slightly lower in Christian countries than in other countries (p<0.1). Regional differences may be more significant, with levels of ethnic group representation being lower in Eastern Europe and the Middle East than in Western countries (p<0.05). However, when only looking at countries that are more heterogeneous, Western countries fare no different to

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53 As outlined in chapter 3, the base category includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; but not Nordic countries.
other regions. Different levels of development appear to have little impact on levels of ethnic group representation in parliament (p>0.1), a story repeated for the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries (p>0.1).

However, considering attitudes towards marginalized groups in society, a much clearer pattern emerges. Attitudes that are more positive are associated with higher levels of representation in parliament (r=0.42, p<0.05). When only looking at heterogeneous countries, this association is stronger (r=0.68, p<0.05). This association seems to support the expectation outlined in hypothesis H8: Not only are attitudes towards marginalized groups closely associated with the level of ethnic group representation, but it also appears that the association is stronger than for the variables capturing just one of the underlying aspects of cultural attitudes. Considering the bivariate associations tested up to this point, it appears that cultural aspects—approximated by religion and region, and measured as attitudes—are the most significant covariates for ethnic group representation.

**Multivariate Analysis**

Having considered bivariate associations, in this section the focus is on how different variables fare when examined at the same time. As in the previous chapter on gender representation, I start with a multivariate analysis including as many cases as possible. In a second step, the use of better variables invariably reduces the number of countries considered.

Following the theoretical framework in chapter 2, significant influences from the electoral system and cultural variables can be expected for levels of ethnic group representation. However, the bivariate analyses above suggest that institutional factors are perhaps secondary in the case of ethnic group representation, although these bivariate results do not control for the make-up of society.
### Table 5: Multivariate Models of Ethnic Group Representation I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mj/MMM (Base)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/MMP</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Quotas (Base)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory Quotas</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Democracy</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (Base)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.005 *</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.005 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Countries</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.003 *</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.003 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.002 *</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.002 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.095 *</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.095 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.005 *</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.005 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.009 *</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.009 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at p<0.05, + significant at p<0.1. N=97.

In a first step, the modelling is designed to maximize the number of cases in the multivariate analyses. Model 1 in table 5, to begin with, performs badly. With only institutional variables, the age of democracy, and the level of political freedom the model fit is poor, and none of the variables appears to be a significant covariant. On average, statutory provisions for ethnic groups seem to make no difference, but although insignificant, it can be speculated that more established democracies come with higher levels of ethnic group representation.

The second model in table 5 introduces a control for the ethnic make-up of society. Whilst this increases the model fit substantially, the other variables are not substantively affected. The premise that the age of democracy may be a significant factor, however, now looks implausible. One possible interpretation for this is that ethnic heterogeneity somehow acts as an impediment to establishing democracy (Lijphart, 2004).

Adding considerations of geographical clustering to model 2—or any subsequent model—does not increase the model fit significantly. The variable itself
is not statistically significant (p>0.1). This finding contradicts a strong theoretical case, where clustering and representation are expected to go hand in hand. No significant interaction between the electoral formula and clustering can be found, and the model fit is not significantly increased by the inclusion of such an interaction term.\textsuperscript{54}

The final model in table 5 introduces regional differences. Shown in the table is the difference between Eastern European and other countries. Compared to Eastern European countries, all other regions fare better (p<0.1). Differences between other regions are not significant (p>0.1). Perhaps the worst cases in regions outside Europe have not yet made the transition to democratic rule, and are thus absent from consideration in this project.\textsuperscript{55}

The results outlined in table 5 suggest that there is an association between differences in regions and levels of ethnic group representation. Oddly enough, once considering regions, the age of democracy is a significant factor, although the direction of the sign is unexpected. The result suggests that ethnic representation scores are higher in newer democracies. Perhaps this is an indication that the age of democracy is in this instance an inappropriate measure of how well a political system is established. It appears that some other effect may be picked up, since when using the \textit{Human Development Index} as an approximation of cultural attitudes instead of regions, the age of democracy is not a significant factor (p>0.1). On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that in new democracies effects of international tutelage and diffusion from neighbouring countries may positively influence the level of ethnic group representation (Bennett, 1991; Stone, 2000).

\textsuperscript{54} As in the other empirical chapters, I have tested various interaction terms, but with no significant results. In particular no significant interaction could be observed between institutional and cultural factors.

\textsuperscript{55} Using the HDI as an indicator of cultural differences, the model fit is lower (R\textsuperscript{2}=0.29), but the variable is a significant correlate. Religious differences, in contrast seem insignificant (p>0.1).
In an additional model, not shown in table 5, only the age of democracy, cultural heterogeneity, and regional differences were considered. This parsimonious model performs relatively well ($R^2=0.40$). This suggests that regional factors are dominant for ethnic group representation. The fact that different variables—regions, religion, the level of development—perform slightly differently suggest that it may be worth pursuing cultural attitudes in more details. This is done in the remainder of the section.

Now in the second part of this section, the nature of cultural variables is investigated in more detail. In chapter 2, I suggested that cultural attitudes measured directly should be more strongly correlated than individual proxy measures (H8b). If this is the case, a model incorporating attitudes towards marginalized groups in society should lead to a better model fit. The results in the bivariate analysis above were encouraging to this extent: Levels of ethnic group representation are higher in places where the population have positive attitudes towards marginalized groups in society.

In order to do this, however, it is necessary to reduce the number of cases considered. This is the case because the corresponding questions are not asked in all the countries covered by the World Value Survey, as well as the limited coverage of said survey: Only 33 countries can be considered when including WVS data.

Table 6 presents the results for model 3 with the reduced sample. The key findings are unchanged. Institutional factors appear of little significance, and quotas for ethnic minority groups seem to have little impact on average. The age of democracy is no longer a significant factor in the reduced sample, whilst both the control for heterogeneity and the regional variables remain significant covariates ($p<0.1$). The estimated magnitude of the regional variables, however, is slightly reduced in the smaller sample. In the reduced sample, the number of countries in some of the regions is very small, and in table 6 the difference
between Eastern European countries on the one hand and all other countries on the other is given.

**Table 6: Multivariate Models of Ethnic Group Representation II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3 (reduced sample)</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula: Mj/MMP (Base)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/MMP</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas: None (Base)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory Quotas</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Democracy</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Not Eastern European</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes: Marginalized Groups</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at p<0.05, + significant at p<0.1. Model 3 is identical to the one used in table 5, but only includes the cases also used in model 4. For presentational reasons only the difference between Eastern European countries and all other countries is shown. N=33.

In order to capture cultural attitudes directly, it is necessary to replace the regional variable because of collinearity issues. As outlined in table 6, the replacement of the variable on regional differences with the more direct attitudinal counterpart leads to a better model fit. Once again, in this model the age of democracy is not a significant factor. This finding adds weight to the suggestion that the result reported initially is spurious. The age of democracy may pick up some cultural differences that are not covered in the regional variable.

The other variables, however, are not substantively affected: Institutional factors such as the electoral formula still appear to have little influence on levels of ethnic group representation. The magnitude of the control for ethnic heterogeneity is similar in models 3 and 4. Whereas the coefficient for regional differences refers to a binary variable, the corresponding coefficient for cultural attitudes stands for the average number of neighbours mentioned as unacceptable. The magnitude of the standardized estimates is similar.

The addition of geographical clustering was more successful in model 3 using the subsample. This variable is a significant correlate (p<0.05), and when
added to model 4, the model fit increases ($R^2=0.60$). This suggests that in countries where ethnic minorities are concentrated in some areas, the level of ethnic group representation is higher. This discrepancy to the full sample is probably due to the nature of the reduced sample, although the fact that the smaller sample includes a disproportionate number of Eastern European countries cannot account for the difference. As in the full sample, the interaction between clustering and the electoral formula is not significant in the subsample ($p>0.1$). Adding other variables to model 4—such as religion—does not increase the model fit significantly, and the variables are not significant ($p>0.1$).

Robustness of Findings

In order to test the robustness of the results, I also looked at a subsample of OECD countries. Considering only OECD member countries, the reported results can largely be replicated. There are data for 25 of the 30 OECD countries, and the results of model 3 are largely unchanged. The model fit is slightly better ($R^2=0.53$), and using the Human Development Index leads to a slightly higher model fit than using regional differences. This is not entirely surprising given the geographical concentration of OECD countries. Within the OECD subsample, Nordic countries seem to come with higher levels of ethnic representation ($p<0.05$), whilst Eastern European countries do not fare different from the remainder ($p>0.1$).

The use of the attitudinal variable does not lead to a coherent result in the OECD subsample: not only is the number of countries covered reduced to 17, but more significantly, the variance of the dependent variable is lessened to the extent that it approaches a constant. The results in this case resemble those of model 2 before adding cultural variables—outlined in table 5. The variable of geographical clustering remains a significant covariate in the OECD subsample ($p<0.05$).
As an additional test of robustness, I have removed countries with an ethnically relatively homogenous population from analysis, which excludes the cases where ethnic representation scores are invariably high. The results are substantively unchanged despite the small number of cases, although—as expected—the control of heterogeneity is no longer a significant correlate. Finally, as in the previous chapter on gender representation, I have excluded countries with a population under one million, and separately countries with a population under five million in further subsample analyses. The results presented in this chapter are not significantly affected by the exclusion of these small countries.

Discussion

Following the framework of political representation in chapter 2, levels of ethnic group representation can be expected to resemble those of gender representation. The relevant hypotheses are formulated largely without regard to group size, focusing on marginalization and positions of power instead. In this sense, both institutional and cultural factors can be expected as correlates for levels of ethnic group representation.

The results of the empirical analyses suggest that the key covariates differ to some extent from those of gender representation. In this sense, the study of the representation of ethnic groups in parliaments merits more attention than currently found in the literature. Contrary to the expectation, none of the institutional factors seemed to be significantly associated with the level of ethnic group representation. This was the case not only for the electoral formula and its related measures of proportionality, but also for the provision of quotas.56

56 The presence of statutory provisions for ethnic groups is uncommon in comparison to the occurrence of gender quotas, for example. To cater for the small number of cases, and thus possible sampling bias, I used propensity score matching to examine the role of quotas in the case of ethnicity. There is very little indication in the literature as to which factors influence the propensity of implementing measures for ethnic groups, and I used a model including the Human Development Index, the age of democracy, political freedom, as well as the level of ethnic heterogeneity (R²=0.18). The reported finding of no overall as-
In the case of quotas, implementation issues may be a problem, since most measures for ethnic minority groups are by nature enforced. For example, in Croatia 3.3% of the seats are reserved for ethnic minority candidates—a country where nearly 20% of the population belong to ethnic minority groups. In New Zealand 5.8% of the seats are reserved for Maori; there are 12% Maori in the population, but relative to their proportion in the population they managed to win more seats. This means that the relatively small quotas do not appear to be a problem in practice: In this case, the provision of quotas may have acted to overcome a representational blockage. At the same time, there are no provisions for Pacific Islanders—5% of the population. Given their numerical under-representation in parliament, there may be a strong case for quotas. In Serbia and Montenegro, there were special provisions for Albanians—3.2% reserved seats, 11.1% of the population—but other minority groups had to fend without such provisions, including Hungarians, Croats, and Roma. In Colombia the 3% seats reserved for Afro-Columbians and other indigenous groups stand in contrast with at least 8% of the population falling into this category—depending on the way indigenous is understood.

In some instances, only certain ethnic minority groups are officially recognized, which means that other groups may not be considered for parliament or special minority rights. This may be significant where reserved seats are in place for ethnic minority groups, and lack of official recognition means a lack of reservation. The lack of official recognition in any case means invisibility: absence in official statistics. Affected are particularly Roma and Jews—such as in Hungary or Bosnia and Herzegovina—or ethnic minority groups with a migration background, such as Turks in Austria. The consequence of such practices is that the overall effect of quotas—where in place—is reduced, despite being en-

sociation was confirmed (p>0.1), indicating that on average provisions for ethnic groups seem ineffective at the national level.
forced measures. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that quotas may be effective for the groups the quotas are designed for.

In contrast to quotas, regional and cultural variables proved more successful in predicting the level of ethnic group representation. In particular, significant regional differences could be identified, suggesting that different historical experience may be a significant factor for ethnic group representation. However, as was the case with gender representation, the more directly measured variable of attitudes towards marginalized groups in society fared better: In places where the population is more open towards marginalized groups, ethnic minorities are more likely to be included in national parliaments.

The measurement of attitudes towards marginalized groups in society correlates highly with the cultural variable used in chapter 4 (r=0.73, p<0.000). In fact, attitudes towards marginalized groups in society are associated with levels of gender representation (r=0.56, p<0.001), in a similar way that the HDI or the predominant religion are significant covariates. In contrast, however, the specific variable on women in politics used in chapter 4 does not correlate significantly with the level of ethnic group representation (r=0.18, p>0.1). As argued in chapter 3, this probably indicates that the measurement in this chapter is a more generic measure of attitudes towards minorities—reflecting sociological liberalism—, whilst in the previous chapter a measure more specific to gender representation is used.

Given that ethnic minorities make up a different proportion in different countries, controlling for the ethnic heterogeneity proved a necessary step. In countries where the ethnic minority population is large, the scope to exclude or under-represent a significant part of the population is larger than in more homogenous countries. However, it is not the case that countries with more heterogeneous make-up necessarily exclude a larger proportion of the minority population: In some places where ethnic minorities form a considerable proportion of the population, they are included in parliament accordingly. Sensi-
tivity analysis was carried out to ensure that homogenous societies do not drive the results presented.

Coming back to the hypotheses, this chapter fails to provide evidence that the electoral system and other institutional factors are significant influences for levels of ethnic group representation (H1 to H5). This is true for all the factors tested, irrespective of the control of ethnic heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the lack of appropriate data means that this project can say little about the role of ethnic minority candidates (H6). It is conceivable that in some places members from ethnic minorities do not come forward in sufficient numbers, and ethnic minorities are in part for this reason under-represented. However, a similar argument is often made in the case of gender representation, and was not supported by the multivariate analyses in chapter 4.

In contrast to the story regarding institutional factors, there is further evidence for the effects of cultural factors (H7), both when approximated using regional differences and when measured directly as attitudes towards marginalized groups in society. It is also the case that attitudes measured directly lead to better predictions (H8b). Taken together, this chapter appears to indicate that cultural factors dominate in the case of ethnic group representation.

Electoral Engineering

As was the case in the previous chapter on gender representation, this chapter highlighted the role of culture in shaping political representation. Institutional aspects appeared of far less importance than initially anticipated. For the factors related to the proportionality of the system, it can be speculated that over time the political élite learn to cope with the particularities of the system (Anderson, 2007). In other words, the political actors might be able to adapt to the system, a point also highlighted by the discussion of the change of electoral formula in New Zealand and its impact on levels of gender representation in chapter 4.
As in the chapter on gender representation, the analyses in this chapter suggest that on average, the presence of quotas and related measures makes only a little difference to the observed levels of representation, if at all. In the case of gender quotas, it is the case that most of these measures are unenforced, which appears to make them ineffective in practice. The picture is slightly different with provisions for ethnic minority groups, where measures for ethnic minority groups are not associated with an increase of levels of ethnic group representation in the multivariate analyses. One explanation for the lack of association is the blockages argument, and the implication that quotas may already have worked to break through a barrier in the levels of ethnic group representation. With the cross-sectional analysis in this chapter, this possibility cannot be ruled out. However, if this is correct, the quotas do not appear to have a significant impact beyond advancing past the barrier. In contrast, the lack of association may stem from the limited use of quotas and implementation issues: In countries where such provisions are used, often only a single or a few ethnic minority groups are covered. The under-representation of other groups means that overall little difference can be observed in these cases.

Enforced approaches clearly work, as illustrated by the quotas used in many communist countries. In this case, it is possible to achieve levels of symbolic representation that would not be expected based on the prevalent attitudes in the wider population. However, such enforced measures come with two drawbacks. Firstly, they may be removed by future members of the élite, as was the case with communist quotas in countries previously associated with the Soviet Union. In this sense, their impact may be temporarily limited. Secondly, forced changes may lead to backlashes in the population (Ramet, 1997; McMillan, 2005; McSmith, 2008).

Whilst the élite may talk about improving levels of representation, in most places, they do not appear to be actively engaged to this end. This may be understood when considering the fact that both the citizens and the élite are em-
bedded in the same cultural context. Given that a part of the attitudes is shaped by this environment, it seems unlikely that the élite will enforce quotas or similar measures ahead of what the population are willing to support. The same conclusion can be drawn when arguing that many politicians are primarily motivated by being re-elected (Downs, 1957; Manin et al., 1999; Stimson, 1999). In this case, members of the élite supportive of enforced measures to increase the level of ethnic group representation may reconsider their actions: Enforced measures may lead to backlashes, with potentially negative consequences for the élite at the polls.

From a utilitarian perspective, it is also important to ask why representation of ethnic minorities is valuable. Arguments in this sense include a wider pool of considered talents (Mill, 1975 [1861]; Duverger, 1955; Norris, 1996; Henig & Henig, 2001; EOC, 2007; EHRC, 2008), serving as role models (Kanter, 1977; Phillips, 1995; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2005; Chynoweth, 2006), but also practical considerations of efficiency in decision-making rooted in the composition of groups (Gratton et al., 2007). Gratton et al. studied the impact of the gender composition of groups on the efficiency of decision-making. Their finding is that where the proportion of men and women is equal, decision-making is associated with greater efficiency and innovation. Given the size of parliamentary chambers, however, a call for 50% women does not follow. Instead, what follows is that select committees should be gender equal, something more likely to happen where the proportion of women in parliament is significant. The application to ethnicity is unclear.

From the point of justice, however, utilitarian considerations are secondary at best. This means that enforced quotas may be an option. However, such quotas are rare; indicating that awareness of under-representation and politicization of ethnic differences may be low—often perhaps because of historical reasons. What is more, quotas are restricted to the political realm, meaning that integration in other aspects of life is not necessarily linked. As an alternative option, it
can be attempted to influence the attitudes of the public. On the one hand, this step may be necessary to implement quotas successfully—assuming a political élite not too detached from the voters. On the other hand, once attitudes have changed to this extent, the implementation of measures to ensure representation may no longer be so pressing. It is sometimes argued that this is what happened with gender quotas in the Nordic countries (Freidenvall et al., 2006; McAllister, 2006).

