Conference item icon

Conference item

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms.

Abstract:

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the wellknown problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of ( p n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabil...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
  • (Version of record, pdf, 341.8KB)

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
Expand authors...
Danish National Research Foundation More from this funder
Publisher:
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Publisher's website
Journal:
Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS Journal website
Volume:
abs/1502.03849
Host title:
Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, May 9–13, 2016, Singapore
Publication date:
2016-05-09
Acceptance date:
2016-05-09
Source identifiers:
578436
ISBN:
9781450342391
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:578436
UUID:
uuid:028f3950-c608-437c-a9e0-9fe0f5e925b6
Local pid:
pubs:578436
Deposit date:
2016-04-04

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP