Conference item
Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Abstract:
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Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure equilibria, and Stackelberg strategies. We first demonstrate that, even for two agents, better responses can cycle. We then present a linear-time algorithm that returns a profile (which we call the “bluff profile”) that is in pure Nash equilibrium. Interesting...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 251.1KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_19
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Springer, Cham Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Algorithmic Decision Theory Journal website
- Volume:
- 10576
- Pages:
- 270-283
- Series:
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Host title:
- ADT 2017: Algorithmic Decision Theory
- Publication date:
- 2017-09-24
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-04-25
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0302-9743
- Source identifiers:
-
697759
- ISBN:
- 9783319675046
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:697759
- UUID:
-
uuid:37639fde-d18b-4552-8496-88e8f741a07b
- Local pid:
- pubs:697759
- Deposit date:
- 2017-05-31
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer International Publishing
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2017 Springer International Publishing AG. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Springer at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_19
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