In the US, redistricting was used in an attempt to increase the parliamentary representation of Blacks. Whilst such minority-majority districts are associated with increased numbers of Black representatives, there is evidence that another consequence may be a decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. This may have happened if representatives of districts with a Black minority have become less responsive to concerns of the black community, in the view that there are representatives from districts where the Black population is in the majority (Cameron et al., 1996; Overby & Cosgrove, 1996).

I argued that strong leadership might be the only measure to improve the situation of ethnic minority groups in society in the short term. This is the case because parliamentarians have incentives not to force higher levels of ethnic group representation in places where the population is not supportive of such a move. In the long term, changes towards more positive attitudes may be reflected in higher levels of ethnic group representation. Given the purported partial link of attitudes towards marginalized groups in society to human development, attitudes do appear to change in many places as the level of development increases. What is more, the suggestion that representative gains for women influence levels of ethnic group representation, and vice versa, may give hope to groups currently absent or grossly under-represented in national parliaments.
Chapter Summary

At the beginning of this chapter, the levels of ethnic group representation in 97 free and partly free countries across the world were outlined. These representation scores meant that for the first time a multivariate empirical cross-national study of ethnic group representation was possible.

The results in this chapter cast doubt on the role of institutional factors in shaping ethnic group representation. In contrast to what much of the literature suggests, once controlling for the ethnic make-up of society and cultural attitudes, institutional aspects seem of little significance. Perhaps worryingly for proponents of electoral engineering, on average quotas are not associated with higher levels of representation at the national level. Such interventions seem to fail because of the way they are implemented. Diligently implemented and enforced quotas might be a temporary measure to improve the representation of minority groups, but considerations of the motivations of the élite suggested that strong leadership is necessary for such a step in places where the population is not supportive of such changes. In contrast to institutional factors, it appears that cultural attitudes—particularly when measured as positive attitudes towards marginalized groups in society in general—are the key driver for levels of ethnic group representation in national parliaments.

In the next chapter, considerations of ideological representation are introduced to complement the examination of political representation. Not only does this allow a comparison of different forms of parliamentary representation in chapter 7, but chapter 6 also introduces a different point of view, going beyond demographically defined groups in society.
Chapter 6

Ideological Representation

Whilst symbolic representation may be essential in terms of legitimacy, ideological representation captures the concerns along which most if not all political systems are organized. Ideological representation covers political views and issue positions. This contrasts with symbolic representation examined in the preceding chapters, which regards demographic characteristics. In chapter 2, I argued that both symbolic and ideological forms of representation are necessary to understand political representation in a more complete manner. The introduction of ideological representation in this chapter introduces a different form of political representation, but it is also an essential step in preparing the next and final empirical chapter, where levels of symbolic and ideological representation are compared. As in the previous chapters, the focus is on the macro level, and the analyses are comparative in order to tease out significant patterns. The objectives for this chapter are to:

- Present the levels of ideological representation in different domains
- Identify correlates for levels of different domains of ideological representation

The political representation of views and issue positions is much studied. The main contribution of this part of the project lies in the compilation of different components: bringing together factors commonly studied in isolation. In this chapter, I consider multiple domains of ideological representation, which address both specific issue domains as well as the more generic ideological space. In addition, new data are used, with the benefit of better estimates of party po-
sitions than in many previous studies, as well as a larger sample than found in most previous studies. Before delving into the empirical analyses, however, it is necessary to revisit findings presented in the literature, and briefly reiterate the measurement of ideological group representation.

Previous Research

A great deal of research on ideological representation concentrates on the proportionality between votes cast and seats gained—procedural representation. The underlying question is somewhat different from the concerns in this chapter. For procedural representation, the key question is how votes translate into the parliament or government being created. As previously outlined in chapter 2, the focus in this chapter differs: it starts with the views held by the citizens, and considers the collective representation of issue positions. However, because the underlying mechanisms are related, much of the research on procedural representation is also relevant to collective ideological representation.

Most previous work identified a certain discrepancy between the issue positions of the citizens and representatives (Converse & Pierce, 1986; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997, 1999a; Powell, 2000), with the degree of difference varying significantly from study to study. Most studies focus on representation on the left–right domain, often because data for other domains are unavailable. Where other domains are considered, economic issues (Birch, 2000) and left–right (Dalton, 1985; Pierce, 1999) are often found to be better represented than other domains.

The left–right domain is also chosen because of its role as summary scale. Even though the meaning of what the position left and right stand for is not constant over time or across countries (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989; Sanders, 1999; Furedi, 2005; Golder & Stramski, 2007), it is commonly argued that left–right is an appropriate way to summarize the political space. Interestingly, maybe, even where the concepts of left and right are actively rejected—such as by cer-
tain Green parties in Europe—the concepts remain meaningful (Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1995; Mair, 2007). The difference in what left and right stand for in different countries is not a problem in this chapter: Here policy positions are compared only within countries.  

In studies on vote–seat proportionality, the electoral system with its many facets is often the key focus in terms of explanatory variables (Farrell & Scully, 2007). The electoral formula is a major concern, as is the district magnitude, or electoral thresholds. By focusing on the parliament as a whole, in this chapter the role of political parties is marginalized: The views of voters of party A may be represented by party B (Weissberg, 1978).

Many studies find better congruence between the policy preferences of the citizens and the members of parliament in countries with PR systems rather than in places with majoritarian systems (Huber & Powell, 1994; Katz, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000, 2006; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; McDonald et al., 2004; Budge & McDonald, 2007). This is thought to be the case because majoritarian systems tend to augment the majority position: the proportionality between votes and seats as the underlying factor behind differences between electoral formulas (Nordlinger, 1968; Katz, 1997).

Powell (2000) elaborated on this approach, arguing that more attention should be paid to the role of the opposition. Where the opposition is stronger, levels of representation tends to be higher; and in PR systems, the opposition is predisposed to be strong. This same argument also applies to the correspondence between citizens and the government. The government rather than the legislature is the focus in studies entirely concerned with policymaking. This is the case, because in advanced democracies governments are regarded as the

57 The assumption remaining is that both the citizens and the élite share the same conceptions of the ideological concepts in question. Anchoring vignettes (King et al., 2004) could offer a solution for this problem, but this clearly addresses a different research question and is beyond the scope of this project. Using anchoring vignettes, positions such as very left and centre could be anchored.
drivers behind public policies. In practice, there is little difference between the different foci (Powell, 2000; Furedi, 2005). This might be the case because government formation is intrinsically linked to the composition of the parliament (Gamson, 1961; Manin et al., 1999).

Not all studies, however, support the finding that countries with PR tend to come with higher levels of ideological representation than those with majoritarian systems. There is some indication that, when considering subsequent elections under majoritarian systems, the average level of representation improves when opposing parties alternate in power (McDonald et al., 2004). In a similar vein, Blais and Bodet (2006) report that PR systems tend to lead to a higher number of political parties, but also to parties that are less centrist than found under majoritarian systems. Whilst PR systems thus offer more choice to the voters, the position of the main parties means that overall, there is no noticeable difference between countries with PR and majoritarian systems.

The choice of data allows this chapter to explore ideological representation in a richer way than most previous studies. In particular, going beyond the commonly studied left–right is important, because citizens are arguably more able to express their views and positions in more concrete domains, as opposed to abstract constructs such as the political left and right (Thomassen & Schmitt, 1997). Moreover, in the domain of political left and right, this chapter uses a larger number of countries than most previous studies, where sample sizes of fewer than two dozens are commonplace. As outlined in chapter 3, the data used allow a direct comparison, in particular for the left–right domain.

Golder and Stramski (2007) argue that better data and methods led to the finding that the electoral system is not associated with levels of representation. Whilst agreeing that better data are now available, Powell (2007) is critical of

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58 Consequently, the number of countries with single-member districts (SMD) is often very small. To counter the problem of small numbers, data from multiple elections are often pooled, which may be problematic in some cases (Jenkins, 2002).
the claims of better methodology: the key difference is a different timeframe. Rather than being a spurious factor, differences between PR and SMD systems are declining in real terms. Powell elaborates that in the past decade in some SMD elections convergence towards the median position can be observed. Since the number of countries with SMD is relatively small, these changes mean that the advantage of PR systems previously registered has largely disappeared.

The literature on the influence of political freedom, the age of democracy, or cultural differences on levels of ideological representation is relatively sparse (Katz, 1997; Birch, 2000; Olson & Crowther, 2002; Banducci et al., 2004; Luna & Zechmeister, 2005). Following the reasoning presented in the theory chapter, variables capturing these aspects are also considered: Higher levels of representation can be expected in freer, and more established countries. Furthermore, differences in the predominant religion and the level of development are expected to influence differences between domains.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the theoretical framework, a number of hypotheses were outlined in chapter 2. These are mainly concerned with the electoral system and its key institutions, but cultural factors may also play a role. In terms of institutional factors, for differences in levels of ideological representation the electoral system is often singled out as an explanation (Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Budge & McDonald, 2007). Because they are designed to reproduce a microcosm of the population, *systems that are more proportional can be expected to lead to higher levels of ideological representation* (H1). This argument should apply to all ideological domains.

Other aspects of the electoral system are also thought to affect political representation. The intuition is that certain institutional settings increase the proportionality of the system, and thus facilitate the representation of political
views. In particular, the experience of working within certain parameters can be thought to increase levels of representation: All the involved actors, from voters to the élite, need some time to understand the effects of the electoral system and its key institutions. What follows is that the efficiency of political communication and thus the system itself is improved in more established democracies: *Levels of ideological representation are expected to be higher in more established democracies* (H3). Similarly, the extent to which a democracy can be considered an established democracy can be approached using the level of political freedom (H4).

Turning to cultural factors, they can be expected to influence the perceived importance of different ideological domains. The intuition is that values and attitudes in society affect the salience of issue domains, which in turn affects vote patterns. This is a generic argument, and is more difficult to operationalize than in the case of symbolic representation. Approximated by religion and development, cultural factors can be expected to influence the perceived importance of different ideological domains. The prevalence of post-material views may affect all kinds of ideological domains, by affecting the salience of specific issue domains—perhaps predominantly social issues and the environment domain.

On the other hand, support for religious parties because of social identity or party identification may influence levels of ideological representation in the social domain. Here the definition of religious parties should be understood in a comprehensive manner, and include parties that traditionally draw from a specific religious community. The influence on levels of ideological representation stems from the fact that such parties tend to be conservative on social issues. In predominantly Catholic or Muslim countries, this means that a significant number of voters may vote for religious parties despite disagreeing with the social positions of the parties. Consequently, their views on social issues are not represented as well as they could be.
As with the other variables, with the data available, I am only able to test this association at the national level. Of the two variables suggested, the influence of religion is more tangible. Following the argument outlined, it can be expected that in predominantly Catholic countries the difference between the views of the citizens and those of the representatives is larger. In other words, \textit{ideological representation scores are expected to be lower in predominantly Catholic countries} (H7). As aforementioned, this is probably particularly the case for domains of social issues. The same expectation also applies to predominantly Muslim countries, but the number of Muslim countries in the data set is too small to make clear inferences.

\textbf{Data and Methodology}

\textit{Data}

As outlined in chapter 3, the ideological representation scores used in this chapter utilize data by Benoit and Laver (2005). Based on the largest expert survey to date, these data allow a reliable placement of parties in multiple domains. The weighted averages of party positions are taken as approximation for the positions of representatives. Particularly when looking at the parliament as whole rather than individual members of parliament, this approach seems acceptable.

One problem with Benoit and Laver’s data is that the different domains sometimes cover different countries. The key domains of left–right, social issues, and environmental issues, however, all include a wide range of countries. What is more, the fact that in some domains some countries are absent is largely a reflection of the salience of these issues (Benoit & Laver, 2007). The
consequence is that the party positions that are included in the analyses are more reliable and less likely to stand for non-attitudes.59

**Measurement**

The ideological representation scores used in this chapter are based on a comparison of mean positions. Assuming that citizens are unable to make very detailed distinctions on many political issues—some of which may not be readily formulated—, this approach deals with the political space in a realistic manner: citizens largely identifying as left or right (Aldrich & McKelvey, 1977; Rabinowitz, 1978; Alvarez & Franklin, 1994). In this sense, the measurement based on mean positions can be thought to mimic the proportional approach used in the previous two chapters. However, being based on mean positions, the measure is unable to address the question whether any particular view is represented in parliament. As further outlined in chapter 7, this measure can be expected to correlate with measures based on proportions, although with the data used in this project a measure based on the mean is the only viable approach.

Formally, ideological representation scores for a particular issue domain are calculated by taking the difference between the mean position of the citizens ($\bar{Z}_k$) and the mean position of the parties, weighed by party strength in parliament ($\bar{R}_k$): $Q_k = 1 - |\bar{Z}_k - \bar{R}_k|$. As with the measures of symbolic representation, a subtraction from 1 is used so that higher values reflect higher levels of representation.

Whilst other—perhaps more sophisticated—measures exist for ideological representation (Pierce, 1999; Powell, 2000; Golder & Stramski, 2007), such meas-

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59 A further consequence is that the argument that citizens may be poorly informed on some issues carries less weight. This selection bias may mean that for each domain representation scores for the countries included may be slightly higher than for those absent. However, since in this chapter differences between citizens and parliamentarians are approached within each country, and not compared across, the analyses are unaffected.
ures are entirely unsuitable in chapter 7 where ideological scores are compared with levels of symbolic representation. Such comparisons are only possible if both symbolic representation and ideological representation are conceptualized in a similar manner. Issues of comparability are discussed in chapter 7, but for the purposes of this chapter, such considerations of comparability are unimportant. As initially outlined in the theory chapter, the chosen measure of ideological representation is widespread, which means that the analyses in this chapter are directly comparable to such studies.

Findings

*Levels of Ideological Representation*

A noticeable variance can be observed in the levels of ideological representation in different countries and across domains. The variance across domains is summarized in table 7: Levels of ideological representation tend to be highest in the left–right domain. As previously outlined in chapter 3, the different domains are: a generic political left–right, a social scale measuring how liberal an individual is on matters such as homosexuality or euthanasia, views on the privatization of state-owned businesses, support for the protection of the environment, the promotion of nationalism and cultural consciousness, the role of religion in politics, immigration policies to assimilate newcomers, as well as views on the deregulation of the market. Figure 8 outlines the distribution of some of the individual domains across countries; the distribution of the other domains is indicated in the main text. For all the domains examined, levels of representation differ significantly across countries. Representation scores for all countries and domains can be found in appendix 3.
Table 7: Ideological Representation in Different Domains

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<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Descriptive statistics for the levels of ideological representation in different domains: a generic left–right measurement, economic issues, social issues, positions on privatization, environmental issues, nationalism, the role of religion in politics, immigration, and market deregulation. Values of the mean theoretically range from 0 (perfect discrepancy) to 1 (perfect match).

As visible in figure 8, the representation scores for the left–right domain are concentrated at the higher end of the scale, with values close to 1 being more common. This indicates generally high and very high levels of representation in terms of political left and right. For social issues, most representation scores are at the upper end of the scale, but in contrast to political left–right, the highest values are not the most common ones. The outlier with the lowest score is Albania, but outlier and residual analysis was carried out for all domains to test the robustness of the reported findings for outliers. In no case could a substantively or statistically significant difference be observed.

Figure 8: Distributions of Ideological Representation Scores in Different Domains

Notes: The distribution of levels of representation in a selection of ideological domains. The distributions for the other domains are included in the main text. The number of cases for each domain is apparent in table 7.

In contrast with the previous two domains, the levels of representation of environmental issues are significantly lower. Looking at the remaining domains, the distribution of representation scores of views on immigration (Immigr.) and the role of religion in politics (Religion) are both characterized by higher variance than for the left–right domain: Very different levels can be found in the countries covered. This might be a reflection of the different salience of these domains in the countries covered. The distribution of representation scores in the domain
of deregulation may be somewhat similar to that of social issues. The number of cases covered is smaller, and the histogram therefore looks jagged. Also absent in figure 8 are the distribution of representation scores in the domains of nationalism and privatization. The distribution of the representation scores in these domains resembles that of the social domain, with the exception of the outlier: a concentration towards the upper end of the scale. In none of these additional domains are the highest levels of representation the most common ones, although there is a concentration towards the upper end of the scale. This might indicate that left–right representation is somewhat prioritized, perhaps at the cost of levels of representation in other domains.

Compared to the levels of gender and ethnic group representation outlined in the previous two chapters, it seems that levels of ideological representation are generally higher than levels of symbolic representation. Nonetheless, there is considerable variance within ideological domains, which the remainder of this chapter focuses on.

**Bivariate Analysis**

Initially, in this section I examine bivariate associations. To some extent, this allows a comparison with studies where single factors are tested. Looking at the difference between countries with PR systems and countries with majoritarian systems—in contrast with much of the literature—no association can be found. This is the case for all the different domains, including left–right, the social domain, and environmentalism. For none of the domains the observed differences are substantively or statistically significant (p > 0.1). For some of the domains, the range of representation scores is noticeably larger in PR systems than in majoritarian systems. These results indicate

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60 The relationship between levels of representation in different domains will be discussed in chapter 7.
that the lack of difference found in the left–right domain by Golder and Stramski (2007) equally applies to other issue domains.\(^6\)

Looking at the level of vote–seat proportionality rather than the difference in electoral formulas does not change the result substantively. Statistically, most of the associations are insignificant (p>0.1). For the political left–right domain, the association may be substantively significant (r=0.51, p<0.05), with higher levels of representation in more proportional systems. The correlation between the two variables is stronger for new democracies (\(\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\·
freedom and ideological representation for political left–right ($r=0.42$, $p<0.01$), and the social domain ($r=0.29$, $p<0.1$). There is no apparent association for the environmental domain ($p>0.1$).

Turning to the level of development, there is no clear pattern of association for most domains ($p>0.1$), with the exception of the left–right domain ($r=0.53$, $p<0.000$). This indicates higher levels of ideological representation in more developed countries. In terms of other variables that may approximate cultural differences, a significant difference can be found between regions only in the left–right domain.\textsuperscript{64} For religious differences the evidence is mixed and not statistically significant ($p>0.1$). Using the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries as a proxy for cultural differences, there is a significant association only for the left–right domain ($\hat{P}$, $p<0.001$, $\Delta Q=0.04$). This variable itself is highly associated with the level of development ($p<0.001$).

In this section, I have considered bivariate associations for the variables highlighted in the literature of ideological representation, or considered significant following the theoretical framework in chapter 2. Whilst some of the associations seem to differ from domain to domain, both institutional and cultural factors may be significant covariates in some instances.

