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Journal article

Post-incident audits on cyber insurance discounts

Abstract:

We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level upon receiving an indemnity claim. Audits can reveal fraudulent (or simply careless) policyholders not following reported security procedures, in which case the insurer can refuse to indemnify the policyholder. However, the insurer has to bear an audit cost even wh...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.cose.2019.101593

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
University College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-8569-1917
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Computers and Security Journal website
Volume:
87
Issue:
2019
Article number:
101593
Publication date:
2019-08-16
Acceptance date:
2019-08-12
DOI:
ISSN:
0167-4048
Source identifiers:
1049817
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:1049817
UUID:
uuid:36882f7a-9b76-4810-aa57-b889ee69fd20
Local pid:
pubs:1049817
Deposit date:
2019-09-06

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