ORA Article: "Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability" - uuid:60042f77-46ca-4f0a-8e81-599467561d02




Links & Downloads


Reference: Antony Eagle, (2004). Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability. Erkenntnis, 60 (3), 371–416.

Citable link to this page:
Title: Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability

Abstract: I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.

Publication status:Published
Peer Review status:Peer reviewed
Version:Accepted Manuscript
Notes:Citation: Eagle, A. (2004). 'Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability', Erkenntnis, 60(3), 371–416. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
About The Authors
institutionUniversity of Oxford
facultyHumanities Division - Philosophy Faculty
oxfordCollegeExeter College
Bibliographic Details
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers (now Springer)
Publisher Website: http://www.springer.com/
Host: Erkenntnis see more from them
Volume: 60
Issue: 3
Extent: 371–416
Issue Date: 2004-May
Copyright Date: 2004
Issn: 0165-0106
Eissn: 1572-8420
Urn: uuid:60042f77-46ca-4f0a-8e81-599467561d02
Item Description
Type: Article: post-print;
Language: en
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Member of collection : ora:articles
Alternate metadata formats
Copyright Holder: Kluwer Academic Publishers (now part of Springer Netherlands)
Terms of Use: Click here for our Terms of Use