**Multivariate Analysis**

In this section, I use multivariate analyses to identify correlates for the different level of ideological representation in different domain. As in the previous chapters, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used. Because of the

\textsuperscript{63} For the nationalism domain, the correlation is relatively strong ($r=0.38$, $p>0.1$), whilst for all the other domains there are no clear associations ($p>0.1$). Treating the Freedom House rankings of political rights as a binary variable, only differences in the social ($\hat{b}$) and left–right domain ($\hat{b}$) are significant ($p<0.05$). Substantively, in the left–right domain the mean representation score in free countries is 0.95, as opposed to 0.90 in partly free countries.

\textsuperscript{64} Compared to the base category of Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, countries in most regions fare worse in terms of left–right representation ($p<0.05$, $\Delta Q=0.04$ to 0.06). In this case, regional variables may pick up differences in development. For the other domains no significant association can be observed ($p>0.1$).
small number of cases in some of the domains, the focus in this section re-
mains on representation in three domains: left–right, social issues, and the en-
vironment.

As in the previous chapters, I summarize the effects of the electoral system into the electoral formula. Given that the bivariate analyses yielded not many significant associations, further distinctions seem unnecessary. In addition, I include variables on political freedom and the age of democracy. The addition of regional and religious dummy variables is tested for all the models, and reported where significant. In contrast with many previous studies, in this chap-
ter, the level of representation is tested in multiple domains rather than just one.

Predicting levels of ideological representation appears to be more difficult than predicting levels of symbolic representation. For political left–right, the electoral system appears to be of little significance, a result that reflects the lack of bivariate association above. The level of political freedom is a significant factor, as is the age of democracy: Higher levels of ideological representation can be found in older democracies and freer countries. Again, these results tell the same story as the bivariate associations.

Table 8: Multivariate Analyses for Left–Right, Social Issues, and the Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left–right</th>
<th></th>
<th>Social Issues</th>
<th></th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.000 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mj/MMM (Base)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/MMP</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.048 *</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Democracy</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.019 *</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at p<0.05. N=49 for left–right; N=41 for social issues; N=30 for environment.

65 Replacing the variable on the electoral formula with one capturing vote–seat proportionality does not change the reported findings substantially, nor do different operationalizations of the electoral formula.
The addition of regional and religious variables to the model reported in table 8 does not increase the model fit significantly, and the added variables are statistically not significant (p>0.1). A model including the HDI rather than the age of democracy leads to a significantly lower model fit for levels of left–right representation, and the variable is not significant (p>0.1). In contrast, replacing the variable on the age of democracy with the difference between industrial and post-industrial countries increases the model fit significantly (R²=0.35). The variable is significant, with the other factors in the model not noticeably affected (p<0.05). Taken together, this suggests that the bivariate association between the level of development and the ideological representation score for the left–right domain may reflect differences in how well a democracy is established. The relevant cut-off between new and established democracies, however, may be somewhat different from the 20 years stipulated in the variable on the age of democracy. In none of these additional models, however, does the electoral formula appear to be a significant or substantively noteworthy factor.66

For the domain of social issues, initially political freedom and the age of democracy appear as insignificant as the electoral system. The model fit of such a model is very low (R²=0.07), but adding the variable on the predominant religion increases this significantly (R²=0.23). Once controlling for the predominant religion of the country, political freedom also appears to be a substantive factor (p<0.1): Higher levels of representation can be found in countries where political freedom is greater. In terms of religion, the level of representation in the social domain is lower in predominantly Catholic countries than in predominantly Protestant countries (p<0.05). Compared to predominantly Catholic countries, predominantly Muslim and Protestant countries fare significantly

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66 The interaction between the age of democracy and vote–seat proportionality is not a significant factor in multivariate models that consider vote–seat proportionality rather than the electoral formula. This contrasts with the results of the bivariate analyses above (see page 159).
better (p<0.05), although the number of predominantly Muslim countries is very small.

The effects of religion on representation in the social domain are difficult to disentangle, because—for the countries covered by the data—all Protestant countries are also democracies established over 20 years ago. Using the age of democracy in a continuous sense does not substantively affect the results reported in table 8, although multicollinearity may still be an issue. Looking only at countries which are predominantly non-Protestant, the difference between old and new democracies is statistically insignificant and substantively very small (p>0.1). The interaction between the age of democracy and a country being predominantly Catholic is statistically insignificant and does not improve the model fit (p>0.1). It can be speculated that the difference between Protestant and Catholic countries is a relevant factor for ideological representation in the social issues domain (C), but the relative lack of variance in Protestant countries is a serious issue that cannot be resolved with the data used.

Turning to predictions of the level of ideological representation in terms of environmental issues, the bivariate analysis suggested the age of democracy as a significant covariant. This is confirmed in the multivariate analysis, where more established countries tend to come with higher levels of representation in this regard. Regional and religious variables do not add significantly to the model reported in table 8, and are not statistically significant (p>0.1). Because of the small number of cases it is not possible to examine regional and religious differences beyond the difference between Western and non-Western countries, or Christian and non-Christian countries.

Table 9 outlines the results for further ideological domains. The table does not show the domain of privatization, because it appears difficult to predict. None of the variables tested was significant. The best model fit was achieved when including a variable on whether the countries are predominantly Christian or not \( (R^2=0.25) \), although substantively the difference between Christian and
non-Christian countries is negligible. The strongest correlate for the domain of nationalism, in contrast, is political freedom (p<0.1). As outlined in table 9, freer countries are associated with higher levels of representation in terms of nationalism. This effect is robust against the addition of further variables—regional or religious—, although these additional factors are neither statistically significant (p>0.1) nor do they add substantively to the model fit.

Table 9: Multivariate Analyses for Additional Ideological Domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Formula</th>
<th>Nationalism B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Religion in Politics B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Deregulation B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MJ/Mmm (Base)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/MMP</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.094 *</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.921</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.059 *</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at p<0.05, + significant at p<0.1. ^ age of democracy measured as the contrast between old and new democracies as in table 8 above. b age of democracy measured in years, because all countries covered are new democracies. N=17 for nationalism and deregulation; N=18 for religion in politics.

Also visible in table 9 is ideological representation in the domain of the role of religion in politics. Views on whether religion should play a significant part in politics appear to be better represented in countries with majoritarian systems, although the association is not statistically significant (p>0.1). The key factor seems to be the age of democracy: Older democracies are associated with higher levels of representation. It should be borne in mind that the sample of countries for this particular domain includes only democracies established within the past 20 years. This may explain the size of the predicted effect, and it seems reasonable to assume that the effect of the age of democracy wanes in the future. The addition of further variables does not improve the model fit, and such variables are not statistically significant (p>0.1).

Ideological representation in the deregulation domain appears to be dominated by the country’s predominant religion. Analysis not shown in table 9 suggests that levels of representation are lower in predominantly Protestant countries than in predominantly Catholic or other countries (p<0.05). Controlling for political freedom, the electoral system, and the age of democracy, the
difference between Catholic and non-Catholic countries is 0.05.\textsuperscript{67} Adding regional variables to the model does not improve the model fit, and the variables are not statistically significant (p>0.1).

Results for the domain of immigration are not shown. Questions of immigration were mostly asked in countries of Western Europe. Because of the lack of variance, the corresponding model cannot include variables on freedom. The predicted effect of PR is negative, but statistically insignificant (p>0.1). Similarly, the age of democracy appears of little importance. The addition of a regional variable does not change the picture (p>0.1). With variables differentiating between different predominant religions, the model fit rises (R²=0.20), but no variable is a significant covariate (p>0.1).

Discussion

In this chapter, I have looked at levels of ideological representation in order to complement the analyses in the previous chapters. For almost half the domains looked at in this chapter, it proved impossible to identify a clear covariate in the multivariate analyses. Perhaps the causes of high levels of representation are more complex and unique to each country; perhaps a key variable was missing. Turning the table, however, it may be possible to identify a more coherent story by looking at the role of individual variables.

The electoral system, to start with, appears to be an insignificant factor when it comes to high levels of ideological representation: The proportionality between votes cast and seats gained seems to be of little importance for the collective representational outcome.\textsuperscript{68} This result reflects recent findings by

\textsuperscript{67} The difference between predominantly Catholic and Protestant countries in the domain of deregulation is 0.03. Whilst in both cases the population appear more liberal than the representatives, the difference between citizens and parliamentarians is more marked in predominantly Catholic countries. This finding is in line with the expectation outlined for hypothesis (H7).

\textsuperscript{68} This project does not consider party representation, and is unable to comment on the role of vote-seat proportionality in this case. As outlined in chapter 2, the analyses in this chapter examine the relation-
McDonald et al. (2004) as well as Golder and Stramski (2007). Perhaps the involved actors—individual voters or parties—have developed suitable heuristics to work with the levels of disproportionality found in any particular electoral setting.

Powell (2007) argues that in some majoritarian systems the levels of representation have increased in the past decade, meaning that the difference in systems has recently declined. None of these explanations would suggest that political institutions as such are irrelevant, but perhaps that their impact is not over-riding, as it often seems to be implied. Looking at the stability of new democracies, Cheibub (2007) comes to a similar conclusion. The results in this chapter, however, go beyond recent studies finding little influence of the electoral system on left–right representation, by showing that the electoral system also appears of little significance in other domains. With the cross-sectional data used, it is unfortunately not possible to test whether this lack of association differs from the past, as Powell argues it is the case for the left–right domain.

In order to test the robustness of the findings reported in this chapter, I have analyzed subsamples and used different estimates for the left–right domain. This analysis, not shown here, reveals that neither looking at the subsample of OECD countries, nor using estimates based on the CSES rather than Benoit and Laver data in the case of left-right representation made a substantive difference to the results reported in this chapter. In the OECD subsample, in the multivariate analysis the significant correlates for left–right representation are the same: the age of democracy (p<0.05), and the level of political freedom (p<0.01)—bearing in mind the small number of partly free countries involved. The electoral formula still seems to be of little relevance.
Whilst the electoral system may not be a significant explanatory factor for levels of ideological representation, three variables proved to be useful in predicting the levels of ideological representation: political freedom, the age of democracy, and in some cases the predominant religion of a country. All these factors are predicted by the theoretical framework in chapter 2.

The age of democracy may be a significant factor, as it takes time for the involved actors to familiarize themselves with the democratic setting. It is the time needed to learn about the political rhetoric, the time needed to develop heuristics to gauge the policy positions of the parties—or conversely, judge the views of the population. This factor appears to be important for the role of religion in politics, but also, perhaps more crucially, the left–right domain. If the involved actors can adjust to the particularities of the electoral system, it becomes possible to explain why there is a correlation between vote–seat proportionality and levels of left–right representation in new democracies, while the same association is less clear in more established democracies—depending on a single country (see page 160).

Whilst attitudes relevant to ideological representation may be difficult to capture directly, underlying factors and attitudes in society seem to matter for a number of domains: in the form of the predominant religion. The predominant religion of a country is a significant factor for the domains of deregulation and social issues, and a possible factor for the domain of privatization, as well as for views on immigration. The importance of attitudes and values established for symbolic representation is here reflected for ideological representation, although in a less direct manner. Whilst religion is often linked to attitudes and views in society (Weber, 1958 [1905]; Eposito & Watson, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2004), the exact mechanisms involved may not always be entirely clear.

Political freedom—the ability to express views and participate in politics—is a factor linked with high levels of representation in political left–right, social issues and nationalism. It may be that freedom is a more significant factor than
outlined, because the sample of countries included in this chapter is relatively homogenous in terms of freedom.

However, this list of what factors are most significant for high levels of ideological representation does not appropriately take into account the different levels of salience the various ideological domains may have in each country (Klingemann et al., 1994). The difficulty to predict high levels of representation in some of the domains may be a reflection that in some of the countries, the issues looked at are less salient. Where issues are less salient, it is probable that many citizens lack crystallized views, which makes matching these views difficult for the parliamentarians. To a certain extent, the different samples used for each domain reflect levels of salience, but the importance of salience is further explored in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have used multivariate regression analyses to predict the level of ideological representation in different domains. There is no clear pattern across different domains, but three explanatory variables proved the most useful ones: political freedom, religion, and the age of democracy. The age of democracy is closely associated with different levels of left–right representation. The factor also seems significant for levels of representation in the domain of the role of religion in politics.

Political freedom is associated with higher levels of representation in the left–right domain, but also that of social issues and nationalism. I argued that the magnitude of the effect associated with political freedom might be larger than reported, because the countries included in this chapter exclude unfree countries. The role of religion came to the fore in the domain of social issues, and perhaps on immigration. This is in line with the expectation that the dominance of Catholicism may influence the relationship between individual attitudes and the votes cast.
In contrast to many previous studies, no significant association could be found between the electoral formula and levels of ideological representation. This finding is in line with recent studies, and might be a reflection of the time-frame of the data. It fits with Powell’s (2007) argument that differences associated with electoral formulas have declined in real terms. This chapter, however, goes further by demonstrating that the lack of association is found in all the ideological domains, not just the left–right domain for which the result was previously established.

In contrast to the chapters on gender and ethnic group representation, in this chapter, cultural variables did not appear to be the key drivers. With the age of democracy and political freedom, two different variables appear to be the best predictors for levels of ideological representation. Looking at the links between different forms of representation in the next chapter helps to illuminate the nature of political representation and its explanatory factors further.
Chapter 7

Relationships between Different Forms of Representation

In this final empirical chapter, I focus on the relationships between different forms of political representation. Whereas the previous chapters addressed underlying covariates for different forms of representation in turn, in this part of the thesis I examine the associations between levels of different forms of representation. In particular, this chapter addresses the question whether there are countries where levels of representation are high in all forms, or whether the relationships between different forms of representation are more intricate. To this end, both ideological and symbolic forms of representation are considered. The objectives for this chapter are to:

• Consider the relationship between representation scores in different ideological domains
• Consider the relationship between levels of gender representation and levels of ethnic group representation
• Examine to what extent levels of symbolic and ideological representation are linked

The chapter is structured into three major sections where the findings are outlined. In a first section, the links between different domains of ideological representation are addressed, whilst the other two sections examine associations between different symbolic dimensions, and between symbolic and ideological forms of representation respectively. In all these sections, the focus is firmly on
the second research question: *How are levels of representation in different forms linked?* First, however, it is necessary to look at previous research, and outline the hypotheses for the remainder of the chapter.

**Previous Research**

When it comes to comparing levels of symbolic and ideological representation directly, as far as I know, there are no real empirical precedents. Studies tend to focus on these different forms of representation in isolation. This is not entirely surprising, given that studies on symbolic representation are often rooted in questions of social justice and legitimacy, whilst studies on ideological representation usually take policymaking as the starting point. The closest thing that can be found is assertions that individuals perceive politics in terms of issues and policies rather than demographic aspects (Vallance, 1979; Dalton, 1985; Wittman, 1990; Darcy *et al.*, 1994; Britannica, 2006c).

A limited number of studies consider multiple ideological domains, and thus indirectly address the relationships between different domains. Birch (2000) examines policy representation in the Ukraine and finds the highest levels of political representation in economic issues. She argues that this reflects the importance people attach to these issues compared to others. This means that the salience of issue domains may be a key factor shaping the relationships between levels of representation in different domains (Birch, 2000; Lutz, 2003). Dalton (1985) looks at the link between party voters and representatives in the European Parliament. The smallest differences can be observed in terms of left–right rather than the more specific scales. Dalton seeks explanations for the observed differences in the liberal bias of the élite, and possibly in the attitudes of parliamentarians towards their representative role. It is argued that many parliamentarians seek to educate the public and are less concerned with representing their views. Pierce (1999) also finds the left–right domain to be the best-represented ideological domain. However, his conclusion is that vot-
ers do not appear to evaluate single issues very carefully, thus focusing more on the voters than the élite as Dalton does.

Similarly, Thomassen and Schmitt (1997) find the highest levels of representation in the generic left–right domain, just like Dalton and Pierce. In their study of representation in the European Parliament, similar levels of representation to the left–right domain can only be found in terms of views on unemployment, although with much greater variance (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999a).

In contrast to ideological representation, it appears that levels of symbolic representation are only studied in isolation: Studies concerned with the political representation of women do not directly address the representation of ethnic minority groups, or vice versa. Some of the comprehensive studies on parliaments (Ross, 1943; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Copeland & Patterson, 1998; Norris, 2004; Kostadinova, 2007) consider multiple dimensions—gender, age, education—but no attempt is made to compare the differences in levels of representation.

Htun (2004) considers both gender and ethnicity, but focuses entirely on the nature of quotas rather than questions of political representation. Norris (2004) treats the representation of women and ethnic minorities, but stays clear of a comparison. She draws on Taagepera (1994) and Lijphart (1999) who argue that the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities can be understood as two sides of the same coin. They argue that the level of representation in one dimension may be used to approximate the other. The underlying argument is that systems that are more proportional are beneficial for the inclusion of all kinds of minorities: “What we know about women’s representation should [also] be applicable to ethnoracial minorities” (Taagepera, 1994, p.244).
Hypotheses

In order to examine the relationships between different forms of political representation, I test three hypotheses briefly introduced in chapter 2. All these hypotheses draw on the generic argument that because of the shared mechanisms and underlying factors that are involved in shaping political representation, similar levels of representation can be expected in different forms of representation. Such shared mechanisms and underlying factors include the electoral system, candidate effects, as well as the influence of cultural attitudes. The intuition is that there are institutional or cultural settings that facilitate political representation in all forms; or in negative terms, that certain institutional and cultural factors inhibit high levels of representation. I test the relationships between different symbolic dimensions, different ideological domains, as well as the relationships between symbolic dimensions and ideological domains.

The first hypothesis considered in this chapter is concerned with the relationships between different dimensions of symbolic representation. The theoretical framework in chapter 2 includes the same explanatory factors for all forms of political representation, and the argument of shared underlying factors and mechanisms applies specifically to the relationship between the representation of women and that of ethnic minority groups. The argument is that some factors are positively correlated with higher levels of representation of women and minority groups in general. Such an argument was made by Taagepera (1994) and Lijphart (1999) who suggested that because of shared institutional factors the measurement of gender representation could be used to approximate levels of ethnic group representation where no data are available. Their theoretical argument is based on institutional factors, but untested as such.

