Conference item
The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare.
- Abstract:
-
The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing prices and allocations are then determined based on their reported preferences rather than their real preferences. We show that the Fisher mar...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 236.0KB)
-
Why is the content I wish to access not available via ORA?
Bibliographic data (the information relating to research outputs) and full-text items (e.g. articles, theses, reports, etc.) arrive in ORA from several different sources. Unfortunately we are not able to make available the full-text for every research output.
Please contact the ORA team (
) if you have queries regarding unavailable content OR if you are aware of a full-text copy we can make available.
) if you have queries regarding unavailable content OR if you are aware of a full-text copy we can make available.
Content may be unavailable for the following four reasons
-
Version unsuitable
-
We have not obtained a suitable full-text for a given research output. See this page for more information.
-
Recently completed
-
Sometimes content is held in ORA but is unavailable for a fixed period of time to comply with the policies and wishes of rights holders.
-
Permissions
-
All content made available in ORA should comply with relevant rights, such as copyright. See this page for more information.
-
Clearance
-
Some thesis volumes scanned as part of the digitisation scheme funded by Dr Leonard Polonsky are currently unavailable due to sensitive material or uncleared third-party copyright content. We are attempting to contact authors whose theses are affected.
Alternative access to the full-text
You may be able to access the full-text directly from the publisher's website using the 'Publisher Copy' link in the 'Links & Downloads' box from a research output's ORA record page. This method may require an institutional or individual subscription to the journal/resource.
Funding
+ European Research Council
More from this funder
Funding agency for:
Zhang, J
Grant:
Advanced Grant 321171 (ALGAME
+ Danish National Research Foundation
More from this funder
Grant:
SinoDanish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation
+ National Science Foundation of China
More from this funder
Grant:
61061130540: SinoDanish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation
Center for research in the Foundations of Electronic Markets
More from this funder
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Publisher's website
- Journal:
- AAAI 2014 Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence Journal website
- Volume:
- 1
- Pages:
- 587-593
- Host title:
- AAAI 2014 Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Publication date:
- 2014-06-21
- Source identifiers:
-
489683
- ISBN:
- 9781577356615
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:489683
- UUID:
-
uuid:2fd213f0-eccf-48e9-80a1-762252a8e0c0
- Local pid:
- pubs:489683
- Deposit date:
- 2016-05-16
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
- Copyright date:
- 2014
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2014, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from AAAI at: [http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI14/paper/view/8373]
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record