Events in London and Egypt in July 2005 – as well as, earlier, in New York and Bali, and, almost continuously, in Iraq – have refocused postcolonial attention on the nature of and justifications for political violence. For postcolonial critics this focus has become particularly sharp because of the pre-eminence which has historically been given to Leninist, Trotskyist, and, subsequently, Fanonist understandings of revolutionary and vanguardist terror as liberatory.1 Indeed, especially since the publication of Fanon’s influential The Wretched of the Earth (1961), which crucially urged an intensification of anti-colonial struggle beyond the Gandhian passive resistance of the 1920s-50s period, terror, or terrorist agitation, has been seen by a number of postcolonial critics as inherent to the anti-colonial condition.2

Following a line which seeks at least initially to interrogate such an assumption, this essay asks how postcolonial revolutionary thinking and history might add to and calibrate our understanding of the contemporary phenomenon of religious- and politically-inspired destruction of the status quo (threatened and actual), often named terror. Might a postcolonial perspective encourage us to fold open more nuanced historical and/or narrative dimensions of terror–dimensions that would allow us to plot diagnostic means-end processes, competing claims to space and time, and the motivations and roles of key agents (perpetrators, supporters, financial backers)? Might it, for example, allow us to configure what is called terror as – in certain contexts and at certain times -- a conflict over rival aspirations to identity and modernity, or to ‘purity’ and freedom?

Such questions assume a particular pertinence when refracted through the complex, iconic political legacy of the anti-apartheid, ‘rainbow-nation’ warrior Nelson Mandela. In the 1980s Mandela was of course widely branded a terrorist by western world leaders like Reagan, Thatcher and Dick Cheney for his 1950s and 60s endorsement of political violence. Now, however, in the twenty-first century, he is acclaimed as a moral colossus of our time. As retired first President of a democratic South Africa he stands as one of the prominent public figures of our time. As retired first President of a democratic South Africa he stands as one of the prominent figureheads and spokespeople for a very different cluster of issues, represented most recently by his support for the Make Poverty History Campaign, various AIDS charities, and Drop the Debt and education for Africa programmes. This marked shift in the global understanding (and postmodern branding) of Mandela forces us to ask what the 1980s leaders recognized or misrecognized in his political approach that passed for terror? Was terror in Mandela’s case, and the case of other anti-colonial, nationalist freedom fighters, like Ché Guevara, Amilcar Cabral, or the Mau Mau guerrillas, another word for antinomian agitation and political commitment ‘unto death’, or was it something rather different? In other words, could the 1950s Mandela, advocate of sedition and sabotage, still be called a terrorist today?

It is widely accepted that at least one dominant genealogy of the contemporary understanding of terror – of a predominantly revolutionary, at times anarchist, strand - leads more or less directly back to anti-statist, Romantic-period, markedly nationalist thought.3 Indeed, as Margaret Scanlan elaborates in Plotting Terror, the terrorist=romantic equivalence has been taken as a truism, if a largely unexamined one, across the twentieth century.4 This romantic genealogy connects with ideas of terror as the disparate, unresolved, and inchoate, as chaos and welter, and of the nation and the self as expressive, formative channels for such disparate energy. The nation, especially the emergent nation (in certain contexts also the community, including the religious community), defined as an idealized self, the quintessential soul of the people, is classically seen as making certain strong demands upon the individual. From the nationalist the nation insists upon an ultimate, destructive, even terroristic, sacrifice: through such sacrifice, the true nationalist, still according to this canonical definition, comes fully into his or her own.

In relation to a definitive anti-colonial and nationalist leader like Mandela the central question is how, one-and-a-half centuries on from the French revolution, fifty years later than the trend-setting extremist period in Bengal, nationalist/anti-statist ideas translated into a willingness to advocate and organize political violence. Was terror in his case regarded, as it had been before, as either the perfection and/or the exacting, self-sacrificial obliteration of the expressive nationalist self? Or, alternatively, do the belated and ongoing romantic/nationalist tendencies of Mandela’s anti-colonialism make it possible to write a less abrupt and interruptive (more diagnostic) narrative of political overcoming accompanied by violent resistance into the post/colonial context?
Might this permit a clearer understanding of what is at stake for the different parties when an act of terror is committed?

