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Journal article

Learning in a black box

Abstract:

We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents' actions or payoffs. Theory shows that even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in many types of games. A key feature of these rules is that subjects search differently depending on whether their payoffs increase, stay constant or decrease. This paper analyzes lea...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.006

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Zoology
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Zoology
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Wolfson College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Journal website
Volume:
127
Pages:
1-15
Publication date:
2016-04-01
Acceptance date:
2016-04-08
DOI:
ISSN:
0167-2681
Source identifiers:
584894
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:584894
UUID:
uuid:120f9299-0d9d-4148-a163-ab6d151b507b
Local pid:
pubs:584894
Deposit date:
2017-05-16

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