Conference item
Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners)
- Abstract:
-
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen from a specified set. We show that it is NP-hard for the designer to make this choices optimally, even in zero-sum games. In fact, it is already intractable to decide whether a given action is (potentially or necessarily) played in equilibrium. We also consi...
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- Publication status:
- Accepted
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
Funding
+ National Science Foundation
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Grant:
IIS-
1527434, IIS-0953756, CCF-1101659, CCF-1337215
+ Army Research Office
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Grant:
W911NF-12-1-0550, W911NF-11-1-0332, W911NF-11-1-0332
Guggenheim Fellowship
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Alexander von Humboldt Foundation
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Publisher's website
- Host title:
- Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Publication date:
- 2016-01-01
- ISSN:
-
2159-5399
- Source identifiers:
-
579634
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:579634
- UUID:
-
uuid:8f6e30dd-dd64-422e-88e1-f208ea71649b
- Local pid:
- pubs:579634
- Deposit date:
- 2015-12-10
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
- Copyright date:
- 2016
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