From when he first became politically active till his 1962 imprisonment, Mandela, influenced by his early reading of Lenin and Guevara, described his position as anti-imperial, nationalist and pro-justice. His role, he said, was that of a struggler and soldier for the African people, and his implacable opponent that particular form of imperialism that in South Africa expressed itself as white supremacy. Freedom and self-expression for black Africans were his overmastering goals. If Mandela’s political career is viewed as a triptych -- divided into the three periods of early radicalism, incarceration, and humanist reconciliation -- it is this first third of the story which forms the primary though not exclusive focus here. This period, in which he formulated his controversial position on armed struggle, was also the period, significantly, on which rested the high regard in which he, the spearhead of Umkhonto we Sizwe itself, was held among his primary supporters, black Africans.

With this established, it is worth acknowledging that there are of course good reasons for disputing rightist definitions of Mandela’s support for political violence as terrorism, especially according to currently dominant definitions of terror as unannounced and calamitous violence inflicted upon civilians or soft targets. Yet it is equally important to acknowledge that his support for armed resistance does conform to traditional, pre-9/11, less judgmental notions of militant nationalism. For example, Peter Heehs in an important discussion of the use of explosives and assassinations during the period of radical, anti-colonial resistance in Bengal, defines terror as the ‘use of violence [in limited and controlled forms, against an oppressive state] … to bring about political, social or other change’. This response was effective at the time of colonialism for several reasons: it demonstrated the vulnerability of the apparently unassailable enemy; it broadcast the aims of the anti-colonial cause; and it powerfully asserted historical agency in situations where this was suppressed or denied.

It was Mandela, a convinced supporter of all such objectives, who, alone among the prominent anti-imperial leaders who resisted the British Empire in the second half of the twentieth century (in particular among those who then came to power), took up and passionately defended the call to arms. He was the founding leader of -- and name-giver to -- the armed wing of the ANC (African National Congress), Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), which was formally constituted in 1961 following first the Sharpeville massacre and then, more immediately, the apartheid government’s repression of a general strike. He was furthermore instrumental in configuring Umkhonto we Sizwe’s approach to retaliatory political violence, often against the advice of ANC elder statesmen including his mentor Albert Luthuli, a Nobel Peace Prize holder.

Even so, though Mandela is certainly convinced of the efficacy of terror in this early period, there are significant pathways along which he departs from and striates the conventional thinking, not only later in his career, but also in this first openly antinomian and combative phase. Before examining the latter more closely, it is helpful to begin by touching on the post-1990 period, what might be termed the tough-talking but reconciliatory walk into freedom, which grew out of the time of incarceration, hiatus, and regrouping of political ideas and resources. In this third period, in consequence probably of his changing responses to historical developments in the decolonizing world or ‘postcolony’ which unravelled during the period of imprisonment, Mandela’s views on retaliation and violence in particular noticeably changed. Encapsulated in the photograph in which he is pictured standing beside the prosecutor Percy Yutar who presided at the Rivonia Trial, the change is probably overaccentuated in the largely commemorative studies of the ANC in general and Mandela in particular published since 1990. Yet it is true that Mandela’s later ideas do shift markedly away from the Fanonist, and back towards what Robert Young amongst others calls his early Gandhism; from self-expression through polarization and destruction of the colonizer, to self-expression through incorporation. This might also be seen, in similarly idealist terms, as his turn or return to other-centred, dialogic ethics, or to an embedded understanding of the good – of social responsibility and generosity – partially derived from his traditionalist Xhosa upbringing; in short, to elements that were latently present in the early politics. Importantly, too, however, this late shift never involved a complete renunciation of political violence or of his burning focus on nationalist selfhood.

In his recourse to a moral authority beyond that of the nation-as-culmination-of-the-self, Mandela’s post-1990 approach is interestingly reminiscent of remarks from the later Levinas, in the 1990s, on the ineffable responsibility for the other (whether mass, people, or even enemy). In ‘Violence of the Face’, for example, an interview in which Levinas considers the implications of ‘the radical for the other’ for justice and violence in the state, he reaches for an understanding of such ‘dis-interestedness’, whether realized within or outside of social organization:

I don’t say that all is for the best, and the idea of progress doesn’t seem to me very reliable. But I think that responsibility for the other man, or, if you like, the epiphany of the human face, constitutes a penetration of the crust, so to speak, of ‘being persevering in its being.'
The other, he makes clear, is not ours to dispose of; its claim on being is primary: on this cornerstone his concept of justice rests.