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69 Shared covariates need not necessarily lead to positive correlations; and positive correlations can be the result of other—unidentified—underlying causes. The argument, however, is made on a theoretical basis.
A similar argument has been made with cultural environments as the underlying factor. The view is that the salience of minority concerns encourages the inclusion of both women and ethnic minority candidates (Baldez, 2006; Aroújo & García, 2006; Kostadinova, 2007). Rule and Zimmerman (1994) make a case that it is the combination of cultural factors and the electoral system that forms a barrier to the inclusion of women and ethnic minority group in parliaments. In chapter 4 and chapter 5, I identified factors that are associated with higher levels of representation for ethnic minorities and women, such as the age of democracy or cultural attitudes. In common with the cited works, this suggests shared factors for levels of gender and ethnic group representation. Therefore, it can be expected that levels of gender representation are positively correlated with levels of ethnic group representation (H10).

The argument that the same explanatory factors influence levels of representation also applies to different ideological domains. The intuition is that there are institutional aspects that are associated with higher levels of representation in general, such as the level of vote–seat proportionality. In a similar way, some political systems may foster an environment that facilitates high levels of ideological representation. The age of democracy may be a reflection of such environments. If such facilitating factors exist, the levels of representation in different ideological domains can be expected to correlate positively (H11). The overall results in chapter 6, however, are not encouraging to this end: No single factor seems to be associated with high levels of ideological representation in all the domains.

The same logic of shared covariates can be applied to the relationships between levels of ideological and symbolic representation. Although both institutional and cultural factors may be considered as underlying covariates, in practice, particular institutional settings are often thought to be associated with higher levels of representation in general, such as the vote–seat proportionality (Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1999). In a similar vein, certain political en-
environments may encourage higher levels of representation more universally. The expectation is thus that *levels of ideological and symbolic representation are positively correlated* (H12). Whilst chapter 4 and chapter 5 seem to indicate that such underlying factors exist for symbolic forms of representation, in chapter 6 no such underlying variable could be identified for levels of representation in different ideological domains. This means that this hypothesis is unlikely to hold.

In addition to the hypotheses, the chapter will pay attention to the salience of demographic divisions and issue domains. Here the salience of divisions is understood to mean the awareness and politicization of under-representation in the case of gender and ethnic group representation, as well as the importance assigned to different issue domains in the case of ideological representation. This factor of salience was introduced in the theoretical framework in chapter 2, but could not be addressed satisfactorily in the preceding chapters, because no data of adequate detail seem to exist. Contrary to the hypotheses, it is possible to focus on the voters making up their minds. At this stage, voters are thought to have to do many things, including considering different forms of representation or holding parliament to account. This process might lead voters to compromise between different considerations.

**Data and Methodology**

The analyses in this chapter utilize the same representation scores as the previous chapters on symbolic and ideological representation. Symbolic and ideological forms of representation are compared with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 as the basis: Both forms of representation are approached with notions of group justice as the starting point. The task in this chapter is to compare levels of representation with respect to an essentially categorical concept—demographic group membership—to levels of representation with respect to an essentially continuous concept—issue positions.
In chapter 2, I argued that the measure based on mean positions is closely associated with one that is based on categories of issues positions—although with the data used, the latter is not attainable. The basic assumption behind this argument is that the distribution of issue positions for citizens and representatives is somewhat similar. The nature of the data used for the representatives means that I am unable to test this assumption thoroughly, but following Galtung (1967) and Holmberg (1999), I have checked the distributions of all ideological domains using the AJUS system as far as possible with the data. This system categorizes distributions by shape, and no problem cases could be identified where the shapes of the distributions of the population and the representatives differ in an obvious way. This would be the case, for example, if the distribution was polarized in the population and concentrated around the mean for the parliamentarians. The lack of obvious disparity means that the differences picked up by the mean positions are unlikely to stem from distributions that vary significantly between citizens and representatives.

In a categorical approach, proportions are of interest. In the simplest case, the proportions left and right of the midpoint are considered. If the proportion of citizens on the left is larger than the corresponding group of parliamentarians, for example, the representation score is lower. At the same time, the mean position of the citizens is further to the left: a larger difference in means. Where the proportions of citizens and representatives on the left differ significantly, the distance of the means is also larger. This means that the measurement based on mean positions is likely to be associated with a hypothetical measurement based on categories. The same is the case for hypothetical measurements using a larger number of categories: Where the proportions differ more in each category, the difference between means is also larger.

Whilst issue positions are measured as the representation of the mean voter, and symbolic representation considers different groups in society, the argument of correlation means that the representation of issue positions is meas-
ured in a way likely to approximate approaches that treat issue positions in a
categorical sense, just as ethnicity or gender. In some way, this means that the
same conception of political representation is used, and the relationships be-
tween levels of symbolic and ideological representation can be evaluated. Be-
cause comparability cannot be resolved completely, this chapter uses analyses
that are not sensitive to a precise measurement of representation. What is more,
the main conclusions of the chapter can also be drawn solely on the sections
that compare different symbolic dimensions and different ideological domains
respectively, two sections where comparability is clear.

Findings: Domains of Ideological
Representation

Having looked at the factors associated with different levels of ideological rep-
resentation in the previous chapter, in this section I consider the relationships
between levels of representation in different domains. One proposition that
can be applied to ideological representation is the logic of shared underlying
mechanisms. The argument is that because of shared covariates and underly-
ing factors, the levels of representation in different domains can be expected to
be positively correlated (H11). Given the results in the preceding empirical
chapter, however, such an association seems unlikely.

As outlined above, a different view can be justified when looking more closely
at the nature of the left–right domain. This argument is based on the view that
the level of representation can be expected to be higher in more salient do-
mains. Because the left–right scale is a summary of political issue position, the
representation scores in the left–right domain can be expected to be more sali-
ent, and thus exceed the levels of representation achieved in other domains.
This expectation is particularly applicable to more established democracies
where the positions of left and right have become more solidified and mean-
ingful over time.
The consideration of the relationships between different ideological domains indicates that there are no significant positive correlations between different domains (table 10). For instance, levels of representation in the social domain appear independent from political left–right scores. The lack of positive correlations means that hypothesis H11 cannot be supported: Levels of representation in different domains do not appear to be positively associated with each other.70

One possible explanation for this lack of positive association is that higher levels of representation in one form come at the direct cost of representation in another form. This argument emerges when considering the choices of voters during elections. Political parties offer certain policy positions, but voters are required to choose a package. It is impossible to choose the economic policies of party A and the foreign policies of party B for example, assuming that the policies of the parties diverge in the different domains. If the voters on average trade-off one issue domain directly against another, it can be expected that ideological representation scores in different domains are negatively correlated.

This argument of direct trade-offs between different domains of ideological representation does not fare much better than the argument of shared mechanisms and underlying factors. As visible in table 10, the majority of pair-wise

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70 To some extent, this finding is consistent with Shafer and Claggett’s (1995) presentation of politics as an essentially multidimensional space (see also Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Moser, 2005).
correlations are not significant. High levels in the left–right domain are most closely associated with low levels in the domains of deregulation and the domain of the role of religion in politics. Both these correlations are negative, indicating that voters on average are likely to trade off one against the other. Similarly, where views on social issues are well represented, views on migration do not seem to be well represented.

The three negative correlations in table 10 might indicate that for some of the domains, the proposition of direct trade-offs has some merit. Perhaps the results are a reflection of the fact that issue positions are generally combined within parties. For instance, if there tends to be no party to offer left-wing politics and the view that there should be an increased role of religion in politics, some voters are probably forced to trade-off one against the other. In places where such a combination of views is offered, a trade-off is not necessary. With the results in table 10, it can be speculated that voters are trading off levels of representation in the most salient domain at the cost of representation in certain other domains, but it is unclear why the significant correlations observed are the ones where a trade-off is observed.

One explanation for the different correlations is that voters are constrained by the political system. In a country where the number of parties is larger, voters are more likely to find a party that fits their views across a range of different ideological domains. On average, voters are thus less likely to have to trade-off issue domains against each other. The effects of the number of parties were tested by regressing levels of representation in one domain on levels of representation in others, whilst controlling for the variable of interest. Once controlling for the number of parties, the associations between levels of left–right representation and deregulation, and the social domain and immigration are no longer significant (p>0.1). The association between levels of left–right representation and religion in politics remains significant (p<0.05). For other relationships between domains of ideological representation, no significant
difference could be determined. This finding is in line with the argument presented.

A different explanation for the lack of association with levels of left–right representation may be the substantive meaning of left and right in different countries. This argument is linked to the argument of salience outlined at the beginning of the chapter. In the preceding chapter, I argued that it lies in the nature of the left–right domain to soak up meaning from various other domains. The positions of left and right then become summary or shorthand positions for other ideological divisions. What follows is that the left–right domain becomes the dominant or most salient of the ideological domains (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1989; Knutsen, 1997). This is probably particularly the case in older democracies, where the positions of left and right have become solidified and meaningful enough to facilitate political communication. Because of the higher salience of the left–right domain, it can be expected that levels of left–right representation are higher than levels of other policy domains. In other words, levels of left–right representation may be associated with different issue domains in different countries, which could explain the lack of overall association in table 10. However, it is unclear whether there is a pattern to these differences: The correlations between levels of representation in different domains do not vary significantly between old and new democracies, or predominantly Protestant and Catholic countries (p>0.1).

Perhaps the first indication that the proximity between the positions of citizens and representatives may be closest in the left–right domain was figure 8 on page 158. This could indicate that political left and right is the dominant domain when it comes to ideological representation, enabling effective political communication. The fact that most correlations in table 10 are statistically insignificant, however suggests that the left-right domain is not a simple summary scale of the more concrete ideological issue domains. The meaning of left
and right may be more in how citizens perceive politics: a form of shorthand that transects the specific issue domains.

The relationships between different ideological domains may be shaped by the salience of different domains: higher levels of representation in the issue domains that are more salient. Table 11 covers the same countries as covered in chapter 6, and indicates as highest score the ideological domain in which the highest representation score was achieved. The table also indicates the most salient domain, based on a question included both in the CSES and in the World Value Survey. Respondents are asked which political issue they consider the most pressing one. Issues revolving around the state of the economy include concerns over economic stability and unemployment; social issues in most countries relate to the healthcare system.

Table 11: Ideological Representation Scores in Different Domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Deregulation</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Economy †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>Social †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>L–R</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It lies in the nature of the measurements that there is a degree of uncertainty inherent in the variables of highest score and most salient. Neither the removal of uncertain cases nor their reclassification changes the overall pattern reported in this chapter.
It is apparent in table 11 that the left–right domain is where citizens seem to be represented best in most countries: In 27 out of 49 countries the highest level of ideological representation is achieved in the left–right domain. Similarly, paired sample t-tests indicate that the left–right representation scores are significantly higher than in any other domain (p<0.05). This fits well with the argument that political left and right works as a summary or shorthand scale.

By extension of the view that the left–right scale takes on meaning from other domains, it might be expected that it takes time for the involved actors—parties and citizens—to develop this meaningful summary or shorthand scale. Consequently, it can be expected that in new democracies the domain with the highest representation score is more likely a domain other than left–right. The intuition is that initially the political system focuses on a small number of issues, and that consequently initially representation is highest in the corresponding domains. Over time, increasingly other issues are politicized, and these are incorporated into positions of left and right. The result is not neces-
sarily high representation scores in all domains, both because of contradictory positions, and because some issue domains will be less salient. Following this argument, it can be expected that there is a positive correlation between the age of democracy and the level of left–right representation being higher than any other ideological domain.

As outlined in table 12, it seems very likely that the association between left–right being the domain with the highest score and old democracies holds (p<0.001). Whilst the results presented in this table are unable to say much about the mechanisms involved, it clearly demonstrates that the age of democracy may be a significant factor when it comes to high levels of representation in the left–right domain.

Table 12: ‘Highest Score’ in Old and New Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Democracy</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L–R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The domain with highest levels of representation in old and new democracies. Included are the left–right domain on the one hand and all other domains clustered together on the other. χ²=17.83, p<0.001. The result does not change significantly if more ideological domains are considered.

It might be that over time the involved actors find ways to create high levels of ideological representation irrespective of the electoral formula, for example. The actors involved seem to be able to adjust to the system, and on ‘average’ — in the sense of left–right — the representational outcome seems reasonably high. Although speculative in nature, this argument would explain why the electoral institutions seemed to be of such little importance to explain the levels of ideological representation in chapter 6.

To a certain degree, the narrative outlined in conjunction with the hypothesis also makes claims about the salience of issue domains. Rather than just a story of time passing, it can be understood as a description of development. Although it is reasonable to think that overall development does not occur in a linear fashion (Sachs, 1992), the following argument does fit a linear account.
Table 13: ‘Most Important Issue’ in Old and New Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age of Democracy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The issue considered the most important one in old and new democracies. \( \chi^2 = 12.44, p < 0.01 \). If security is excluded as a possible issue, the differences are more marked \( p < 0.001 \).

In terms of development, the issue citizens consider most important may start with security. The presentation in table 13 might be misleading in this regard, since at the time of writing terrorism-related security was a highly salient issue in some of the established democracies, such as the US or Spain. In some way, however, this illustrates the fundamental need for security: Only when security is achieved other concerns are considered as pressing. As a next step the stability of the economy and issues of employment may be considered—issues of economic management. For the post-communist countries included in the sample, issues of the privatization of key industries and deregulation of markets are in many cases highly salient. Across countries, the economy is by far the most commonly mentioned of the most pressing issues. With increasing development, social issues become more prominent: in most cases the healthcare system. This may be the case once economic stability is taken for granted (see also Dalton et al., 1984).\(^2\)

In terms of the outlined narrative on development, it can be speculated that once basic security is achieved, the prime concerns will initially be the political and economic system. This is not only reflected in the high importance assigned to privatization and the economic system in post-communist countries, but also in concerns over corruption in Romania, or the role of religion in politics in the Ukraine. To a certain extent, these concerns are reflected in the do-

\(^{72}\) There is also an association between which domain comes with the highest level of representation on the one hand and which issue is considered most important on the other \( \chi^2 = 6.19, p < 0.05 \). Although the association is significant, both factors are probably influenced by the age of democracy, or salience may be an intermediate variable.
main with the highest score, but over time, the positions of political left and right take on a more encompassing meaning. The underlying factor driving changes in salience and the domain with the highest representation scores is thus how well the system is established, not necessarily the age of democracy in years to which the factor is closely associated.

Section Summary

Having rejected the hypothesis that all ideological domains are linked within each country, the most likely explanation for differences in representation scores appears to be the age of democracy as well as the salience of issue domains. The age of democracy is linked to what kind of political issues are considered the most important ones. Albeit speculative in nature, I argued that in more established democracies the domain of political left–right successfully developed into an encompassing shorthand scale. This domain of left and right is the most salient domain in established democracies, and tends to come with the highest levels of representation.

Findings: Dimensions of Symbolic Representation

Having considered links between different domains of ideological representation, in this section I examine whether levels of symbolic representation in different dimensions are linked. The analyses in this section link both to the previous section as well as to chapter 4 and chapter 5 on gender and ethnic group representation. As in the previous section, based on the theoretical framework, the relationships between different dimensions of symbolic representation can be expected to be influenced by shared underlying explanatory factors. At the same time, a direct trade-off—for example between gender and ethnicity—, and the salience and politicization of symbolic dimensions are two other explanations considered.
To start with shared underlying mechanisms and explanatory factors, it can be expected that levels of gender representation are positively correlated with levels of ethnic group representation (H10). The intuition here is that the same explanatory variables are associated with high levels of representation in both cases. In contrast, however, voters may not have the option to vote for both symbolic dimensions at the same time. This would occur if they were more often than not forced to choose between either women or candidates from an ethnic minority group. Where levels of gender representation are directly traded off against the representation of ethnicity, a negative correlation between the different representation scores can be expected.

A different proposition is concerned with the salience and politicization of demographic cleavages in society. The argument is that representation scores are higher in dimensions that are more salient. The actual make-up of society may be an indicator of the salience and politicization of demographic differences. For instance, in countries that are ethnically more heterogeneous, the salience of ethnic divisions may exceed that of gender differences. The expectation in this case is that levels of ethnic group representation exceed levels of gender representation. Presumably, the reverse is also the case. However, it needs to be borne in mind that, in countries that are ethnically relatively homogeneous, high representation scores necessarily follow. Consequently, relative representation scores are used to examine this proposition. These relative scores are not affected by the size of the minority group.

In addition to the variable used in chapter 5, ethnicity can also be conceived along the lines of linguistic and religious differences. In some places, these are fundamental aspects of ethnic identity, but both language and religion can be understood as symbolic dimensions in their own right (Lijphart, 1979). Hypothesis H10 can therefore be reformulated into the expectation that levels of
representation in all dimensions are positively correlated, including levels of linguistic and religious representation.73

The sample for religious group representation is very small because of exceptionally high refusal rates during data collection (N=13). The key covariates appear to be the presence of parties with a religious focus as part of their manifesto, and possibly attitudes towards marginalized groups.74 Analyses on the representation of language groups are based on a larger sample (N=30). In contrast with the other symbolic dimensions, the representation of linguistic groups seems unaffected by either the electoral system or cultural aspects. The level of representation is higher in countries where minority groups are geographically clustered (p<0.01).75

In order to address the hypothesis of shared covariates, table 14 summarizes the key explanatory factors for the representation of all four symbolic dimensions considered in this section. Significant factors are indicated with one or two asterisks.

73 Data on the parliamentarians were collected by approaching official parliamentary contacts, and complemented by data from Alonso and Ruiz (2007), Reynolds (2006), and the Congressional Quarterly (2006). For the citizens I used data from national statistics, the Ethnologue for language groups (Raymond, 2005), and the World Factbook (2006) for religious groups. The analyses also considered the presence of linguistic and religious parties, coded using the party profiles on Election World (Derksen, 2006). A party was coded as a specialized party if it contained a reference to language or religion in its name or as a major policy.

74 In the case of religious representation, there is only one country in the sample with a majoritarian electoral system, and it comes with lower levels of representation than in any of the countries with PR. Older democracies may provide slightly higher levels of religious representation. Given the small sample, none of the associations is statistically significant (p>0.1). The religious division in Germany is reflected in the composition of parliament: Religious minorities, as well as the third of non-believers are well represented in parliament. In Finland, non-believers are slightly over-represented, possibly reflecting the prevalence of non-believers amongst highly educated citizens. In the Lebanon, Maronites and to a lesser degree Sunnis are over-represented, whilst other religious groups are under-represented, particularly the Shia population. In other places, religious minorities tend to be under-represented.

