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Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty

Abstract:
A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential selle...Expand abstract...
Publication status:
Published
Version:
Author's Original

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics - Centre for the Study of African Economies
Series:
CSAE working paper series
Publication date:
2008
URN:
uuid:2257e3d3-733b-4712-8140-261d6ae2effa
Local pid:
ora:2544

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