Mandela’s emphasis through the 1990s, despite his tactical fighting talk and threatened recourse to violence should negotiation fail, was likewise consistently on such perseverance of being. Perseverance for him, too, involved the recognition of the humanity even of the opposition; of what might be called the affirming moral power of the other. If with strategic modifications he thus continued to develop implications rising from the rousing statement he issued in 1985 when refusing the apartheid government’s conditional offer of release: ‘Your freedom [that is, of the South African people] and mine cannot be separated’. Derrida in his seminar Of Hospitality, strongly marked by Levinas’s influence, speaks in notably comparable ways of the testing obligations of hospitality that ‘the foreigner’ or other demands of the subject. Significantly, it is according to Levinas in order to maintain this utter recognition of the other, and not to obliterate the other in order to realize the self, that violence in and by the state may alone be justified:

[T]he origin of the meaningful in the face of the other, confronted with the actual plurality of human beings – calls for justice and knowledge; the exercise of justice demands courts of law and political institutions, and even, paradoxically a certain violence that is implied in all justice. Violence is originally justified as the defense of the other, of the neighbour (be he a relation of mine, or my people!), but is violence for someone [emphasis in text].

The shift in Mandela’s political philosophy I am sketching here may be understood in these terms therefore as a shift from violence for the self-as-nation, to violence for or on behalf of the numinous other. But to circle back to his early years and establish some form of continuity within the trajectory of Mandela’s career, the idea of action ‘on behalf of’ - especially here on behalf of the nation or people – merits more attention. How in the manichean anti-colonial context did such action produce justifications of armed resistance?

‘Own struggle and sacrifice’: retaliation and the expressive self

When in early 1962 following the collapse of the Treason Trials Mandela travelled around Africa, including Frantz Fanon’s adopted country Algeria, to canvas prevailing ideas on military resistance, he was already convinced that the only remaining recourse for the oppressed South African majority was violent retaliation. The path towards this decision had been a difficult one, necessitating any number of delicate negotiations with more openly Gandhian and avowedly Christian ANC leaders, but after Sharpeville the previous year and various government repressions culminating in moves against the planned strike in May 1961, Mandela saw no alternative. Vis-à-vis the uncompromising overlordship of the suprematist state, the ANC’s Gandhian arsenal of non-cooperative responses had, he believed, been exhausted. Indeed, its Gandhian agenda had never been sharply formulated whether as a derivative or an adaptive politics. Moreover, as he, Walter Sisulu and others realized, in the wake of the formation of the Pan-African Congress a few years earlier, it was important, too, to offer leadership to the more militant and tear-away younger groupings within the ANC who might otherwise organize violently on their own. In Mandela’s carefully coded words: ‘[I]t is first and foremost by our own struggle and sacrifice inside South Africa itself that victory over White domination and apartheid can be won’. And again:

The freedom movement in South Africa believes that hard and swift blows should be delivered with the full weight of the masses of the people, who alone furnish us with one absolute guarantee that the freedom flames now burning in the country shall never be extinguished.

The address from which these quotations are drawn, entitled ‘A Land Ruled by the Gun’, was given in January 1962 in Addis Ababa in Mandela’s capacity as the leader of the ANC delegation to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. Mandela’s intention in giving the talk, in asking a neatly pitched rhetorical question about what role freedom movements were to play (which immediately precedes the second quotation), was to explain and justify to other African political groups and parties the ANC’s controversial turn to violence. The Mark Antony-like question in full is: ‘Can anyone, therefore, doubt the role that the freedom movements should play in view of this hideous conspiracy?’

What is especially revealing about the speech is how, much like Aurobindo Ghosh in 1900s Calcutta, very much like Fanon in his own conference address to African leaders ‘Concerning Violence’, Mandela, an admirer of Julius Caesar, moves rhetorically through the different stages of increasing repression the African majority has suffered. Following on from this steady build-up the only answer to the question about the role of the freedom movements is clear. No one can doubt that hard and swift blows must be delivered; it is undeniable
that freedom’s flames must be released. As Fanon would have earnestly agreed, through the medium of a transformative, self-making violence the black man must now lay claim to and achieve his humanity. Significantly however in view of his concern to striate his public’s understanding of political violence, Mandela divided retaliation into four categories of incremental intensity: sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism against civilians, and open revolution. Even at this stage he urged that the first alone should be developed.