75 In a multivariate analysis, only geographical clustering, the age of democracy, and the control of cultural heterogeneity are statistically significant (p<0.05). Cultural heterogeneity incorporates considerations of linguistic similarity when determining the value of heterogeneity. The model fit is high: R²=0.74. Finland and Romania provide near perfect representation for Swedish and Hungarian speakers respectively. Minority language groups in other countries are under-represented.
Table 14: Explanatory Factors across Symbolic Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Formula</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Parties†</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity (Control)</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clustered Minorities</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Religion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Attitudes‡</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Given is a summary of bivariate associations for the different symbolic dimensions. Factors that appear to be associated but where the association is not statistically significant are given in brackets. * Factor remains significant in a multivariate analysis; other factors are only significant in bivariate associations. ** Factor still remains significant when considering cultural attitudes measured directly. † Specific parties refer to linguistic and religious parties respectively. ‡ Cultural attitudes refer to attitudes towards women in politics in the case of gender representation, and attitudes towards marginalized groups in society in the case of ethnicity, religion, and language.

In the analyses on gender and ethnicity, cultural attitudes appeared to be the key covariates. The same is also true for the smaller sample available for religious representation, along with the presence of religious parties. For linguistic representation, in contrast, the clustering of minority groups seems to be the most significant factor. It therefore appears that hypothesis H10 has some merit: There are shared covariates for three of the symbolic dimensions. However, the argument that levels of representation are linked within countries looks unsubstantiated by the actual representation scores. The representation scores for gender and ethnicity do not correlate significantly (r=0.10, p>0.1). The shared underlying factors outlined in table 14 are not reflected in the correlations between levels of symbolic representation, and hypothesis H10 cannot be supported.

A different explanation is based on the view that higher levels of representation in one form may come at the cost of another form: direct trade-offs between different forms of representation. In the case of symbolic representation, this would occur if voters were more often than not forced to choose between either women or candidates from an ethnic minority group, because the avail-

76 As outlined chapter 5, the variables of attitudes towards women as political leaders and attitudes towards marginalized groups in society are highly correlated (r=0.73, p<0.01). Both factors are strongly associated with the level of development (HDI: r=0.45, r=0.60 respectively, p<0.01).
able candidates mean that it is impossible to vote for both. If the voters on average deal with such cross-pressures in a similar manner, and levels of gender representation are directly traded off against the level of ethnic group representation, a negative correlation is the consequence. The expectation therefore is that levels of gender representation are negatively correlated with levels of ethnic group representation (Banducci et al., 2004; Grey, 2006). Given that attributes of gender and ethnicity are not exclusive, there is little reason to assume that voters are frequently forced into such a direct trade-off, and this proposition seems less likely than the one where a positive correlation is predicted.

The lack of association outlined above equally means that no negative correlation can be found. With that, there is no evidence for a direct trade-off between the two dimensions of representation. Moreover, there are no significant correlations with the other symbolic dimensions of religious and linguistic representation (p>0.1). This means that the proposition that all forms of symbolic representation are linked—including language and religion—cannot be supported.

In order to address the nature of a possible trade-off between levels of gender and ethnic group representation, it is necessary to look at the difference between representation scores. When comparing levels of ethnic group representation and gender representation in table 15, it can be observed that for many of the countries the difference of values is rather large, although there are also countries where the levels of representation in the different dimensions largely coincide. Overall, levels of gender representation tend to be lower than in the other dimensions, often significantly lower. This might be a reflection of the fact that in terms of gender all countries are necessarily highly heterogeneous, a fact which is addressed in the subsequent analysis, where the salience and politicization of different dimensions is considered.
Table 15: Comparison of Representation Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Subsample)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Given are the number of cases, the mean scores, and the range for the different dimensions of symbolic representation. The gender subsample includes the countries for which there is also an ethnic representation score.

The relationship between levels of gender representation and ethnic group representation scores may be characterized by the salience of the corresponding division rather than a direct trade-off. In the context of this section, the salience of social divisions refers to the awareness and politicization of underrepresentation of women and ethnic groups. This factor of salience is highlighted in the scant literature on the relationships between different symbolic dimensions, and was introduced in the theoretical framework in chapter 2. The premise is that where divisions are more politicized, it can be assumed that voters are more likely to vote on that basis (Birch, 2000; Mateo Diaz, 2005). The relationship between levels of ethnic and gender representation may thus be affected by varying awareness: Divisions that are more salient can be expected to lead to higher representation scores.

The argument revolves around a trade-off between the representation of women and that of ethnic minority groups, and of interest here is the salience of ethnic divisions relative to the salience of gender divisions in society. The expectation is that where the relative salience of ethnic divisions is higher than that of gender divisions, the levels of ethnic group representation exceed those of gender representation. The reverse should also follow—higher levels of gender representation where the relative salience of gender divisions exceeds that of ethnic divisions.

Empirically, the salience of divisions and awareness of under-representation is difficult to attain. For ethnic divisions, in this chapter it is assumed that such differences are more politicized in societies that are more heterogeneous. Consequently, in this section the ethnic heterogeneity of a society is understood as
a proxy of salience. This measure is not perfect, because there are other influences on the salience of ethnic divisions in a country, such as historical reasons. However, ethnic heterogeneity scores are probably the best available data for cross-national analyses. Given that the proportion of women is relatively constant across societies, no measurement of gender heterogeneity can be included. For the purposes of examining this propositions, the level of ethnic heterogeneity is used as an approximation of the relative salience of ethnic divisions. The argument that follows is that where ethnic heterogeneity is high, ethnic representation scores are expected to be relatively high compared to gender representation scores. By extension, where ethnic heterogeneity is low, levels of gender representation are expected to be relatively high compared to levels of ethnic group representation.

The focus on relative representation means that R-scores are used to examine this proposition instead of the representation scores used elsewhere in this project, because R-scores are not affected by the heterogeneity of the population. However, because relative representation scores are based on ratios, outliers may affect the findings a great deal. Therefore, median values are compared in the analysis that follows. Table 16 presents both mean and median values to illustrate the influence of outliers in this instance.

Table 16: Relative Ethnic and Gender Representation in High and Low Ethnic Heterogeneity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Heterogeneity</th>
<th>High Heterogeneity</th>
<th>Low Heterogeneity</th>
<th>High Heterogeneity</th>
<th>Low Heterogeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (R-scores)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (R-scores)</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Differences of median values are significant at the 0.01 level. As previously, values of ethnic heterogeneity were split into high and low at 0.3, a value corresponding to the mean for the countries covered. Mean values are presented to highlight the influence of outliers. R-scores greater than 1 can occur where minority groups are numerically over-represented, and the mean R-score for ethnic group representation is driven by a single case: South Africa.

The concept of relative representation was introduced on page 128 in chapter 5. These R-scores simply state what proportion of women or the ethnic minority population is included in parliament, irrespective of the size of the group. R-scores greater than 1 correspond to a numerical over-representation.
As visible in table 16, both the propositions outlined above are supported. In places where ethnic heterogeneity is higher, the relative level of representation of ethnic minority groups is higher than that of women (0.63>0.29). At the same time, in places where the ethnic make-up of society is more homogenous, the level of gender representation is higher (0.37>0.28). The salience of demographic divisions appears to be associated with the levels of symbolic representation achieved (p<0.01). I have checked the robustness of this result by removing Nordic countries from consideration, as well as removing outliers where ethnic R-scores are greater than 1 because a minority group is significantly over-represented, but the reported relationship is not affected significantly.

In order to examine the relationship in more detail, I looked at the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and relative representation scores for gender and ethnicity (R-scores). Levels of ethnic heterogeneity are positively correlated with the difference between relative levels of ethnic representation and relative levels of gender representation (r=0.41, p<0.000). It is the case that levels of ethnic heterogeneity are positively correlated with relative levels of ethnic group representation (r=0.40, p<0.000), whilst they are negatively correlated with relative levels of gender representation (r=−0.25, p<0.01). This indicates that in practice higher levels of relative gender representation are traded off against higher levels of relative ethnic group representation, in accordance to the relative salience of divisions—as measured by the level of ethnic heterogeneity. The reported relationship is thus not entirely driven by the relationship between levels of ethnic heterogeneity and relative levels of ethnic group representation.

In this section, I examined the relationship between levels of ethnic and gender representation. Even though some of the underlying factors are shared, as assumed in hypothesis H10, overall no significant association can be determined. This section also examined cases when ethnic and gender representation may
differ, illuminating the relationships between different symbolic dimensions: It appears that in places where levels of ethnic heterogeneity are higher—and with that presumably the salience and politicization of difference increased—the level of ethnic group representation is greater than that of women. The opposite is also the case: Where levels of ethnic heterogeneity are lower, the level of gender representation is higher than that of ethnic minority groups. Levels of representation appear to be higher in dimensions that are more salient and politicized, reflecting results in the previous section on ideological representation.

Considering the fact that in many places representation scores for ethnicity are higher than for gender, it is possible to speculate about the order of events over time. It appears that in many places relatively high levels of representation of ethnic groups may precede higher levels of gender representation. Other forms of representation, such as religion, and then by extension the representation of sexual orientation, towards (post-modern) lifestyle choices, may follow suit. Included in these considerations is the observation of increased demands for symbolic representation in parliaments on grounds of justice: Success in one dimension may lead to demands in another (Allwood & Wadia, 2004).

The order of events may of course differ depending on the salience of divisions in society. In some divided societies, the cleavage of religion, for instance, has lead to parties taking up religion in their programmes, and thus improving levels of representation. Here the élite may play a role in politicizing a certain division, although the results above suggest that the actual make-up of society

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78 It is important to bear in mind that a high level of symbolic representation may be also achieved in a country where one of the dimensions is a non-issue—places where the salience of a divide approaches zero—in the sense that members of different groups are treated the same. Consequently, purely based on probability, parliament would be mirroring the population nearly perfectly: meaning a representation score of about $Q=1$, and by extension $R=1$ for all groups.
is the prevalent factor. This means that historical aspects of nation-building may affect present-day representation in parliament.

**Section Summary**

In this section, I considered links between gender representation and ethnic group representation—and to a lesser extent religious and linguistic representation. Despite shared underlying mechanisms, levels of symbolic representation are not generally linked. In contrast, considering the salience and politicization of cleavages proved fruitful. The results suggest that the actual make-up of society may play a significant role in shaping the relationships between levels of symbolic representation in different dimensions: Representation scores tend to be higher in the symbolic dimensions that are thought to be more salient.

**Findings: Symbolic and Ideological Representation**

Having looked at links between different ideological domains and different dimensions of symbolic representation, this section attempts to bring the two together. As far as I know, this is the first time, an empirical analysis has been attempted to compare these different forms of representation. With this comparison, the nature of political representation should be further illuminated. As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the conclusions drawn from this section hinge on the assumption that levels of symbolic and ideological representation are somewhat comparable. I argued that even though the measurement of ideological representation is based on mean positions rather than categories, it is likely that the observed patterns of associations are correlated to hypothetical associations based on a categorical measurement. Because of data availability, the analyses in this section are perhaps the best possible comparisons between levels of symbolic and ideological representation in national legislatures.
As in the previous two sections, in this part of the project the hypothesis of shared mechanisms is tested: On a theoretical basis, the same mechanisms were identified for both symbolic and ideological forms of representation. Consequently, levels of the two can be expected to be linked (H12). This is contrasted with the view that high levels of symbolic representation may come at the cost of high levels of ideological representation, reflected in a negative correlation. It is often asserted that voters perceive politics primarily in terms of issues and policies. Therefore, it can be expected that ideological differences are more salient than their symbolic counterpart, which is probably translated into the levels of representation achieved. The result is that ideological representation scores are expected to exceed those based on demographic characteristics.

To start with the argument of shared covariates, table 17 outlines the correlations between levels of symbolic and ideological forms of representation. The table includes gender and ethnicity on the one hand, and left–right, social issues, and the environment on the other. Not included in the table are the dimensions of linguistic and religious representation, as well as a number of ideological domains, all because of the small number of cases in each cell.

**Table 17: Correlation between Levels of Symbolic and Ideological Representation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>Social Issues</th>
<th>Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * significant at p<0.05

The only statistically significant correlation is that between gender representation scores and the levels of left–right representation (⁎⁎). On close examination, it becomes clear that this effect is largely due to the difference between old and new democracies in the countries covered. In old democracies gender representation tends to be high regardless of the level of ideological representation (⁎⁎); in new democracies levels of left–right representation tend to be lower in all cases (†). The association between levels of gender representation
and levels of left–right representation is shaped by their shared association with the age of democracy. Essentially the same result can be achieved when regressing levels of left–right representation on levels of gender and ethnic group representation: only levels of gender representation are significant ($p<0.05$). There are no significant associations for ethnic group representation, or the domains of social and environmental issues ($p>0.1$). The lack of significant positive correlations between the levels of representation in different forms means that hypothesis H12 can be supported only for the relationship between levels of gender representation and levels of left–right representation.79

A different explanation is argument of trade-offs between different forms of representation (Overby & Cosgrove, 1996; Cameron et al., 1996). When studying a particular form of political representation, it is often forgotten that citizens normally only have a single vote with which they are expected to achieve a number of different things, including expressing preference in terms of symbolic and ideological representation. Consequently, a direct trade-off between different forms of representation is a likely outcome. For example, if voters emphasize ethnic differences, candidates may be chosen based on their ethnicity rather than their ideological views or policy preferences. If the voters on average trade-off representation in demographic terms against representation in terms of ideology and policy preferences, a negative correlation between symbolic representation scores and levels of ideological representation can be expected. The lack of a significant negative correlation in table 17, however, means that the argument of direct trade-offs cannot be supported: There is no indication that higher levels of symbolic representation come at the direct cost of higher levels of ideological representation, or vice versa.

79 PR systems are often suggested as a means to increase levels of symbolic and ideological representation. Although in the chapter on ethnic group representation and ideological representation no such association could be determined, the expectation that follows would be that the associations outlined in this chapter are stronger under PR. Unsurprisingly, there is no support for such interaction effects ($p>0.1$).
Focusing on the differences between ideological and symbolic representation scores, the salience of social divisions is highlighted. Based on the argument that divisions that are more salient lead to higher levels of representation, it can be expected that ideological representation scores exceed their symbolic counterparts. In most cases, the political space is primarily organized based on ideological rather than symbolic differences. Voters are equally thought to perceive politics principally in terms of issue differences, and vote on that basis. What follows is that in most places ideological differences are expected to be more salient than their symbolic counterparts are. Consequently, ideological representation scores are expected to be higher than in any of the symbolic domains. This is probably particularly the case for left–right scores. Table 18 outlines the representation scores for different ideological domains and symbolic dimensions in different countries.

**Table 18: Symbolic and Ideological Representation Scores in Different Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Old</td>
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</table>

*Note: Representation scores in different ideological domains and symbolic dimensions.*

Overall, in 60% of the countries studied, the representation scores of ideological domains exceed those of symbolic dimensions. However, it must be borne in mind that the representation scores will be invariably high in a country with a homogenous population, something that affects ethnic representation scores in particular. One way to consider this is by restricting the view to gender representation. In this case, the relationship is very clear: Levels of left–right representation exceed levels of gender representation in every case (100%).

However, the role of ethnic representation scores merits further investigation. This can be done by removing countries with an ethnically relatively homogenous population, which excludes the cases where ethnic representation scores are invariably high from analysis. In this case, the percentage of countries with higher ideological representation scores increases to 70%. However, the proportion of countries where ethnic divisions are relatively salient may in this case also be larger—and thus places are included where to a certain degree voters are more likely to vote based on ethnicity.

Rather than dividing countries into ethnically heterogeneous and homogenous, an alternative measurement can be used. Table 19 utilizes the proportion of
ethnic minorities as part of the total population. The table indicates in which form of representation the highest levels were achieved, grouped by the proportion of ethnic minority population. In this case, in all of the most homogeneous societies the level of ethnic group representation is higher than levels of left–right representation. This is an artefact of the measurement of representation used: The level of representation is necessarily high, since the proportion of the population not represented is small. Consequently, very high levels of left–right representation would be necessary for the left–right score to exceed the ethnic representation score.

For countries where the proportion of minority groups is larger, but still under 10%, the picture is mixed: in some countries, left–right representation scores are higher, in others the representation of ethnic groups. Looking at countries with a proportion of ethnic minority population of 10% to 30%, levels of left–right representation increasingly exceed those of ethnic group representation. In this group, in 88% of the countries left–right representation scores are the highest ones of any form. Whilst in the most homogenous countries it is often the case that no member of an ethnic minority group is present in parliament, in this group of countries there is at least one minority member present in all the countries. However, it appears that in contrast to the more homogenous countries, such token representation in many cases is no longer sufficient for high levels of ethnic group representation.

Table 19: Highest Levels of Representation by Proportion of Ethnic Minority Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Minority Population</th>
<th>Left–Right Representation Highest</th>
<th>Ethnic Group Representation Highest</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>0%–3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3%–10%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%–30%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%–50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The proportion of countries where representation scores are highest in the left–right domain and the dimensions of ethnicity respectively, given at different levels of ethnic minority population. The categories chosen reflect the distribution of the values (LE).
higher; in two ethnic representation scores are higher. A larger proportion of ethnic minorities in the population may increase the salience and politicization of ethnic differences—and with that a sensibility for integration. At the same time, if such integration does not occur—or only to a limited extent—the scope for poor ethnic group representation is large in these countries.

What emerges here is that once the level of ethnic heterogeneity is considered, the argument of salience can also be supported for ethnic representation scores. In other words, discounting countries where ethnic representation scores are high because of the relative homogeneity of the society, left–right representation scores tend to be the highest scores achieved. The story is slightly different in more homogenous countries, where ethnic representation scores are high in any case, or where token representation can make a difference. In countries that are more heterogeneous, token representation is no longer enough for high ethnic representation scores, leading to the under-representation outlined in chapter 5.80

In order to explore the differences between ideological and symbolic representation further, it is possible to expect that the difference between ideological and symbolic representation scores is larger in more homogenous countries. This argument follows the above discussion on the make-up of society, although the size of the observed effect may not be linear because of measurement issues in the case of ideological representation. The intuition is that in more homogenous societies, symbolic differences are less salient, and thus the corresponding representation scores are comparatively lower. Similarly, in countries that are more heterogeneous the level of symbolic representation is

80 Unfortunately, I do not have ideological representation scores for the most heterogeneous countries considered in this project. With that, it would be possible to test the suggestion that in the most heterogeneous countries ethnic differences become so salient and politicized that left–right scores are overshadowed. It is also possible to envisage the same relationship as observed in the medium heterogeneity groups, if despite the high salience of ethnic divisions, some ethnic groups are under-represented—be it for historical reasons or issues of power.
assumed relatively high. At the same time, for the purposes of this argument, the salience of left–right is assumed to be independent of the make-up of society. With that, the difference from ideological representation scores is larger.

