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No best world: creaturely freedom

Abstract:
William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the 'moral-luck' counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.1017/S0034412505007778

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Oriel College
Department:
Humanities Division - Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press Publisher's website
Journal:
Religious Studies Journal website
Volume:
41
Issue:
3
Pages:
269-285
Publication date:
2005-09-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1469-901X
ISSN:
0034-4125
URN:
uuid:4b194e78-56b5-4bd9-a58f-8fcf0f54942c
Local pid:
ora:1485

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