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Equilibria in sequential allocation

Abstract:

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure equilibria, and Stackelberg strategies. We first demonstrate that, even for two agents, better responses can cycle. We then present a linear-time algorithm that returns a profile (which we call the “bluff profile”) that is in pure Nash equilibrium. Interesting...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_19

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer, Cham Publisher's website
Journal:
Algorithmic Decision Theory Journal website
Volume:
10576
Pages:
270-283
Series:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Host title:
ADT 2017: Algorithmic Decision Theory
Publication date:
2017-09-24
Acceptance date:
2017-04-25
DOI:
ISSN:
0302-9743
Source identifiers:
697759
ISBN:
9783319675046
Pubs id:
pubs:697759
UUID:
uuid:37639fde-d18b-4552-8496-88e8f741a07b
Local pid:
pubs:697759
Deposit date:
2017-05-31

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