There are multiple ways to conceptualize differences between ideological and symbolic representation. I considered all of the following: highest scoring ideological domain versus highest scoring symbolic dimension, highest ideological versus lowest symbolic, lowest ideological versus highest symbolic, and the lowest level achieved for each form. Comparing the highest representation scores in each case leads to a relatively clear pattern: The difference between symbolic and ideological representation scores is largest in countries that are more heterogeneous than average. The association is strong and statistically significant ($\gamma^2$, $r=0.64$, $p<0.01$), but the sign of the association is counter to the expectation outlined.81

This association is not entirely surprising given the strong negative association between cultural heterogeneity and levels of ethnic group representation. Excluding the ethnically more homogenous countries from analysis demonstrates this, suggesting that the strong positive correlation is mainly driven by the measurement used. In the more heterogeneous countries—where levels of ethnic representation scores are not necessarily high—the result is different: The difference is slightly larger in countries that are more homogenous than average, as stipulated by the hypothesis. However, the effect is small and with the small sample not statistically significant ($r=-0.05$, $p>0.1$; $N=11$).82

Similarly, focusing on differences that involve the lowest scoring symbolic dimension, no clear pattern of association can be determined. This appears to be

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81 Very similar associations can be achieved when looking at the proportion of ethnic minorities of the population ($r=0.45$, $p<0.05$) and the variable of ethnic heterogeneity ($r=0.47$, $p<0.05$) rather than the variable of cultural heterogeneity.

82 Unfortunately, in contrast to the preceding section where I compared levels of gender representation with levels of ethnic group representation, ideological R-scores cannot be calculated in a meaningful manner, and are thus unavailable to test this hypothesis.
the case because levels of gender representation tend to be significantly lower than levels of representation in other forms of symbolic and ideological representation. Whilst the highest ideological representation scores are higher than the lowest symbolic representation scores in all cases, the opposite is not always the case. In 10% of the cases, the lowest performing ideological domain still exceeds the highest symbolic counterpart. If anything, this can be taken as support for the suggestion that voters primarily make sense of politics in terms of issues and policies.

In none of the comparisons, however, the proposition of larger differences in more homogenous societies appeared to have much merit. This was the case for the reported results, as well as for subsamples of established or ethnically heterogeneous countries, amongst others. Whilst the counter-intuitive positive correlation presented can be explained with the measurement of ethnic group representation, the subsample of ethnically heterogeneous countries failed to provide a significant relationship, albeit hampered by a small sample size.

Section Summary

In this section, I compared levels of ideological and symbolic representation. I showed that ideological representation scores tend to exceed levels of gender and ethnic group representation. With that, the suggestion that voters and the élite approach politics primarily in terms of issues and policies might be supported. As outlined at the beginning of the chapter, the results in this section hinge on the assumption that levels of ideological representation and levels of symbolic representation are somewhat comparable. I argued that this is the case, and focused on associations that are not sensitive to the precise measurement of ideological representation. Following the lead in the preceding section, I further explored the role of salience, showing that the highest levels of political representation may be associated with the salience of divisions. Where ethnic divisions are thought to be more salient, the level of representa-
tation is comparatively higher; where the society is relatively homogenous, levels of ideological representation tend to be highest.

In most instances, a purported direct link between symbolic and ideological representation based on shared explanatory factors could not be supported. There are also no signs that voters on average trade off ideological representation against representation in terms of demographic differences. In some way, this paves the way for electoral engineering: increasing levels of symbolic representation need not affect levels of ideological representation.

Discussion and Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the relationships between different forms of political representation: between different ideological domains, between levels of gender and ethnic group representation, as well as between ideological and symbolic forms of representation. These considerations and the corresponding analyses complement the previous empirical chapters where different forms of representation were approached in isolation. As far as I know, in two of the sections, the empirical considerations of how different forms of political representation are related are a first of their kind. In the section on the relationships between levels of symbolic and ideological forms of representation, the comparability of measures is not immediately apparent, although I defended the position that the different representation scores are comparable in a meaningful sense. The other two sections are unaffected by this, and the substantive results of this chapter can be drawn from these sections only: the results from the different sections are mutually supportive.

Throughout the chapter, I tested the hypothesis of shared mechanisms, but also paid attention to different explanations in order to illuminate the relationships between different forms of representation. These different explanations are the argument that there are direct trade-offs between levels of representation in different forms, and the view that the salience of divisions and aware-
ness of under-representation may account for differences in representation scores.

The hypothesis based on the premise of shared mechanisms and correlates was rejected in almost all cases. The exception was the relationship between levels of gender representation and levels of left–right representation. Both these variables are positively associated with the age of democracy. Given the small size of the effect, relying on the age of democracy does not appear to be a good strategy if one is interested in increasing levels of representation, as previously outlined in chapter 4. In the other cases, however, the presence of shared explanatory mechanisms does not directly translate into similar representational outcomes. This finding contradicts expectations that certain institutional settings—such as proportional representation systems—are associated with higher levels of representation in general, as frequently argued in the literature (Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1999; Yoon, 2004; Bieber, 2004; Baldez, 2006).

Similarly, there is no clear evidence for the proposition that levels of representation in one form are directly traded off against levels of representation in another, as apparent in the lack of negative correlations between levels of representation in different forms. There are some significant negative correlations between levels of ideological representation in different domains, but it is unclear why the particular correlations are significant. For the relationship between levels of gender and ethnic group representation, or symbolic and ideological forms of representation, no significant negative correlations can be observed. This lack of negative correlations is encouraging for proponents of electoral engineering: There is no evidence that increasing levels of symbolic representation would compromise levels of ideological representation.

One factor that might influence the relationships between levels of representation in different forms is the salience and politicization of different political divisions. Throughout the chapter, the argument linked to the salience of different factors proved much more successful than those based on shared co-
variates or direct trade-offs did. These findings are in line with studies that argue that salience is a key factor for ideological representation (Birch, 2000; Lutz, 2003; Wlezien and Soroka, 2007). In this chapter, I demonstrated that this appears to be the case not only for differences in ideological representation, but also for differences in symbolic representation, which affects the relationships between different forms of representation. Particularly in the section on the relationships between different symbolic dimensions was it possible to ascertain that demographic differences that are more salient seem to lead to higher representation scores. I approached this using ethnic heterogeneity as a proxy of the relative salience of ethnic divisions. The result is that where ethnic divisions are thought to be more salient and politicized relative to gender divisions, ethnic representation scores tend to be higher than levels of gender representation. The inverse case—lower salience, lower representation scores—tends also to be the case.

The argument of salience was equally applied to policy preferences in addition to demographic differences. It appears that in older democracies left–right positions have developed into more meaningful or useful shorthand positions, leading to higher representation scores in left–right relative to other ideological domains. At the same time, in most cases levels of ideological representation are higher than levels of symbolic representation. I argued that this is a reflection of the higher salience of ideological differences. This result fits well with the proposition that voters and other political actors perceive the political system primarily in terms of ideological differences and policy issues.

This means that the argument of salience crosses the division between ideological and demographic differences. Higher levels of representation seem to be achieved in the forms of representation that are more salient, whether the underlying divisions are of symbolic or ideological nature. In many cases, the most salient division is the left–right domain, but the make-up of society may
mean that ethnic differences dominate the political landscape in some countries.

This chapter addressed the second research question in this project on the relationships between levels of representation in different forms, and the results suggest that levels of ideological and symbolic representation are not inherently linked. Based on the theoretical framework in chapter 2, I suggested that the salience of political issues and awareness of under-representation might influence the relationships between levels of representation in different forms. The key finding in this chapter, however, is that in most cases levels of representation in different forms are not associated. In particular, there is no evidence that higher levels of symbolic representation necessarily come at the cost of levels of ideological representation. With that, electoral engineering in the name of group justice may become viable. The potential of electoral engineering is examined in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter 8

Discussion

Having addressed the variables associated with different levels of political representation in four empirical chapters, it is now time to bring the findings together. Not only does this chapter review and discuss the main findings outlined in the preceding chapters, but it also addresses additional factors that might influence levels of political representation. On several occasions in the thesis, it became clear that unfortunately not all potential factors that may influence levels of parliamentary representation could be considered adequately. This is for instance the case, where no data are available, or where measurement is inadequate. Some of the factors are highly context dependent and not measureable as country variables, which would be necessary to include them in the cross-national comparison in this project. The objective for this chapter is to:

- Summarize and discuss the main findings of the empirical chapters

I revisit the four empirical chapters in turn. In each case, I summarize and discuss the main findings and address additional influences on levels of political representation. This discussion includes the role of political parties, the supply of candidates, the implementation of quotas, as well as the role of the élite and individual voters. As will be explained, these factors could not be treated adequately in the empirical chapters for a number of reasons. The consideration of additional factors results in a better and more complete understanding of political representation in general, and helps identify areas worth further investigation. Not only does this discussion enable addressing the research questions
in a more nuanced way, but the discussion also builds up towards a consideration of how levels of parliamentary representation could be improved in the final part of the chapter. Interventions of electoral engineering are often suggested in the literature, and I discuss the viability and effectiveness of such measures in light of the findings in this project.

**Gender Representation**

In the first empirical chapter, I looked at gender representation. The strong bivariate effects of the electoral system and voluntary gender quotas were reduced once controlling for regional differences and attitudes towards women as political leaders. Whilst broadly in line with the literature that considers the impact of cultural factors along with institutional ones, the extent to which attitudes towards women in politics proved dominant contrasts with many previous studies. The results outlined for free and partly free countries in chapter 4 suggest that cultural factors dominate in the case of gender representation—particularly attitudes towards women as political leaders. The electoral formula may also play a role, although it cannot account for changes over time.

In line with all the literature considering political culture in one form or another, in this project issues of causal direction cannot be resolved completely (Fuchs, 2007). In chapter 4, I used a limited analysis over time to demonstrate that cultural attitudes may be causally linked to changes in the levels of gender representation. In addition, I highlighted that there are many factors shaping cultural attitudes, which makes it unlikely that the presence of women in parliament on its own influences attitudes towards women in positions of power to a significant degree. Chapter 2 outlined a number of these factors, including the predominant religion of a country, and women as role models in public positions other than parliament, and I showed that these are statistically associated with variables that capture cultural attitudes. Whilst a certain degree of reverse causality cannot—and based on the arguments presented in chapter 2
should not—be ruled out, I argued that the main direction of influence is from attitudes to levels of representation rather than the other way around.

One factor that might affect levels of gender representation but was largely absent in the empirical analyses is the role of political parties. Political parties are major political actors (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Rabb & Suleiman, 2003), and their role in the recruitment of candidates affects political representation (Vallance, 1979; Leijenaar, 1993; Norris, 1993; Simms, 1993; Bystydzienski, 1995; Allwood & Wadia, 2004). To some extent, the variables of candidate supply and voluntary quotas addressed this factor in the chapter on gender representation, but not adequately. Given that there are multiple parties to consider in each country, the cross-national perspective makes it difficult to cater for the influence of individual parties and their actions.

The way political parties influence political representation is by choosing the candidates who are presented to the voters (Norris, 1993). The importance of parties stems from the fact that they can set the rules and procedures of recruitment. To some extent, political recruitment is framed by the political system: The political culture and the key institutions of a country shape the norms and rules within parties, which in turn influence the way the recruitment process works (Norris, 1993; Skjeie, 1993; Matland, 2006). Women candidates may be disadvantaged during recruitment because of the selection rules in place, particularly choices over what kind of experience is counted as relevant political experience. This makes selection more difficult for women in places where they are also under-represented at lower levels of the political system. Norris (1993) identified party ideology as one factor as to why parties differ in their

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83 Depending on the party structures, there is a difference in the extent to which party members or the party elite are the key actors within political parties (Scarrow et al., 2000). With reduced party membership and a trend towards professionalization parties ensure that the selected candidates are in line with party ideology (Scarrow, 2000).
approach to candidate selection: left–wing parties are often more egalitarian in their approach. Such differences in party culture may lead to unconscious and unintended discrimination of certain aspirants (Skjeie, 1993; Appleton & Mazur, 1993; Simms, 1993; Leyenaar, 2004).

Quotas and affirmative action are often suggested to overcome recruitment issues within parties—forcing parties to actively look for suitably qualified aspirants (Bystydzienski, 1995)—, but without diligent implementation such actions may remain ineffective. In fact, when it comes to the successful implementation of gender quotas, the support for these quotas in the wider population may also play a role (Mueller, 1988; Gray, 2003). Contrasting quota regulations in Argentina and Chile, Gray (2003) argues that broad support for quotas in Argentina ensured a diligent implementation, which in turn led to more women in parliament. In Chile, in contrast, support for quotas in the wider population was largely absent, resulting in unenforced regulation and no significant gain for women in politics. Rather than focusing on the institutional part as Gray does, based on the results in the empirical chapters it may be more appropriate to consider the incentives of the élite. The same considerations may help to understand the actions of the élite with regard to candidate selection.

Elsewhere I argued that the political élite are influenced by the same political environment as the wider population (Anderson, 2007; Peffley & Rohrsneider, 2007). However, even if the selectors were completely detached from the cultural influences outlined, assuming that the parliamentarians are interested to stay in power, it would be in their rational interest not to be too much out of step with the demands of the electorate (Downs, 1957; Braud, 1988; Laver, 1997). This means in a country where a female candidate is unlikely to gain more votes than a man, the parties have little incentive to actively encourage women to come forward. In some instances, women candidates are considered an electoral risk (Rule & Zimmerman, 1994; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). This
means that although the actual implementation of procedures can encourage better representation within parties, it seems that parties are unlikely to make use of this potential beyond what they consider beneficial for electoral success. Even if enforced quotas were used to increase the number of women in parliament, it seems unlikely that this would substantively shape attitudes towards women in politics. As outlined on page 111 in chapter 4, once considering regional differences or the level of development, the share of women in parliament in the past is not a significant covariate for attitudes towards women in politics in the present. This finding is in line with the argument that there are many other influences on cultural attitudes than the number of women in parliament, such as the predominant religion of a country. This means that whilst enforced quotas could increase the number of female parliamentarians, the resulting impact on the status of women in society would be limited.  

Having considered additional influences on levels of gender representation, it appears that the role of parties in the recruitment of candidates is useful to explain differences within countries. For the cross-national comparison in this project, however, the overall picture of the empirical chapter should remain unaffected: Attitudes towards women in politics are the strongest correlate for levels of gender representation. The discussion of political parties, however, highlights the potential of the party élite to influence overall levels of representation, particularly through quotas. However, considering incentives of electoral success, I argued that cultural factors are likely to remain dominant.

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84 The experience of countries in Eastern Europe raises further doubts on the ability of quotas to shape cultural attitudes in a lasting manner. In these countries, enforced quotas ensured relatively high levels of gender representation during communist rule. With the fall of communist rule, however, not only did the quotas disappear, but also did the number of women in parliament drop markedly (UN, 1992; Dahlerup, 2006). It appears that in these countries the presence of women in parliament during communist rule did not substantially affect support in the wider population for the inclusion of more women in parliament.
Ethnic Group Representation

The second empirical chapter examined levels of ethnic group representation. As in the preceding chapter on gender representation, the focus was on explaining levels of representation. The results of chapter 5 cast doubt on the suggestion that institutional factors are the main factors shaping ethnic group representation. Once controlling for the ethnic make-up of society, the significant covariates are cultural factors rather than institutional aspects. However, when looking at quota regulations, it became clear that the role of institutional factors could not be ignored in individual cases: The actual way quotas for ethnic minority groups are implemented seems of great importance. Across countries, the lack of diligent implementation seems to be the reason why ethnic quotas are an insignificant factor in the cross-national comparison, despite being enforced measures. Whilst cultural aspects—measured as attitudes towards marginalized groups in society—appear to be the key driver of ethnic group representation, it seems that a strong leadership in conjunction with adequately implemented quotas could equally work to improve the level of ethnic group representation.

In the context of gender representation in the previous section, I discussed the role of political parties in selecting candidates. Unfortunately, no appropriate data seem to exist for ethnic minority groups that would allow analyses at the national level. The compilation of such data would be an area of further research, notwithstanding the separate need to consider aspects of supply at the party level. However, as outlined in the context of gender representation, it seems unlikely that the absence of supply effects affects cross-national models where cultural attitudes are incorporated.

Although quotas and related measures were addressed in the chapter on ethnic group representation, issues of implementation merit a further look. In the empirical analysis, the provision of quotas did not appear to be associated with higher levels of representation, but in this section, I attempt to combine
these findings with considerations at a more individual level. The presence of quotas is controversial in any case, even if they may be an effective means to increase the number of representatives from ethnic minority groups. The preferential treatment underlying such measures is at odds with the principles of equality and meritocracy (Kolinsky, 1993; Miller, 1999; Mansbridge, 2005; Grice, 2008), but is sometimes defended as unavoidable to reach a fairer outcome. Because of their controversial nature the possibility of backlashes is ever present (Gray, 2003; Jones, 2005; Mansbridge, 2005; Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008).

It is often argued that a successful implementation of quotas requires enforcement on behalf of the élite or the state (Stanley, 1995; Gray, 2003; Jones, 2005; Matland, 2006). This argument is compatible with the findings in the empirical chapters, where quotas did not appear to be associated with higher levels of representation, possibly because of the lack of such enforcement. In the countries excluded from analysis in this project—unfree countries—, the élite can influence political representation negatively by curbing political rights. In a more positive way, the élite may use enforced quotas or other forms of political engineering to increase the level of symbolic representation of specific groups. There may be international pressure to deal with under-representation, meaning that the élite consider quotas (Bennett, 1991; Stone, 2000; Paxton et al., 2006; Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008). However, as was the case with candidate selection, because of the cultural environment and incentives to stay in touch with the wider population, the impact of such external influences may be somewhat limited.

