Journal article
Learning in a black box
- Abstract:
-
We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents' actions or payoffs. Theory shows that even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in many types of games. A key feature of these rules is that subjects search differently depending on whether their payoffs increase, stay constant or decrease. This paper analyzes lea...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Version of record, pdf, 842.6KB)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.006
Why is the content I wish to access not available via ORA?
Bibliographic data (the information relating to research outputs) and full-text items (e.g. articles, theses, reports, etc.) arrive in ORA from several different sources. Unfortunately we are not able to make available the full-text for every research output.
Please contact the ORA team (
) if you have queries regarding unavailable content OR if you are aware of a full-text copy we can make available.
) if you have queries regarding unavailable content OR if you are aware of a full-text copy we can make available.
Content may be unavailable for the following four reasons
-
Version unsuitable
-
We have not obtained a suitable full-text for a given research output. See this page for more information.
-
Recently completed
-
Sometimes content is held in ORA but is unavailable for a fixed period of time to comply with the policies and wishes of rights holders.
-
Permissions
-
All content made available in ORA should comply with relevant rights, such as copyright. See this page for more information.
-
Clearance
-
Some thesis volumes scanned as part of the digitisation scheme funded by Dr Leonard Polonsky are currently unavailable due to sensitive material or uncleared third-party copyright content. We are attempting to contact authors whose theses are affected.
Alternative access to the full-text
You may be able to access the full-text directly from the publisher's website using the 'Publisher Copy' link in the 'Links & Downloads' box from a research output's ORA record page. This method may require an institutional or individual subscription to the journal/resource.
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Journal website
- Volume:
- 127
- Pages:
- 1-15
- Publication date:
- 2016-04-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-04-08
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0167-2681
- Source identifiers:
-
584894
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:584894
- UUID:
-
uuid:120f9299-0d9d-4148-a163-ab6d151b507b
- Local pid:
- pubs:584894
- Deposit date:
- 2017-05-16
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- West et al
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record