It was in the early 1960s therefore that Mandela decisively if still in qualified terms came out in favour of violent political retaliation on behalf of the people. However it is possible to trace the build-up to this position, always configured in the name of the oppressed, the nation unable to realize itself, across the preceding decade. Already from the early 1950s Mandela had marked himself out as a powerful young leader who, growing impatient with the ANC’s widely championed non-violent (and elite-driven) methods, advised and supervised the restructuring of the grass-roots organization of Congress. Such restructuring would, it was thought even at the time, help prepare the ground for a movement of underground insurgency based on small, highly disciplined cells should this ever become necessary. At meetings he was to be heard urging that Congress move beyond speeches and resolutions for the compelling nationalist reason that leaders should give expression to the ‘mass movement’ of the people just as a Romantic poet might channel the forces of nature. In a notorious 1953 address he was heard saying that ‘violence was the only weapon that could destroy apartheid’. The speech was punctuated with revolutionary songs inviting the people to take up weapons against their enemies, and included the insistent Amandhla ngwethu nobungcwalisa nabo bobethu (power is ours, so is justice).19 Power in this song is noticeably primary to justice and, even if implicitly, inseparable from retaliatory violence.

In view of his anti-colonial radicalism if not proto-Fanonist militancy during the 1950s decade, it would seem persuasive to read significance into the fact that Mandela established the Spear of the Nation grouping in the same year Fanon published The Wretched of the Earth, 1961. Yet, as regards Fanon’s direct influence on Mandela, tempting as it is to posit in the light of their joint commitment to armed struggle, it is unlikely that Mandela having no French would have read Fanon before his imprisonment. Then again, as Fanon gave his address on the importance of anti-colonial violence at the 1958 All-Africa People’s Conference, in response to Kwame Nkrumah’s advocacy of positive action stopping short of violence, it is likely that Mandela would have been exposed to his ideas, especially on his horizon-expanding Pan-African tour. He explicitly refers both to the 1958 Conference and to Nkrumah’s defensive 1960 Positive Action conference in ‘A Land ruled by the gun’. He would further have agreed with Fanon that colonial brutality had effectively exhausted the options available to non-violence. Such brutality had been all too recently graphically demonstrated at Sharpeville where police fired on a peaceful protest, an incident to which Mandela refers in the 1962 talk. The Spear of the Nation manifesto, released in December 1961 following its first acts of sabotage, is certainly clear and unequivocal on the Fanonist imperative of retaliatory violence as a means of obliterating the manichean politics of the colonial state: ‘The people’s patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come in South Africa’.20

I will return to that question of choice – to submit or to fight – in a moment. But first it is worth asking what it is that gives the oppressed colonized subject the agency and self-motivation to be able to rally back from being brought low. The answer to this will by now be fairly obvious. It is violence itself. Anti-colonial violence is the definitive expression of the anti-colonial subject: through it the oppressed reclaim their humanity. In order to give a clearer picture of what is meant by this, it is helpful to look more closely at the romantic expressivism that is entailed by extremist nationalism.

The Romantic (thinker or activist), according to the identikit that Charles Taylor supplies, affirms the truth of the self, ‘the rights of the individual, of imagination, and of feeling’, against the classic stress on rationalism.21 The Romantic does so because he posits nature as an inner source, which manifests itself through intuition and/or inner conviction. The self, like the work of art, therefore, is that which both bodies forth and actualizes this inner source. But the implications of, in Taylor’s phrase, ‘radical individuation’, extend, too, beyond the self, to the notion of the people or the nation as possessing a self or identity. They extend therefore to the idea of national culture as at once articulating and defining something specific and special about that people, its spirit, character or soul. National culture therefore is to national spirit as aesthetic object is to the creative imagination.

To Mandela, as to so many other postcolonial nationalists, there would be nothing surprising or counter-intuitive about such ideas, including that concern with the expression and manifestation of the nation’s inner self. The national impulse, he would have agreed, requires the shaping force of national culture and of political freedom to be transfigured. However, he would further have recognized, it can happen that expression is baulked or trammeled by political and cultural repression, as in colonialist 1950s South Africa; it can happen that all creative and progressivist avenues of articulation are closed down. The state of the nation is one of turmoil;
everyone violence and lawlessness break out, including in the home. In this state other modes of self-definition have to be explored.