The implementation of quotas and affirmative action goes beyond the selection of candidates, because parties are often also involved in assigning candidates

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85 Further research is needed to understand whether such backlashes are of lasting nature, or whether the enforced changes can survive the backlashes and citizens adjust to the changed setting. This possibility does not rule out that the politicians responsible for the enforced measures will not politically survive short-term backlashes. The reason why strong quotas are rare might be that there is a willingness to implement changes, but that the will to stay in power is stronger.
to their respective seats. Fair rules of selection or diligently implemented measures may still fail at this stage, if for instance women tend to end up in hopeless seats while more men end up in safe seats (Norris, 1993). What may be at play here are attitudes at the micro-level—the attitudes of individuals. Where the party élite do not wholeheartedly embrace the rules and selection procedures, in some cases this can be problematic for newcomers. For example, the recent introduction of parity laws in France affected the selection of women candidates in all parties. Whilst the consequence was a significant increase in female candidates, women disproportionately ended up in unwinnable seats, greatly reducing the impact of the new legislation (Klausen & Maier, 2001; Karp & Banducci, 2007; Murray, 2007). The same may happen with unenforced quotas for ethnic groups (Htun, 2004). Despite the potential of the élite to increase levels of ethnic group representation by means of diligently implemented reserved seats, in practice this approach is uncommon. As was the case with gender representation, I argued that this might be best understood in terms of the incentives of the political élite seeking electoral success. The overall results are therefore unaffected: Cultural factors remain the strongest correlates for differences in the levels of ethnic group representation.

Ideological Representation

The third empirical chapter introduced considerations of ideological representation. Looking at different domains of ideological representation, the electoral system once again appeared to be of little significance for high levels of representation. This finding contradicts many previous studies, but in line with some recent studies might reflect the timeframe of the data (Powell, 2007).

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86 Norris (1993) argues that affirmative action is most effective when formalized and used in centralized parties. Informal approaches, such as an official aim to select more candidates from under-represented groups, or discretion to local branches may mean that affirmative action is undermined. In such instances, the incentives for the selectors to actively consider alternatives to the status quo are limited.
Powell argued that in terms of ideological representation, the differences between countries with majoritarian systems and countries with PR have largely disappeared. The empirical analyses in chapter 6 are compatible with this view: No significant association between the electoral system and levels of left–right representation can be found—in this case using a larger sample than Powell (2007). What is more, the results suggest that this lack of difference also applies to other ideological domains, further supporting the argument of diminishing differences. Further research is needed to explain the trend outlined by Powell, but also to investigate the findings of previous studies where levels of representation were found to be associated with the electoral system.\textsuperscript{87}

No clear pattern could be determined across levels of representation in the different domains of ideological representation considered in chapter 6. Different levels of left–right representation are closely associated with the age of democracy and political freedom. Political freedom is also associated with higher levels of representation in the domains of social issues and nationalism. The role of religion came to the fore in the domain of social issues, and perhaps on immigration. This is in line with the expectation that the dominance of Catholicism influences the relationship between individual attitudes and the votes cast. Although religion is often linked to attitudes and values in society, unfortunately, the exact mechanisms involved may not be entirely clear, but the results in chapter 6 suggest that further research along this line is warranted.

Going beyond the representation in parliament, the actual power of and within national parliaments may affect policy outcomes (Gallagher \textit{et al.}, 2001; Heath \textit{et al.}, 2005; Indridason, 2007). Such considerations of policymaking are largely beyond the scope of this thesis, where representation is approached with questions of justice in mind. As will become apparent, adequate consid-

\textsuperscript{87} The fact that the system remained and the associated effect seems to disappear probably indicates that the electoral formula on its own is the wrong variable. As outlined in chapter 6, the operationalization of the variable is not the reason for the reported lack of association.
erations of power within parliament are difficult to implement in cross-national approaches. Powell (2000), for instance, argues that in terms of policymaking, it is the government rather than the parliament with the strongest influence. Powell demonstrates that in committee systems, where the opposition plays an active role in policymaking, higher levels of performative representation are the consequence. A complete appreciation of power within parliament, however, would have to take into account a great many more factors, including the many ad-hoc committees created for single issues, or the different power of different ministries.88

Staying with policymaking, it is important to recognize that national parliaments are not the sole actors in policymaking (Diamond, 2002). The influence of parliamentarians on policies should be seen in relation to the power of external consultants, the power of a possible president, or the role of supreme courts.89 Other influences may be international pressure, which can limit the actual policy options available to parliamentarians (Paxton et al., 2006). A further influence lies in the fiscal realities: Policymaking is caught between public

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88 Such considerations of power are an area where further research is warranted along the line of Powell (2000). A full consideration would take into account a greater number of influences, including the strength of the opposition, involvement in committees, or the different status and power of different ministries (Bystydzienski, 1995; Gallagher et al., 2001; Blondel, 2004; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). What is more, members of parliament are found to be actively involved in only a limited number of issue domains, in which they are relatively influential (Hall & Wayman, 1990).

89 The influence of commissions and external experts appears to be increasing as policy decisions become increasingly complex (Gallagher et al., 2001). In the context of policymaking within the European Union, the power of the Commission relative to the Parliament, for instance, is often highlighted (Bogdanor, 1996; Scharpf, 1999; Hooghe, 2001). Popular initiatives are a rare means for citizens to be directly involved in policymaking (Gerber, 1999; Feld & Kirchgässner, 2000; Linder, 2001; LeDuc, 2002; Lijphart, 2004). In addition, the work of lobby groups needs to be considered, with their aim to take a direct influence on policymaking (Milbrath, 1965; Holtzman, 1966; Blondel, 1973; Aidi, 1998; Givel & Glantz, 2001; Berry, 2002; Nestle, 2002; Blondel, 2004). Lobby groups include large corporations, quangos and unelected organizations, supra-national bodies, or interest groups, but not all lobby groups have voices of equal loudness (Becker, 1983; Denzau & Munger, 1986; Yearley, 1995; Givel & Glantz, 2001; Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Nestle, 2002). Most lobbying is focused on activating policymakers already supportive of the cause, or on those wavering but likely to support the cause. However, pinpointing the sources of power is empirically difficult, because depending on the issue at stake and country considered, different groups are the ones with greatest influence (Mills, 1956; Heinz et al., 1993; Berry, 2002; Schlozman, 2002). Future research could identify the influence of specific actors in any given policy area. It might even be possible to aggregate findings from individual domains to all domains, weighing by salience or budget size.
demands and economic constraints that limit what is possible (Bosanquet, 1996; Page & Wright, 1999). All these factors may shift the focus of parliamentarians and reduce levels of performative representation. If one regards the role of parliament entirely as policymaking, the influence of the power of and within parliament undoubtedly merits investigation to establish to what extent members of parliament are able to represent the electorate in the face of such pressures.

In contrast with many previous contributions, chapter 6 could not confirm that the electoral formula is the strongest covariate for differences in levels of ideological representation. To the contrary, in line with some recent contributions, there appears to be a lack of association between the electoral formula and levels of left–right representation. The chapter demonstrated that this lack of association is found in all the ideological domains considered, not just the left–right domain. Instead, it appears that other variables may be more significant for levels of ideological representation, such as the age of democracy for levels of left–right representation.

**Relationships between Different Forms of Representation**

The final empirical chapter was designed to address the relationships between different forms of representation. The chapter tested the hypothesis that shared mechanisms and underlying factors lead to a positive correlation between levels of representation in different forms. At the same time, attention was paid to the arguments that there might be a direct trade-off between levels of representation, and that the salience of political divisions may shape levels of representation. Most hypotheses based on the premise of shared covariates and direct trade-offs were rejected because there was no significant correlation. In contrast, the suggestion that the salience of issue domains and symbolic divisions might account for differences in representation scores proved success-
ful. It appears that more salient issue domains and an increased awareness of demographic differences might translate into higher representation scores. In most cases, ideological differences remain dominant over demographic divisions.

In the section on ethnic group representation the élite were already mentioned in the context of the implementation of quotas. In this section a broader definition of the élite is used to include members of the economic and social élite (Rabb & Suleiman, 2003; Etzioni-Halevy, 2004; Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 2007), in order to examine the influence of their actions on levels of representation. Who should be counted as a member of the élite is empirically difficult to determine, if not outright impossible (Mills, 1956; Schattschneider, 1975; Yach & Bettcher, 2000; Givel & Glantz, 2001). It is for this reason that the empirical chapters ignored whether the élite are able to influence levels of political representation. In this section, I consider agenda-setting, as well as motivations and incentives of the élite—both factors that may influence levels of representation and the relationships between levels in different forms.

The élite and interest groups may be in a good position to influence the political agenda: the issues that are talked about. By means of press releases and public statements, for example, they are able to draw attention to certain issues, or to certain aspects of an issue (Smith, 1995; Nestle, 2002; Semetko, 2007; Lewis et al., 2008). Because of their narrow interest, pressure groups are commonly in a position where they are providers of information: both to the public as well as the more generalist members of parliament (Heclo, 1978; Browne, 1990). In terms of the relationships between different forms of representation, influence over the political agenda includes the ability to draw attention to the under-representation of women or ethnic minority groups.

The mass media play an important role in shaping and maintaining the political stories that are talked about, and the ways issues are seen (Cohen & Young, 1973; Mueller, 1988; Iyengar & Reeves, 1997; Tomlinson, 1997; Kellstedt, 2000;
McGuigan, 2002; Soroka, 2003). In practice, however, the power of the media is reduced since many news stories are reproduced without much mediation (Lewis et al., 2008). Rather than playing an active role in shaping the views of the public, the media often seem to simply spread public relation statements—that may originate from companies with a vested interest, interest groups, government, or political parties. For the élite, the media may play an important function as a campaign tool: Mass media disseminate information, which help to link the élite and the masses (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). At the same time, the media may work for the citizens, acting as a watchdog of the political leaders, enabling the voters to evaluate the performance of their representatives.

Leaving the sources of news stories aside, the impact of the media on voters can vary according to the context. This has led to some disagreement in the literature over the extent to which the media affect citizens (Thompson, 1995; Crigler, 1996). It is probably the case that for political issues where people have well-formulated preferences, the media have only an insignificant amount of impact (Klapper, 1960; Norris et al., 1999; Mutz, 2007). In contrast, for new and unknown areas, the media are thought to be powerful, especially in terms of agenda-setting (Bartels, 1993; Bryant & Thompson, 2002; Noelle-Neumann et al., 2005). This means that the expected effects vary from context to context, and probably also from individual to individual. Further research is needed to establish whether the nature of the mass media in a country has a discernible effect on levels of political representation.

A different influence on levels of representation stems from the different motivations of parliamentarians. Depending on their motivation to become representatives, parliamentarians consider their role as representative differently, which may affect their behaviour once elected into parliament (Blondel, 1973; Wessels, 1999b; de Winter & Swyngedouw, 1999). Being an individual affair, it is difficult to incorporate such considerations in a cross-national research de-
sign. However, it can be constructive to assume a certain degree of self-interest in order to assess the incentives the political élite may have to emphasize high levels of representation. A parliamentarian or political party interested in re-election can be expected to emphasize representation and responsiveness to the citizens only to the degree that this goal is achieved. Consequently, higher levels of representation can be expected in the most salient issues: Both the parties and the members of parliament are likely to focus on the issues they will be held to account on.

This argument fits with the findings in chapter 7, where I showed that levels of representation are higher in the forms of representation that are thought to be more salient. I argued that this is not only the case for different ideological domains, but also for demographic differences. This assumption of self-interest has implications for political reform: Should the political élite decide to include more minority candidates, or emphasize representation in a less salient ideological domain on their own accord, the payoff in terms of electoral success may be limited if not absent. Without demand for change in the population, the incentives to change the current state of affairs are limited. Assuming that changes to the status quo are costly to the political élite, the scope for change without a corresponding change in the population’s attitudes seems limited.

Turning to individual voters, it is often argued that voters perceive politics primarily in terms of issues and policies. Because of that, it seems reasonable for citizens to invest more effort into ensuring that their vote goes to the right candidate in this regard rather than any other aspect that an individual might also support. Mueller (1988) is clear that although many citizens are concerned about women’s equality, when it comes to voting, the state of the economy and security overshadow such concerns for social justice. Because of this primacy of concerns for issue positions, men and women do not differ significantly in their support for women candidates (Duverger, 1955; Dolin, 2004). It also
means that in places where the electorate are neutral towards the gender of a
candidate, the élite can select an increased number of female candidates with-
out affecting the electoral success of the party.

Staying with individual voters, it can be expected that voters shape levels of
representation, as opposed to non-voters. This is the case for two reasons.
Firstly, they make their views known through the votes that are counted. Sec-
ondly, parliamentarians interested in re-election have a clear incentive to reach
out to those who are likely to cast votes. Looking at ideological representation
in the US, Griffin and Newman (2005) report that the views of voters are sig-
nificantly better represented than those of nonparticipants. The result in the US
is a conservative bias.

Where citizens have only poorly articulated views and opinions, it may be dif-
cult for the representatives to match theses, in spite of extensive research they
may undertake. However, the lack of crystallized views can largely be com-
pensated by means of heuristics and information shortcuts, such as party rec-
ommendations (Sobolewski, 1968; Converse, 2000; Kuklinski, 2002; Christin et
al., 2002; Sears et al., 2003; Schläpfer et al. 2004; Schläpfer & Schmitt, 2005).
Indeed, using experiments, Schläpfer and Schmitt (2005) have demonstrated that
many voters are largely unable to formulate coherent preferences without such
guidance, especially on issues that are less salient. However, citizens who sim-
ply lack clearly formulated preferences should not be regarded as irrational
voters. Political views can be complex and at times contradictory, making it
difficult and costly for citizens to formulate clear views on many issues. Unfor-
tunately, considerations of the voting behaviour of individuals are difficult to
incorporate in cross-national analyses. Further research in this area is war-
ranted to establish whether patterns of individual voting behaviour differ sig-
nificantly across countries to affect overall levels of representation.

In this section, I have considered agenda-setting and the actions of the élite,
but these factors do not appear to significantly influence the relationships be-
tween levels of representation in different forms. If anything, the discussion helped to underline the importance of salience and awareness. The élite have the potential to influence levels of representation, but when assuming a self-interested focus on re-election, it appears that in many places they are unlikely to introduce such measures. For instance, nominating more women where the population is largely averse to their presence in public life may be a costly move for the political élite.

**Electoral Engineering**

In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the viability of electoral engineering. Interventions into the electoral system and the introduction of quotas are often suggested in the literature. The underlying assumption is that differences should be accommodated, since other approaches are either unsuccessful or too slow. Whilst considerations of electoral engineering are sometimes motivated by the representation of parties, such interventions are often suggested in order to increase levels of representation for women and ethnic minorities. In this section, I focus on the effectiveness of interventions on increasing levels of representation of women and ethnic minorities rather than the proportionality between votes and seats for which changes in the electoral system have a relatively clear and predictable impact.

In chapter 7, I established that there is generally no direct trade-off between levels of representation in different forms. In particular, higher levels of symbolic representation do not appear to come at the cost of high levels of ideological representation. This makes it worth considering forms of electoral engineering that attempt to increase levels of symbolic representation. Such increases in the levels of symbolic representation may be sought for multiple reasons. A key argument revolves around notions of group justice: Because women and ethnic minorities are equal citizens to men and the majority population, they have an equal right to sitting in parliament. Suggestions that sym-
bolic under-representation may be linked to ideological under-representation of particular issues make a more utilitarian case for focusing on the inclusion of ethnic minorities and women (Childs, 2002; Lovenduski, 2005; Phillips, 1995; Bystydzienski, 1995). The key argument is that the social, economic, and political environment affects different groups in society in a different way. Because of these different experiences, men and women may differ in some of their policy preferences (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Leyenaar, 2004). The same argument also applies to ethnic minority groups.

From a justice point of view, some forms of electoral engineering may fall short of reaching their aims. Interventions such as reserved seats or enforced quotas may increase the number of women in parliament, but end just there. It is conceivable that in places where women enter parliament by means of quotas rather than wider support in both the parties and population, women are left out in the actual decision-making processes in parliament. It is for reasons like this that Powell (2000) highlights the need to consider the composition of governments and cabinets, in addition to parliament. However, the proportion of women in parliament is the single most significant factor predicting the number of women appointed as cabinet ministers (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). This means that the proportion of women in parliaments is a good indicator of their involvement in policymaking. What is more, focusing on gender representation in Mexico, Zetterberg (2008) finds no indication that women who entered parliament by means of quotas are marginalized more than any other woman in parliament is.

There are different interventions that are considered in order to increase the number of women and members of ethnic minorities in parliament. Because of the obvious relationship between votes cast and seats gained involved the elec-

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90 There are different bases for justice, as outlined in chapter 2. Consequently, representation in parliament can be regarded as valuable in itself, notwithstanding the actual involvement in policymaking.
toral system is often considered. Perhaps the most drastic action is a change of electoral formula towards a more proportional variant (Lijphart, 1977; Sartori, 1997; Sisk & Reynolds, 1998). Although such interventions are rare, changes in the electoral formula do happen, such as the recent switch to proportional representation in New Zealand (Zimmerman & Rule, 1998). In France a change of electoral system was tried and undone later on (Norris, 1993; Colomer, 2004); whilst in Japan the change was from a majoritarian to a mixed system (Colomer, 2004). Substantive changes to the electoral institutions influence the incentive structure, and therefore can be expected to have an effect on voting behaviour. However, the consequences of such changes may be difficult to predict because there are many other factors that influence both voting behaviour and the manoeuvring of political parties. Further research is needed to assess the impact of changes in electoral arrangements. Given the relatively low frequency of such changes, however, certainty about the impact of some of the institutional changes may never be achievable.\footnote{Considering changes in local elections may increase the number of cases, but it is unclear whether findings from second order elections apply to first order elections.}

PR systems are often suggested as a means to increase levels of gender representation (Rule, 1987; Darcy et al., 1994; Matland & Taylor, 1997; Paxton, 1997; Reynolds, 1999). The argument is sometimes widened to minority group representation in general (Hogan, 1945; Reynolds, 2006). Particularly PR systems with closed lists are highlighted (IDEA, 1998; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Matland, 2006). Levels of representation are in this case dependent on the political parties including an appropriate number of women and ethnic minority candidates. This makes it clear that it is individuals within the political institutions who make representation work (Weßels, 2007). For instance, despite an electoral context where the arrangements are unfavourable to women and ethnic minorities, women and ethnic minorities may still be included as part of mainstream parties. Similarly, there are countries where most parties exclude
minority candidates, such as Russians in Estonia. In such cases, the electoral system in itself is unable to ensure adequate representation of minority groups in parliament. The results in the empirical chapters suggest that changes in the electoral system are unlikely to affect levels of symbolic representation directly. Similarly, however, this also means that changes with the aim of increasing party representation are unlikely to affect levels of symbolic representation negatively.92

When it comes to levels of ideological representation, suggestions for higher levels of representation often depend on the focus of the individual study. The actions of the parliamentarians are sometimes highlighted, although in line with the suggestions for symbolic representation, PR systems are frequently suggested for better congruence between citizens and their members of parliament (Hogan, 1945; Rae 1967; Lijphart 1994; Huber & Powell 1994; Powell, 2000). Powell (2007) argued that whilst PR systems were associated with higher levels of ideological representation in the past, in recent years the difference from majoritarian systems has largely disappeared. The results presented in chapter 6 reflect this recent lack of association.

