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Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities

Abstract:

The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibili... Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/bjps/axu036

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
St Hilda's College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Journal:
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Journal website
Volume:
67
Issue:
1
Pages:
271-296
Publication date:
2014-12-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1464-3537
ISSN:
0007-0882
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1100536
Local pid:
pubs:1100536
Deposit date:
2020-04-17

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