At this point my exposition departs from Taylor, who is not specifically concerned with such blockages, or indeed with nationalism, which he does however mention as expressive of the expressivist turn. Like Mandela I also move away from Gandhi who in his preoccupation with strategies of self-denial – of self-making through self-denial – is perhaps less of an expressive romantic than his one-time emulator, Mandela. For Gandhi, to resort to the tools and strategies of the oppressor is to become like him. By contrast, Mandela in 1961, confronted with the prospect of the frustrated selfhood of the black South African, finds there are only two choices for the self-denied oppressed, and one is a bad one. It is only later, in his third phase, as earlier, that the demands of the self are resolved vis-à-vis what Spivak calls an underived – or Levinasian – otherness.

The choices are, as was seen, ‘submit or fight’. To submit means that the national impulse must self-destruct and be entirely cancelled. Yet this is unthinkable. The alternative – and it is one for which numbers of protestors and radicals since have been labeled terrorists – is to take up arms. It is to manifest through struggle, to resort to a self-defining and disciplined counter-violence. For Fanon certainly this was the only available path. Against Hannah Arendt’s concern in On Violence to find a distinction between Fanon’s understandings of violence and of politics (and so to claim him for her ‘party’), there lies the sheer clamour of his enthusiasm for transformative violence. In struggle, especially perhaps in self-sacrifice, Mandela and Fanon would agree, the resisting self that is responsive to its inner nationalist impulses becomes fully itself, a loyal nationalist. It submits to the desire of the people for radical change as if to a force of nature, yet it also shapes and guides that force.

But it may not be self-sacrifice alone that is involved, transfiguring and seductive as this may seem. Martyrdom is definitely a definitive mode of romantic nationalist retaliation. As examples we need only think of the Young Irelanders, or Easter 1916, or nationalists across Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. For Mandela in 1961, not only were his colleagues and superiors in some respects grooming him for martyrdom, but he himself also openly welcomed the prospect of giving up his life for the ideal of freedom, as he famously said during his summing up at the Rivonia Trial in 1964. It is perhaps worth hearing these words again and noting how dichotomous this freedom fighter’s vision and choices are:

I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

However if the anti-colonial goal is self-realisation, then the achievements of self-sacrifice for the individual, which are by definition transitory, will finally be unsatisfactory. For the nation self-sacrifice may provide useful if exacting myths; for the individual political involvement and expression are summarily ended. Martyrdom thus makes for powerful propaganda, yet twinned with it as a mode of retaliatory counter-violence is an approach that is altogether more diachronic and less self-destructive. It is anticipated in the accent that Mandela lays above on harmony. To continue the earlier analogy with the artwork as an expressive vehicle, against the moment of transfiguration offered by the poem or the white-heat act of self-sacrifice, this approach presents struggle rather as a narrative of repeated, disciplined acts of violence, a kind of reverse-terrorism. This narrative may manifest as a geometric progression or a cycle but is ultimately aimed at a distinct, resolving conclusion – harmony, equality. In saying this I depart from those critics who regard narrative, especially postmodern narrative, as a mode either imbued with and/or consequent upon terror. Instead I am concerned rather with the interrogative yet ultimately constructive forms of the postcolonial narrative, which assert agency and seek justice, often against political odds. A specific analogy for Mandela’s reverse-terrorism lies, for example, in the story of the Mandela-esque Dad character in Okri’s The Famished Road, whose struggle with his godlike opponent often threatens to obliterate him completely, yet who repeatedly makes sure, at times through sheer will-power, to return to fight another day.

