ORA Thesis: "The logic of ballistic missile defence procurement in Japan (1994-2007): from hedging through self-imposed restraints toward hedging from the position of military strength" - uuid:73b6dc56-e10b-4bc4-abba-0abcd3a0d204

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Reference: Maxim Shabalin, (2011). The logic of ballistic missile defence procurement in Japan (1994-2007): from hedging through self-imposed restraints toward hedging from the position of military strength. DPhil. University of Oxford.

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Title: The logic of ballistic missile defence procurement in Japan (1994-2007): from hedging through self-imposed restraints toward hedging from the position of military strength

Abstract:

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan’s preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US.

The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites.

A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks.

On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely the Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions.

The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.


Digital Origin:Born digital
Type of Award:DPhil
Level of Award:Doctoral
Awarding Institution: University of Oxford
About The Authors
institutionUniversity of Oxford
facultyHumanities Division - Oriental Studies Faculty
oxfordCollegeMerton College
fundingHill Foundation
 
Contributors
Prof Ian Neary More by this contributor
RoleSupervisor
 
Bibliographic Details
Issue Date: 2011
Copyright Date: 2011
Identifiers
Urn: uuid:73b6dc56-e10b-4bc4-abba-0abcd3a0d204
Item Description
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Member of collection : ora:thesis
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Copyright Holder: Maxim Shabalin
Access Condition: Restricted: Full content available from 2014-06-5 (ISO 8601). Embargo lifted 2011-11-07 at author's request
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