Working paper
Aid and fiscal instability
- Abstract:
-
We show that a combination of temporariness and spending pressure is intrinsic to the aid relationship. In our analysis, recipients rationally discount the pronouncements of donors about the duration of their commitments because in equilibrium they know that some donors will honor those commitments while others will not. Donor types pool in equilibrium; in sharp contrast to conventional signaling situations, there is no separating equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, pooling necessarily ...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Not peer reviewed
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Bibliographic Details
- Series:
- CSAE working paper series
- Place of publication:
- http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/main-wps.html
- Publication date:
- 2008-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:322dd444-306a-4f88-8835-b055fd725cbe
- Local pid:
- ora:2547
- Deposit date:
- 2009-01-23
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Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Stephen A O’Connell, Christopher S Adam & Edward F Buffie
- Copyright date:
- 2008
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