Embellishing this narrative analogy, it is important to remember that, having endorsed armed struggle as an available and powerful response, Mandela’s recommendation was firmly that the ANC stick to sabotage, the first stage of retaliation, for the foreseeable future. Any shift from this position would require further soul-searching, consultation and discussion. In other words, if there is a narrative that outlines Mandela’s change of heart at this time, it is one of incremental progression towards open violence and revolution. It is by following through this narrative of stage-by-stage reverse-terrorism that the black South African nation in Mandela’s eyes might begin slowly and painfully to manifest and express itself.
As I move to my conclusion I must however once again probe the reasons for calling Mandela’s expressivist turn to violence in the years prior to his incarceration terrorist, or fully terrorist? It is this concern to qualify which has produced my term reverse-terrorism. However the question that immediately rises from this hedging is whether terrorism can in fact be qualified and hence whether the act of terror as opposed to the gradual commitment to stage-by-stage retaliation can in fact be rendered as narrative. Is the mode of terrorism, defined as a dedication to extremes, to moments that change everything utterly, not intrinsically non-narrative? It would appear to lend itself more readily to the endlessly iterative modes of the film clip, the television spectacle. In any call for self-defining self-obliteration there is some resort to a concept of calamitously destructive, literally momentous and moment-bound terror. Indeed the attempt to narrate the political, cultural and conceptual processes that produce such terroristic responses could, according to this logic, be construed as in itself a deconstruction of terrorism, as a reverse-narrative of terror. Mandela himself stipulated at Rivonia that the limited violence the ANC had chosen to adopt they did not define as terrorism. His asseverations to the contrary, there are undeniable tinges of the romantic terrorist Fanon in Mandela’s 1960s support for violence as the realization and perfection of the oppressed; as the means through which the subaltern come into their own and express the freedom they have been denied. Mandela was after all a founder member of the Congress Youth League which as far back as 1944 adopted a militant, nationalist manifesto which even the Fanonist Biko in the 1970s would have found congenial. Beginning with the declaration that no nation could free an oppressed group other than the group itself, the CYL manifesto committed itself to the new spirit of nationalism among the people and proclaimed that spirit as its leader. The CYL it further stated should tap into popular militancy to develop its strategies and give expression and guidance to that spirit. Mandela always maintained that loyalty to the nation took precedence over loyalty to an individual. He continued to do so in fact through the 1990s and into the new twenty-first century.

Then again, there is, even so, substance to Mandela’s qualification of the term terrorism, much as this was made in an apartheid court of law. Mandela’s rationale of political violence, especially as regards its incremental structure, where each stage is a step towards an increasingly embattled, yet increasingly more assertive national self-expression, could equally be viewed as oppositional to the self-immolating moment of terror. To Mandela’s mind it is exclusively by means of this stage-by-stage process that greater autonomy and hence freedom and selfhood can be achieved. In short, he understands terror in both its modes, as instantaneous self-immolation, its poetic mode, and as incremental or reverse-terrorism, its narrative mode. Significantly, in his pre-1964 political speeches he drew inspirational examples from narratives of freedom struggle and not of martyrdom from elsewhere in the world.

For Mandela, in sum, even at his most fiery and romantic, the narrative of incremental terrorism operates on two fronts. It resists or postpones the Fanonist commitment to immediate and utter change yet is also pitted against the vulgar fictions of the colonial state, as Mbembe, for one, has defined them. 28 This is what Mandela’s statements and speeches during this period, all at once epigraphic, telegraphic and empirical, keep insisting upon. They open out and write into the discrete, successive moments of destructive violence of the colonial state, and also of its opposition, anti-colonial terrorism, the stochastic yet ongoing narrative of a movement, its complex motives of solidarity and rebellion. They recount decisions agonizingly taken, reversed, revised, made again; they explore what is at stake for the parties involved, for families and communities when such decisions are taken. They speak, too, of the overmastering hunger for freedom and justice and of the avenues of peace that continue to run alongside those of war.

Biographical Note

Elleke Boehmer is the Hildred Carlile Professor of Literatures in English at Royal Holloway, University of London. Her publications include Empire, the National and the Postcolonial: Resistance in Interaction 1890-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Stories of Women: Gender and Narrative in the Postcolonial Nation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), Colonial and Postcolonial Literature, 2nd ed. (1995; Oxford University Press, 2005), as well as three novels. She is the co-organizer of a British Academy-funded workshop, ‘Terror and the Postcolonial’, to run in 2006.

Notes
See, as a quintessential example, Leon Trotsky, *The Defence of Terrorism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929).


4 Margaret Scanlan, *Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001), passim.


6 To reinforce this point it is noteworthy that fundamentalist US preachers like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson with impunity brand the Prophet Muhammed himself a terrorist. See Malise Ruthven, ‘An Unnecessary Clash’, *TLS* 5339 (29 July 2005), p.25.


8 Luthuli was himself as President-General of the ANC banned in 1956 for inciting treason.


18 ‘Concerning Violence’ now of course appears as the lengthy and controversial first chapter of Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp.27-84.


22 See Mandela, *No Easy Walk to Freedom*, p.188.