Other institutional changes may be implemented within political parties. In contrast to changes in the electoral system, changes within a party require agreement of a significantly smaller number of people—often likeminded people—, which can lead to more immediate results. When considering electoral engineering, the immediacy of changes is of interest (Jones, 2005; McSmith, 2008). For political reasons, quick results may be preferred (Engstrom & McDonald, 1982), but from the point of view of social justice, only sustainable

92 Other factors of the electoral system are also considered in order to increase levels of representation. These include the registration requirements of political parties (Birnir, 2004), lower electoral thresholds, district size (Lijphart, 1994), reserved seats at the national level (Van Cott, 2005; Matland, 2006), enforced quotas (Reilly, 2002), veto rights (Sartori, 1997), decentralization (Taylor, 2005), or the ballot structure (Sartori, 1997; Norris, 2004).
changes are of interest. In the section on gender representation, I argued that although quotas are frequently suggested as a means to increase the number of women and ethnic minorities in parliament (Ballington, 1998; Childs, 2000; Dahlerup, 2006; Tripp & Kang, 2007), quotas might not be associated with higher levels of representation because they are not implemented diligently. I argued that the élite are unlikely to force quota regulations in places where the population is averse to such interventions.

It is important to bear in mind that quotas appeared to be ineffective at the national level, and the analysis in the empirical chapters does not make claims about the effectiveness of quotas within parties. Comparisons of the state before and after the introduction of quotas seem to indicate that quotas within parties generally work (Ballington, 1998; Childs, 2000; Yoon, 2004; Dahlerup, 2006), but such simple comparisons do not cater for the possibility that this might be a reflection of changed attitudes. Within parties, there might be threshold effects that make the change in attitudes appear instantaneous. In some places, there are also social-desirability effects, where quotas as such become associated with notions of progress (Sawer et al., 2006; Baldez, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer & Palmer, 2007). The analysis in the empirical chapters thus simply indicates that once cultural variables are taken into consideration, in practice quotas are not associated with higher levels of representation at the national level.

At the same time, apparently unsuccessful and unenforced quotas can be welcomed, because they might be a way to raise awareness of the under-representation of women and ethnic minority groups. Taking this approach, the actual implementation of quotas, or the enforcement of voluntary party

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93 Institutional changes may have immediate effects that are not sustained over time. For example, the relatively recent change of electoral formula in New Zealand was associated with an unprecedented increase in the number of women elected to parliament. In the subsequent elections, however, this increase could not be repeated, and the long-term trend seems to be unaffected by the change of electoral formula (see page 109).
quotas is no longer a central issue of concern. Instead, the focus is on the discussions about the political integration of different groups in society. Indeed, Bystydzienki (1995) argued that discussions about quotas and equality have the largest impact, not the unenforced quotas that are commonplace. In this case, however, quotas could be replaced by a different stimulus to encourage discussions of equality and justice. Indeed, it appears that the introduction of quotas in itself does not affect attitudes towards women as political leaders. When regressing attitudes at present on attitudes a decade ago, and whether quotas were introduced in the meantime, the introduction of quotas is not significantly associated (p>0.1), whereas attitudes in the past are (p<0.000). This analysis does not capture the discussions about quotas and equality that Bystydzienki highlighted, but highlights that the introduction of quotas in itself does not appear to affect attitudes towards women in politics, perhaps because not all introductions of quotas stimulate the same level of political discussion.

Chafetz (1984) warns against losing sight of the aim of quotas—increasing the number of women in parliament should not become an end in itself. Rather than trying to increase the number of women in parliament, the government could focus on policies with a direct impact on the lives of women, such as the provision of childcare for women in paid work. Here Chafetz seems to imply that it is possible for men to represent the interests of women, but also that there are relatively clear interests shared by all or most women. Such governmental policies may lead to changes in work organization, followed by changes in attitudes towards the role of women in society. The eventual outcomes in terms of both the lives of women and the proportion of women in parliament may be similar to that of institutional interventions, but with the crucial difference that the more abrupt implementation of quotas risks backlashes and resistance. Further research is needed to fully understand the influence of increased numbers of women in parliament on policymaking. With
that it would be possible to gauge the success of quotas vis-à-vis other policy interventions.

Considering only institutional aspects, individual interventions of electoral engineering appear to have prospect. On closer examination, it transpires that the manner of implementation is crucial, but also that it is their possible impact on attitudes that appears to make the most sustainable contribution to levels of representation: It is not so much the intervention, but the accompanying increase in awareness of under-representation and injustice. When taking a more inclusive look, it becomes clear that there are other factors beyond electoral engineering that affect the level of representation. This means that the impact of such interventions should not be overestimated.

Throughout the project, I have considered an array of influences on levels of political representation. Some of these factors are small-scale in nature, affecting only parts of the processes that shape levels of representation (Chafetz, 1984). Given that all these factors are embedded within the wider political system (Matland, 2006), the cross-national perspective chosen in this project is both useful and necessary. The aim is not to dismiss the smaller factors, but to concentrate on the factors with the largest impact (Vester, 1984, 1999).

The discussion in this chapter so far, together with the results in the empirical chapter highlights two factors: the role of the élite and cultural values. These two factors are central to changes in levels of political representation, because they are able to influence many of the other factors considered. For example, the élite may have an effect on the level of development through policy decisions, influence the implementation of quotas, or affect the media and the actions of political parties. This means that actions of the élite may act as a catalyst, invoking a series of other changes.

Changes in attitudes towards women and marginalized groups in society seem to be positioned well for substantial and sustainable changes in levels of repre-
sentation because they affect most other variables. Consequently, even relatively small changes in attitudes may lead to noticeable changes in levels of representation—probably reflecting changed status in society. However, given that values and attitudes are shaped by a great number of factors, including the level of development, the predominant religion, and cultural history, a direct intervention on attitudes seems difficult. Continuous advocacy work increasing the awareness of inequalities might be a suitable means of intervention for long-term changes in attitudes—and with that levels of parliamentary representation.

Rather than a call against institutional interventions, the argument presented here should be understood as highlighting the need of attitudinal changes for a sustainable increase in levels of representation. Enforced quotas or other forms of electoral engineering that cannot be sidestepped by changes in electoral behaviour cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. However, it needs to be borne in mind that in order to make such changes sustainable, there is a need for corresponding cultural attitudes. If this is not the case, progressive members of the élite may pay a price at the elections, and there is a risk that the institutional setting changes in the future and levels of representation decrease. This means that the élite are most likely to actively influence levels of symbolic representation in places where the electorate are either neutral towards an increased inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in parliament, or assign little importance to symbolic representation—meaning that there is little electoral risk for the élite. At the same time, however, it seems that the actions of citizens and parliamentarians are such that they can largely adjust to a given institutional reality. One implication is that backlashes to electoral engineering might be temporarily limited. It seems reasonable to assume that if the institutional setting becomes a real obstacle in a society where there is significant demand for more inclusion, then this demand is translated into changes in the electoral institutions. The opposite—changes in the electoral system directly
At the beginning of this chapter, I highlighted the fact that there appears to be no trade-off between high levels of symbolic and ideological representation. This means that efforts to include more women and ethnic minorities in positions of power do not come at the cost of levels of ideological representation. If anything, levels of ideological representation might increase through better representation of uncrystallized views and attitudes related to being a member of a minority group, although such an impact is difficult to measure and would not be reflected in the ideological representation scores used in this project, which are based on issues that are more salient. Whilst electoral engineering is often suggested in the literature as a solution to increase the levels of gender and ethnic group representation, this chapter is more cautious. I argued that quotas and related measures could not be ruled out as a solution, but that they should only be regarded as part of a solution where changes in attitudes play a central role.
Democratic theory assumes that all humans are essentially equal. Despite advances in the last century, women and ethnic minority groups remain significantly under-represented in many places. Rooted in questions of group justice, this project set out to explain the variables associated with different levels of political representation in a cross-national comparison. A theoretical framework was drawn up to integrate various factors as explanations for the different levels of representation found in countries across the world. By considering both symbolic and ideological forms of representation, this project treated political representation in a more comprehensive way than most other studies. Moving towards questions of rectifying under-representation, the project also set out to examine whether levels of symbolic and ideological representation are linked. Four empirical chapters examined two research questions.

The first research question was: *How can we explain differences in the levels of representation?* —For levels of gender and ethnic group representation variables measuring cultural attitudes are the dominant factors explaining differences in representation scores. Where attitudes towards women and marginalized groups in society are more positive, women and ethnic minorities are more likely to be included in parliament. In the case of ideological representation, the salience of the issue domain seems to be closely associated with the level of representation in the respective domain.

In the first empirical chapter on the representation of women, the importance of cultural attitudes was highlighted, in terms of both regional differences and
attitudes towards women in politics. In addition to the cultural variables, only the electoral formula may be a significant correlate, although the evidence is mixed. In the bivariate analysis, the presence of gender quotas is associated with higher levels of gender representation, but once cultural differences are controlled for, voluntary party quotas appear unable to affect levels of gender representation at the national level significantly. This finding has significant implications for the literature on electoral engineering, where voluntary quotas are frequently suggested—yet the effectiveness of such quotas vis-à-vis cultural factors has not been tested before.

In chapter 5, the representation of ethnic groups was examined. With newly collected data on the ethnic composition of parliaments, it was possible to demonstrate that cultural factors are the strongest predictors for high levels of ethnic group representation. This was the case for regional differences, but particularly for attitudes towards marginalized groups in society. Whilst quotas and reserved seats for ethnic groups are generally enforced and thus by definition affect levels of representation, the analyses in chapter 5 suggested that the implementation of such measures might often be inadequate, leading to the finding that on average ethnic quotas are not associated with higher levels of representation. For example, quotas may be implemented for only certain ethnic minority groups in a country whilst ignoring others.

Chapter 6 introduced levels of representation in different ideological domains, but no clear overall pattern could be determined. Using new data, chapter 6 established that the electoral formula is not associated with differences in the levels of ideological representation. This is the case for the left–right domain, where this lack of association was recently established with smaller samples, but also in other domains such as the representation of social issues and views on the environment. Differences in levels of ideological representation might be explained with the salience of issue domains: The chapter demonstrated
that levels of representation tend to be higher in the more salient issue domains.

In the discussion in chapter 8, I have complemented the results of the empirical chapters with considerations of additional factors that for various reasons could not be included in the numerical analyses—including the role of political parties and the motivations of the élite. With that, the range of the factors shaping levels of political representation was widened, but attention was paid not to lose sight of the bigger picture. As was the case with the empirical chapters, the importance of cultural attitudes in shaping levels of representation transpired as a key factor: liberal attitudes such as positive views of the inclusion of women and marginalized groups in public life, and political office in particular—attitudes akin sociological liberalism. Whilst on theoretical grounds institutional factors seem as relevant as cultural factors, it appears that the involved political actors are largely able to adjust to the specific political setting.

Contrary to the expectation in much of the literature, institutional factors featured less significantly as explanatory variables than their cultural counterparts. In particular, the proportionality between votes cast and seats gained seems to be of little relevance to levels of the ethnic group representation and different domains of ideological representation. This finding might reflect a recent trend towards more centrist positions in majoritarian systems, which largely cancels out the advantage of PR systems in terms of ideological representation (Powell, 2007).

In terms of gender representation, the commonly cited advantage of PR systems in terms of including women in parliament may exist because the élite are empowered to choose more women. In addition, it is possible that factors that shape today’s cultural attitudes—such as the predominant religion of a country—also influenced the choice of electoral system in the first place. In either case, the dominance of cultural factors means that the literature should
pay more attention to these factors. Whilst currently the literature often ignores cultural factors or treats them as an after-thought, the findings in this project suggest that cultural variables should be a central consideration.

The finding that cultural factors are the best predictors for levels of symbolic representation, however, does not mean that institutional and other factors are dismissed. In the context of gender representation, the electoral system may be a significant covariate; for ethnic group representation, diligently implemented quotas may have merit. In the case of ideological representation, the age of democracy and political freedom are significant covariates particularly with regard to levels of left–right representation. What is more, in terms of symbolic representation, enforced institutional interventions mean that at least potentially institutional factors can shape levels of symbolic representation. However, a look at the incentives for the political elite indicated that such enforced interventions are unlikely to become common practice in places where the electorate are not supportive of increased numbers of women and ethnic minorities in parliament.

The second research question in this project was: How are levels of representation in different forms linked? — The analyses in chapter 7 are clear that in most cases there is no evidence for a direct link between levels of representation in different forms, despite many theoretical indications in the literature that a direct link can be expected. The only positive association is between levels of gender representation and levels of left–right representation, both of which are influenced by the age of democracy. At the same time, there is no clear evidence for a direct trade-off between levels of representation in different forms. There are some negative correlations between levels of representation in different ideological domains, but it is unclear why these particular correlations are significant rather than others. Instead, it seems that the salience of political differences might shape the relationships between different forms of represen-
tation: Levels of representation are associated with the salience of issues and the awareness of under-representation.

The analyses in chapter 7 were the first time relationships between levels of ideological and symbolic representation were addressed empirically. The analyses indicated that in most cases there is no direct association between different levels of representation: Countries where levels of ideological representation are high do not necessarily also have high levels of symbolic representation. There was also no clear evidence for a direct trade-off, where higher levels of one form representation would come at the direct cost of another. When examining the relationships in more detail, it transpired that the salience of issues and the awareness of under-representation might be a factor to understanding the association between the different forms of representation. Where political divisions are thought to be more salient, the corresponding levels of representation tend to be higher. This equally applies to cases where the underlying divisions are symbolic or ideological, although for the most part ideological differences are the most salient ones. The importance of salience means that advocacy work to increase the awareness of the under-representation of certain groups in society might prove to be just as useful as institutional interventions.

In chapter 8, I considered additional influences on levels of representation, but the central role of cultural attitudes was maintained. This was particularly the case when considering the incentives of parliamentarians to stay in power. For example, the scope of including more women than what the general population would support—or significantly fewer—is limited. Such actions come with considerable electoral risks, particularly in places where demographic divisions are more salient. The argument, however, is not one of cultural determinism. In individual cases, strong leadership by the élite or within political parties can lead to significant differences. This is particularly the case where the citizens are neutral towards the inclusion of more women and members of
ethnic minorities—or not strongly opposed to such undertakings. In these cases, cultural factors remain an important mediating factor, by shaping the bounds within which changes are possible.

In terms of electoral engineering the argument presented here means that some institutional interventions, such as enforced quotas or registration requirements, can make a significant difference to levels of political representation. The key, however, is that such measures are implemented diligently. Whilst such enforced interventions may be required to prevent the complete exclusion of certain groups in society—effectively silencing their voices—, such forms of electoral engineering require corresponding changes in attitudes to be effective and successful in the long-term. For new democracies, this probably means focusing on choosing the right institutions, but also recognizing that without corresponding advocacy work on attitudes, the outcomes may not be as intended. Here the political élite may play a crucial role in implementing an institutional setting diligently rather than undermining and side-stepping the potential of electoral settings.

However, I argued that for a number of reasons cultural variables prevail with regard to symbolic representation. To some extent the élite are embedded in the same cultural environment, which means that they can be expected to share their outlook with the citizens. What is more, it can be assumed that the élite are concerned with re-election, and therefore do not nominate women and ethnic minority candidates beyond what makes them sufficiently popular.

The results reported in this project are compatible with modernization theories, suggesting that in more established and more developed countries, levels of representation may be higher—particularly in terms of including women and ethnic minorities, as well as left–right representation. It remains to be seen whether in increasingly postmodern societies this means increasing calls for representation of other demographic groups and perhaps even groups defined by lifestyle choices. In any case, the empirical work in this project suggests that
both cultural and institutional factors have the potential to shape levels of symbolic and ideological representation. However, it appears that in places where the institutional setting is averse to the inclusion of women, for example, positive cultural attitudes can often overcome such a hurdle—mediated by electoral success and failure. In contrast, in places where attitudes are averse to the inclusion of ethnic minority groups, for example, institutional interventions may fail to rectify the situation. In such cases, there is a real possibility of insincere implementation that fails its intent, or that the level of symbolic representation increases without corresponding changes in status in society. This means that institutional interventions require corresponding cultural attitudes in order to be effective.
Appendices
Appendix 1

Gender Representation Scores by Country

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
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## Appendix 2

### Ethnic Representation Scores by Country

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<td>0.680</td>
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<td>0.635</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>0.456</td>
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<td>0.080</td>
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<td>European, Maori, Pacific, Indian</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>0.300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Haoussa, Djerma Sonrai, Tuareg, Pueblo</td>
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<td>Wolof, Pular, Serer</td>
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<td>0.612</td>
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<td>Token</td>
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<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>Suriname</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>1.176</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Majority population (Hindustani, Creole, Javanese), Maroons and other minorities</td>
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<td>0.820</td>
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<td>0.961</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>0.988</td>
<td>2.564</td>
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<td>0.954</td>
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<td>7.000</td>
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Notes: * An almost identical representation score is achieved when considering Danish and migrant groups (Q=0.970). † An almost identical representation score is achieved when considering Japanese, Korean, and Chinese (Q=0.994). ‡ In France and Guyana there are measurement issues for the R-scores, as outlined in chapter 5. Of free and partly free countries, no data could be obtained for the following countries: Austria, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Grenada, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and South Korea. For many of the countries there are estimates from different sources that largely agree.
## Linguistic Representation Scores by Country

<table>
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<th>Q-Score</th>
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<td>0.510</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Spanish, other</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>1.270</td>
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<td>English, other</td>
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<td>1.050</td>
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<td>0.988</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Spanish, other</td>
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<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Greek, other</td>
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<td>0.694</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Georgian, Abkhazian, Ossetian, Russian</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Romany</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>0.723</td>
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Religious Representation Scores by Country

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<td>0.060</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Orthodox, Catholic</td>
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<td>0.680</td>
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<td>Religious, Atheist</td>
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<td>1.266</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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* In countries without a clear minority, R-scores for minority groups combined are mostly meaningless.
## Appendix 3

### Ideological Representation Scores by Country

#### Left–Right Domain

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<th>Country</th>
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* Data on these countries are taken from the CSES (2007) rather than Benoit and Laver (2005), as outlined in chapter 3.

#### Social Issues Domain

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### Nationalism Domain

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