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Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis

Abstract:

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge morefrequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibriumprediction. To understand better how subjects with...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford Publisher's website
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2013-01-25
Pubs id:
601308
Local pid:
pubs:601308
Paper number:
641

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