No best world: creaturely freedom
- William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the 'moral-luck' counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around.
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- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Cambridge University Press
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- Citation: Leftow, B. (2005). 'No best world: creaturely freedom', Religious Studies, 41(3), 269-285. [Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=RES]. This article follows on from the article 'No best world: moral luck'.
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